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Abstract 
Several researchers have pointed out that narcissism can have detrimental consequences for 
other people and society (e.g., Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Twenge & Campbell, 2009). 
Hence, it is surprising that little research has focused on how narcissism develops and how the 
environment influences the development of narcissism. The present dissertation investigated the 
assessment, dimensionality, and development of narcissism in early adulthood. 
To pave the way for research on the development of narcissism, Studies 1 and 2 investigated 
the assessment and dimensionality of narcissism. Study 1 examined the closeness to 
unidimensionality and measurement precision of the subscales of two narcissism questionnaires, 
the Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry Questionnaire (NARQ; Back et al., 2013) and the 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Hall, 1979). We assessed the closeness to 
unidimensionality and measurement precision of the two questionnaires using minimum rank 
factor analysis and item response theory, respectively, across three large samples from two 
different countries. 
Across the samples of Study 1, the two subscales of the NARQ showed high levels of 
closeness to unidimensionality and measurement precision. These result are in line with the two-
dimensional structure proposed by Back et al. (2013). This structure splits grandiose narcissism 
into assertive aspects (i.e., narcissistic admiration) and antagonistic aspects (i.e., narcissistic 
rivalry). Some NPI subscales, which are also believed to assess grandiose narcissism, also 
showed high levels of closeness to unidimensionality and measurement precision. Because these 
NPI dimensions were related to but distinct from the two NARQ dimensions, Study 1 indicated 
that there are more dimensions of grandiose narcissism than the two dimensions proposed by 
Back et al. (2013).  
Study 2 investigated how the various dimensions of narcissism, including dimensions of 
grandiose and vulnerable narcissism, are related to overclaiming bias. Overclaiming bias is a 
form of self-enhancement that is characterized by illegitimately claiming knowledge. In a large 
online sample, we modeled the various narcissism dimensions assessed with the NARQ, the NPI, 
and the Pathological Narcissism Inventory (Pincus et al., 2009) with a second-order factor 
model. The model contained three second-order factors: assertive narcissism, antagonistic 
narcissism, and vulnerable narcissism. The results showed that only assertive narcissism but not 
   
antagonistic or vulnerable narcissism were related to overclaiming bias. The fact that the various 
dimensions or second-order factors of narcissism were related differently to an external criterion 
buttresses the idea that there is a need to distinguish various kinds of narcissism. 
Study 3 investigated the mean-level development of narcissistic admiration from age 20 to 
30. Moreover, Study 3 researched how individual differences in the development of narcissistic 
admiration are related to studying economics at university and experiencing any of 30 life events 
(e.g., starting a new job or getting married). We analyzed longitudinal data from two samples 
from the TOSCA study (Transformation of the Secondary School System and Academic Careers 
study; Köller, Watermann, Trautwein & Lüdtke, 2004; Trautwein, Neumann, Nagy, Lüdtke, & 
Maaz, 2010). In both cohorts, the mean levels of narcissistic admiration barely changed. In 
contrast to our hypothesis, studying economics was not related to an increase in narcissistic 
admiration over time. That said, five life events (e.g., a negatively evaluated failing of an 
important exam or a positively evaluated change to another university/apprenticeship) were 
positively related to changes in narcissistic admiration during early adulthood. 
The results of the three studies are discussed with reference to previous studies and relevant 
theories. Implications are considered. Strengths and limitations are assessed. And directions for 
future research are suggested. The main takeaways of the dissertation are: Longitudinal research 
on narcissism needs to distinguish various dimensions or, at least, second-order factors of 
narcissism. Furthermore, certain experiences in early adulthood are related to the development of 
narcissistic admiration. 
 
  
 
   
Zusammenfassung 
Eine Reihe von Forschern hat aufgezeigt, dass Narzissmus für andere Menschen und die 
Gesellschaft abträglich sein kann (z.B., Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Twenge & Campbell, 
2009). Angesichts dessen überrascht es, dass sich bisher kaum Forschung damit beschäftigt hat, 
wie sich Narzissmus entwickelt und wie Umweltfaktoren die Narzissmus-Entwicklung 
beeinflussen können. Die vorliegende Dissertation untersucht die Erfassung, Dimensionalität und 
Entwicklung von Narzissmus im jungen Erwachsenenalter. 
Als Vorbereitung für die Forschung zur Narzissmusentwicklung untersuchten Studie 1 
und 2 zunächst die Erfassung und Dimensionalität von Narzissmus. Studie 1 überprüfte die 
Messgenauigkeit und die Nähe zur Eindimensionalität der Subskalen zweier 
Narzissmusfragebögen, dem Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry Questionnaire (NARQ; Back et 
al., 2013) und dem Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Hall, 1979). Die 
Messgenauigkeit und Nähe zur Eindimensionalität wurden mittels Item Response Theorie bzw. 
Minimum Rank Faktorenanalyse mit drei großen Stichproben (aus zwei verschiedenen Ländern) 
untersucht. 
Über die Stichproben hinweg zeigten die zwei NARQ-Subskalen ein hohes Niveau an 
Messgenauigkeit und Nähe zur Eindimensionalität. Diese Resultate entsprechen der 
zweidimensionalen Struktur, die Back et al. (2013) vorgeschlagen haben. Sie teilt grandiosen 
Narzissmus in assertive Aspekte (Narzisstische Bewunderung) und antagonistische Aspekte 
(Narzisstische Rivalität). Manche der NPI-Subskalen, die auch grandiosen Narzissmus messen, 
wiesen ebenfalls ein hohes Niveau an Messgenauigkeit und Nähe zur Eindimensionalität auf. 
Diese NPI-Dimensionen korrelierten zwar mit den NARQ-Dimensionen, waren aber trotzdem 
verschieden von diesen. Daher verdeutlichte Studie 1, dass grandioser Narzissmus aus mehr 
Dimensionen besteht als den zwei von Back et al. (2013) vorgeschlagenen. 
Studie 2 untersuchte, wie die verschiedenen Dimensionen von Narzissmus, einschließlich 
grandioser und vulnerabler Dimensionen, mit Overclaiming Bias zusammenhängen. 
Overclaiming Bias ist eine Form von Selbstüberschätzung, die durch das ungerechtfertigte 
Behaupten von Wissen gekennzeichnet ist. In einer großen Online-Umfrage wurden die 
verschiedenen Dimensionen von Narzissmus mittels NARQ, NPI und Pathological Narcissism 
Inventory (Pincus et al., 2009) erfasst und mittels Second-Order Faktormodell modelliert. Das 
   
Modell beinhaltete drei Faktoren zweiter Ordnung: assertiver Narzissmus, antagonisticher 
Narzissmus und vulnerabler Narzissmus. Die Resultate zeigten, dass nur assertiver Narzissmus, 
nicht aber antagonistischer und vulnerabler Narzissmus mit Overclaiming Bias zusammenhängt. 
Dass die verschiedenen Dimensionen bzw. Faktoren zweiter Ordnung von Narzissmus 
unterschiedlich mit einem externen Kriterium zusammenhingen, untermauert die Notwendigkeit, 
mehrere Arten von Narzissmus zu unterscheiden. 
Studie 3 untersuchte die Mittelwertentwicklung von Narzisstischer Bewunderung 
(Narcissistic Admiration) im Alter zwischen 20 und 30. Zusätzlich beschäftigte sich Studie 3 mit 
der Frage, inwiefern individuelle Unterschiede in der Entwicklung von Narzisstischer 
Bewunderung mit dem Studieren wirtschaftlicher Studienfächer und dem Erleben eines von 30 
Lebensereignissen (z.B. Beginn eines neuen Jobs oder Hochzeit) zusammenhängen. Wir 
analysierten längsschnittliche Daten von zwei Stichproben der TOSCA-Studie (Transformation 
des Sekundarschulsystems und akademische Karrieren Studie; Köller, Watermann, Trautwein & 
Lüdtke, 2004; Trautwein, Neumann, Nagy, Lüdtke, & Maaz, 2010). In beiden Kohorten 
veränderten sich die Mittelwerte von Narzisstischer Bewunderung kaum. Im Widerspruch zu 
unserer Hypothese hing das Studieren wirtschaftlicher Fächer nicht mit der Entwicklung von 
Narzisstischer Bewunderung zusammen. Allerdings hingen fünf Lebensereignisse (z.B. ein 
negativ bewertetes Scheitern bei einer wichtigen Prüfung und der positive bewertete Wechsel zu 
einer anderen Universität/Lehre) positiv mit der Veränderung in Narzisstischer Bewunderung 
zusammen. 
Die Resultate der drei Studien mit Bezug auf bisherige Studien und relevante Theorien 
diskutiert. Implikationen werden erläutert, Stärken und Schwächen beurteilt, und Richtungen für 
weitere Forschung aufgezeigt. Die wichtigsten Schlussfolgerungen der Dissertation sind: 
Längsschnittliche Narzissmus-Forschung sollte die verschiedenen Narzissmus-Dimensionen oder 
zumindest Faktoren zweiter Ordnung von Narzissmus unterscheiden. Außerdem hängen 
bestimmte Erfahrungen im frühen Erwachsenenalter mit der Entwicklung von Narzisstischer 
Bewunderung zusammen. 
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1. Introduction and Theoretical Framework 
In many industrialized countries, the priorities of the educational system are to improve 
useful skills and knowledge, whereas shaping students’ personality is not a priority. This is 
evident, for example, in the focus on reading, mathematics, science, and problem solving of most 
large-scale educational studies such as the Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA; OECD, 2013). Thus, this raises the question: Should the education system not also, as 
much as possible, attempt to shape the personality traits of people and teach them to be good 
citizens? Of course, you might immediately object by asking: What are good citizens? For 
example, is it better to have citizens with personalities characterized by obedience and 
compliance or personalities characterized by the tendency to disagree and think critically? The 
answer probably depends. But even if there are no easy answers to the questions of what 
constitutes good citizens and with what aim education should affect the personality traits of 
people, shall we therefore simply ignore the possibility that the educational system already plays 
a role in shaping people’s personality traits? The educational system probably shapes people’s 
personalities, and it does so regardless of what is intended or understood. Hence, we may as well 
gather information and study how the educational system and the environment in general are 
related to the development of personality traits. We may as well investigate how and why the 
educational system and specific aspects of the environment influence people’s characters and 
discuss later how the educational system should influence people’s characters and what we as a 
society want our citizens’ personalities to be like. 
The current dissertation aims to shed light on these large questions by investigating how 
studying economics at university and 30 life events shape the development of the personality 
trait narcissism1 in early adulthood. I decided to focus on the personality trait narcissism because, 
compared with other personality traits, its development has rarely been studied—which is 
surprising given that the consequences of narcissism for other people and society as a whole 
have often been bemoaned (e.g., Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Campbell & Buffardi, 2008; 
                                                 
 
1 Narcissism is conceptualized in this dissertation as a non-clinical personality trait that is dimensional and 
not categorical: People are believed to vary in narcissism along a continuum rather than some people 
(“narcissists”) are qualitatively distinct from others (“non-narcissists”). 
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Twenge & Campbell, 2009). Furthermore, I focus on early adulthood because previous studies 
have found that personality traits related to narcissism (e.g., social dominance) show strong and 
robust changes during early adulthood (e.g., Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006).  
This dissertation also addresses a second question that is in many ways a prerequisite for the 
investigation of the development of narcissism: How can we capture the individual differences in 
narcissism we perceive in everyday life, clinical contexts, and behavioral studies with a method 
that is able to withstand scientific scrutiny? In short, how should we assess narcissism? The 
question about the assessment of personality traits is as old as personality research itself. And it 
is an intermediate step in the process of investigating the development of narcissism. Study 1 of 
this dissertation thus compared two psychometric properties (i.e., closeness to unidimensionality 
and measurement precision) of two prominent self-report questionnaires that are commonly used 
to assess narcissism, the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Hall, 1979) and the 
Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry Questionnaire (NARQ; Back et al., 2013). Study 2 further 
clarified the assessment of narcissism by investigating the dimensionality of narcissism: how 
many dimensions there are, how the dimensions can be modeled, and how differently the 
different dimensions of narcissism are related to overclaiming bias (i.e., a form of self-
enhancement that is characterized by an illegitimate claim of knowledge).  
Finally, Study 3 focused on the development of narcissism in early adulthood and how 
studying economics at university and 30 life events are related to the development of narcissism. 
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1.1 The Personality Trait Narcissism and Its Origins in 
Psychoanalysis 
People are not all the same. They vary with regard to physical attributes as well as with 
regard to psychological characteristics. Some people are very expressive and talk a lot, whereas 
others prefer to keep their feelings and thoughts to themselves. Some people think they are good 
at mathematics, whereas others think mathematics is not their cup of tea. Some people react 
aggressively when provoked, whereas others are more composed in their reactions to 
provocations. Some people excel on intelligence tests; others perform poorly. These and similar 
individual differences in psychological qualities fall under the umbrella term “personality traits.” 
More abstractly defined, personality traits are relatively stable individual differences in the 
tendency to experience certain emotions, cognitions, behaviors, and motivations. This is a very 
broad definition of personality traits as it includes interests, values and motives, attitudes, self-
related concepts, various forms of abilities (e.g., cognitive or emotional), and broad factors of 
personality such as extraversion or conscientiousness (e.g., Asendorpf, 2007). It is important to 
note that personality traits are traits and not states: They are tendencies that are relatively stable 
across situations and over time. 
The personality trait narcissism has its origins in psychoanalytic theories. Sigmund Freud 
and other psychoanalytical thinkers derived the term “narcissism” from the Greek myth about 
narcissus who fell in love with his own reflection in a pond. In line with the myth, 
psychoanalysts have often defined narcissism as the condition of self-love at the expense of love 
for other people, which is also called “lack of object love” (e.g., Freud, 1914/2007; Kohut, 1966; 
Reich, 1960). That said, Freud used the term “narcissism” inconsistently throughout his writings, 
and it has been used inconsistently throughout the psychoanalytical literature in general.  
1.1.1 Freud’s Conceptualizations of Narcissism 
Three of Freud’s conceptualizations of narcissism have been especially influential on 
psychoanalysts and personality psychologists. First, Freud (1914/2007) conceptualized primary 
narcissism as an early-life self-love phase that everybody undergoes. Second, he conceptualized 
secondary narcissism as a defense mechanism by which one withdraws one’s libido from other 
7    
  
people onto the self (Freud, 1914/2007). Secondary narcissism was believed to be the 
consequence of disappointments related to unrequited love and narcissistic mortifications 
(“narzisstische Kränkungen”). Third, he conceptualized a narcissistic libidinal type. In Freud’s 
(1931/1955) text Libidinal Types, he sketched out three libidinal types: an erotic, a narcissistic, 
and a compulsive type. The following description of the narcissistic type has been frequently 
cited by personality psychologists as a foundational description of narcissism (e.g., Krizan & 
Herlach, 2017; Miller & Campbell, 2008):  
The subject’s main interest is directed to self-preservation; he is independent and not 
open to intimidation. His ego has a large amount of aggressiveness at its disposal, which 
also manifests itself in readiness for activity. In his erotic life loving is preferred above 
being loved. People belonging to this type impress others as being "personalities"; they 
are especially suited to act as a support for others, to take on the role of leaders and to 
give a fresh stimulus to cultural development or to damage the established state of affairs. 
(Freud 1931/1955, p. 3) 
 
Taken together, Freud’s influential conceptualizations of narcissism include (a) a normal 
infantile developmental phase, (b) a defense mechanism that leads to an increased self-focus, and 
(c) a personality characterized by a high degree of independence and dominance.  
Various psychoanalysts after Freud have also proposed diverse narcissism concepts. 
Going into detail about all of the narcissism concepts proposed by the psychoanalysts and 
psychoanalytical schools that followed Freud would go beyond the scope of this dissertation (for 
a collection of important conceptualizations of narcissism, see Morrison, 1986). Here, my aim is 
to summarize the narcissism concepts of two influential psychoanalysts besides Freud: Heinz 
Kohut and Otto F. Kernberg. Both are often referenced by personality psychologists and have 
influenced the notions of narcissism that exists in the field of personality psychology today. 
1.1.2 Kohut’s Forms and Transformations of Narcissism 
Building on Freud’s concepts of narcissism, Heinz Kohut (1966) distinguished two major 
forms of narcissism: the ego ideal and the narcissistic self (later called “grandiose self”; Kohut, 
1971). In an attempt to maintain the original perfection and omnipotence of the primary phase of 
narcissism, the child creates an idealized parental imago, which later becomes the ego ideal. The 
perfection and power of primary narcissism is initially projected onto the parent figure (i.e., 
idealized parental imago). After frustrating but inevitable object losses (e.g., death of parent, 
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absence of parent, withdrawal of affection due to physical or mental illness), the projection of 
perfection and power onto the idealized parental imago is brought back to the self by identifying 
with the parent (i.e., formation of the ego ideal). The ego ideal corresponds to the introjected 
qualities of the idealized parent: “Every shortcoming of the idealized parent leads to a 
corresponding internal preservation of the externally lost quality of the object [i.e., parent or 
other caregiver]” (Kohut, 1966, p. 65-66). The internalized values, standards, and ideals gain 
such an emotional importance (i.e., they arouse love and admiration) because the narcissism has 
passed through a cherished object before its reinternalization. When the person does not live up 
to this ego ideal, narcissistic tensions arise. 
The second form of narcissism, the narcissistic self, is a normal developmental 
achievement in infancy characterized by exhibitionistic drives and grandiose fantasies. These 
exhibitionistic drives must gradually become desexualized and subordinated to goal-directed 
activities and ambitions. This is achieved best through gradual frustrations combined with loving 
support (Kohut, 1966). Overt and covert attitudes of rejection and overindulgence by the 
caregiver (especially alterations between lack of support and overindulgence) can lead to 
disturbances according to Kohut (1966): “Instead of pleasurable confirmation of the value, 
beauty, and lovableness of the self, there is painful shame” (p. 70). These premature 
interferences with the narcissistic self might lead to long-lasting narcissistic vulnerabilities 
because grandiose fantasies are repressed and inaccessible to modifying influences.  
If the grandiosity of the narcissistic self … has been insufficiently modified because 
traumatic onslaughts on the child’s self-esteem have driven the grandiose fantasies into 
repression, then the adult ego will tend to vacillate between an irrational overestimation 
of the self and feelings of inferiority and will react with narcissistic mortification to the 
thwarting of its ambitions. (Kohut, 1966, p. 68-69)  
 
More than many other psychoanalysts, Kohut (1966, 1971) pointed out that narcissism, if 
sublimated, can have positive consequences. The goal of therapy should not necessarily be to 
change narcissism into a love of others but the integration, strengthening, and reshaping of 
narcissistic structures. It is possible to harness narcissistic energies and drives by transforming 
narcissism into creativity, humor, empathy, and wisdom. 
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1.1.3 Kernberg’s Conceptualization of Narcissism 
Compared with Kohut, Kernberg placed more emphasis on the pathological nature of 
narcissism. Whereas Kohut viewed the narcissistic self as a fixation on a normal primitive self 
(i.e., an infantile normal form of narcissism), Kernberg viewed the narcissistic self (which he 
also called the “pathological grandiose self”) as part of a pathological structure, clearly different 
from infantile narcissism (Kernberg, 1974). For Kernberg (1970, 1974), the narcissistic self is a 
compensation for ego weakening effects of a primitive defense organization that is common to 
narcissism and borderline personality disorder. According to Kernberg, both narcissism and 
borderline personality are characterized by primitive defense mechanisms: splitting, denial, 
projective identification, omnipotence, and primitive idealization. The difference is that 
narcissistic patients show better impulse control and (on the surface) better social and 
occupational functioning than borderline patients. In fact, narcissistic personalities are often 
intensively ambitious and strive for brilliance, wealth, power, and beauty to get the external 
admiration and gratification they long for. However, careful observation of their work reveals 
superficiality and flightiness (Kernberg, 1970). Taken together, Kernberg saw more similarities 
between narcissism and borderline conditions than Kohut did. 
Another difference between Kohut and Kernberg was that Kernberg more strongly 
emphasized the presence of envy than Kohut did. According to Kernberg (1970, 1974), 
narcissistic patients are occupied by chronic and intense feelings of envy and defenses against 
such envy (i.e., devaluation of others, omnipotent control, and narcissistic withdrawal). 
That said, Kernberg (1970, 1974) stated that he agreed with Kohut on several descriptive 
features of narcissism: People with a narcissistic personality present an unusually large degree of 
self-absorption and self-reference in their interactions with other people. Although they lack 
interest in and empathy for others and although they have inflated self-views, they have a great 
need to be loved and admired by others. Their lack of empathy and their need for admiration go 
hand in hand with exploitative, manipulative, and controlling tendencies and a lack of trust, 
coldness, and ruthlessness. When they are disappointed or abandoned, they do not react with real 
sadness for the loss but with anger, resentment, and revengeful wishes. Some narcissistic patients 
report strong conscious feelings of insecurity and inferiority. Feelings of insecurity and 
inferiority may also alternate with feelings of greatness (Kernberg, 1970). 
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1.1.4 Narcissism in the Field of Personality Psychology 
In the last four decades, the various psychoanalytical and clinical conceptualizations of 
narcissism have made their way into the field of personality psychology. Psychoanalytical and 
clinical conceptualizations have influenced personality psychologists and their scale construction  
either directly (e.g., Hendin & Cheek, 1997; Murray, 1938) or indirectly (i.e., they influenced the 
description of narcissistic personality disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, which in turn influenced personality psychologists; e.g., Raskin & Hall, 1979; Raskin 
& Terry, 1988). All the same, narcissism has received more and more attention in the field of 
personality psychology in the last 30 years and can now be considered one of the most prominent 
personality traits along with the Big Five personality traits (i.e., extraversion, agreeableness, 
openness to experience, emotional stability, and conscientiousness). 
Narcissism has been defined in the field of personality psychology (and is defined in the 
current dissertation) as a nonclinical personality trait that describes individual differences in the 
tendency to desire agentic or ego goals (superiority, uniqueness, grandiosity, fame, status) above 
communal or non-ego goals (affiliation, tolerance, communal feelings; e.g., Campbell & Foster, 
2007; Crocker & Park, 2004; Miller & Campbell, 2008; Morf, Weir, & Davidov, 2000; Wink, 
1991).2 That said, as in the field of psychoanalysis, how exactly narcissism is defined depends on 
which personality psychologist you ask, as I will show in Chapter 1.2.  
Naturally, because the Big Five were constructed to cover the whole range of personality 
traits, the Big Five and narcissism show signs of redundancy (e.g., O’Boyle, Forsyth, Banks, 
Story, & White, 2014). Narcissism is uniquely characterized by an exceptionally strong drive for 
superiority, uniqueness, grandiosity, fame, status, and high self-esteem. Accordingly, the usual 
correlations between narcissism scales and any Big Five scales reach their maximum at around 
.40 to .50 (O’Boyle et al., 2014), which means that 16% to 25% of the variance in narcissism is 
shared with variance in extraversion, for example.  
                                                 
 
2 For example, Miller and Campbell (2008) stated: “Both academicians and clinicians think of the 
prototypical narcissist as being highly dominant, agentic, and antagonistic” (p. 470-471). On the other 
hand, findings by Besser and Priel (2010) suggest that only people high in grandiose narcissism but not 
people high in vulnerable narcissism care more about achievements than about interpersonal 
relationships. 
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1.2 The Assessment and Dimensionality of Narcissism 
A fundamental question in personality research is how a respective personality trait is to 
be assessed. Both narcissism and the Big Five personality traits are assessed via self-report 
questionnaires. However, narcissism and the Big Five have different origins, and this has 
important implications for their assessment as I will illustrate in the following by comparing how 
narcissism questionnaires and the Big Five questionnaires were developed.  
The Big Five personality traits were retrieved via a lexical approach (for a review, see 
e.g., John & Srivastava, 2000). Researchers inspected dictionaries to derive a large number of 
adjectives that describe psychological traits and characteristics of people. Participants rated how 
much each adjective applied to themselves or to a peer. These ratings were analyzed via factor 
analysis. The results revealed that five factors could explain a large number of the associations 
found among the adjective ratings.  
An advantage of the lexical approach is that it has led to a five-factor structure that is 
widely accepted in the field of personality psychology—although there is some debate about 
whether there are five or six underlying factors (see e.g., Lee & Ashton, 2004). Accordingly, 
there are a number of established and well-validated Big Five questionnaires that all measure 
more or less the same five dimensions. Examples of such questionnaires are the Big Five 
Inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999) or the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (Costa & 
MacCrae, 1992).  
The lexical approach also has some disadvantages. The lexical approach is not based on a 
theory, and it does not provide a theory (e.g., John & Srivastava, 1999). Furthermore, the lexical 
approach depends on concepts and words used by lay people, and these tend to show various 
(language) biases (e.g., Trofimova, 2014). 
Narcissism has been able to avoid some of these limitations. Narcissism has a stronger 
theoretical foundation, and its assessment depends less on concepts and words used by lay 
people because it was not retrieved via a lexical approach. Instead, psychoanalytical theories 
suggested the concept of narcissism (Chapter 1.1). The frequent reference to narcissism by 
clinical psychologists led to the introduction of narcissistic personality disorder into the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-III (DSM-III). On the basis of the 
behavioral criteria for the narcissistic personality disorder outlined in the DSM-III, Raskin and 
 INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 12 
   
Hall (1979) developed the most used self-report questionnaire on narcissism, the Narcissistic 
Personality Inventory (NPI; see also Raskin & Terry, 1988).  
However, the reliance on diverse psychoanalytical theories (Chapter 1.1) and the DSM-
III rather than on the lexical approach has also produced some issues. Most striking, no 
consensus has been reached on the dimensionality of narcissism. This lack of consensus on 
dimensionality has manifested itself in the ongoing debate on the factor structure of the NPI and 
in the great number and variety of narcissism questionnaires that have been developed before 
and after the introduction of the NPI in 1979. 
1.2.1 Narcissism is not Unidimensional 
In the past, narcissism has often been viewed as a unidimensional construct. Accordingly, 
several developers have tried to develop narcissism scales that are unidimensional (e.g., Raskin 
& Terry, 1988). However, these views and attempts have not been able to withstand empirical 
testing.  
A first indication of its multidimensionality was that narcissism was found to be 
correlated with a heterogeneous set of outcomes. Researchers have shown that narcissism is 
related to psychological health (Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004) and 
positive self-views (Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002). At the same time, narcissism has 
been found to be related to aggressive behavior (Golmaryami & Barry, 2009), fragile self-views 
(Thomaes et al., 2010), emotional volatility (Besser & Zeigler-Hill, 2010), and dysfunctional 
relationships (Back et al., 2013).  
A second indication of the multidimensionality was that plenty of research has suggested 
that the NPI is multidimensional (e.g., Ackerman et al., 2011; Brown, Budzek, & Tamborski, 
2009; Exline, Baumeister, Bushman, Campbell, & Finkel, 2004; Zeigler-Hill & Besser, 2013): 
Factor analyses of the NPI items have repeatedly revealed more than one factor. Thus, several 
authors have proposed a multifactorial model of the NPI (e.g., Ackerman et al., 2011; Brown, 
2009; Emmons, 1987; Kubarych, Deary, & Austin, 2004).  
The third indication was that different NPI factors have shown different correlations with 
external criteria (e.g., Ackerman et al., 2011; Brown et al., 2009; Exline et al., 2004; Zeigler-Hill 
& Besser, 2013). For example, the Entitlement/Exploitativeness facet of the NPI was not 
correlated with self-esteem, whereas other NPI facets were positively correlated with self-esteem 
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(Ackerman et al., 2011). Similarly, some narcissism researchers have found that different 
narcissism scales are related differently to life outcomes. For example, Cramer and Jones (2008) 
found that one type of narcissism (“autonomy”) measured at age 33 was positively related to 
well-being during subsequent years, whereas two other types of narcissism (“willfulness” and 
“hypersensitivity”; Wink, 1992) measured at age 33 were either negatively or not associated with 
subsequent well-being.  
As a consequence of all these findings, it has now been widely accepted in the field of 
personality psychology that narcissism is not a unidimensionality construct (e.g., Ackerman et 
al., 2011; Back et al., 2013; Miller et al., 2011; but see also studies on narcissism in childhood, 
e.g., Brummelman et al., 2015). 
1.2.2 Grandiose and Vulnerable Narcissism 
The most common way in which researchers have abandoned unidimensionality has been 
to distinguish grandiose narcissism from vulnerable narcissism. A forerunner of this trend was 
Paul M. Wink. Already in 1991, he extracted two orthogonal components in a principal 
component analysis of data from six narcissism scales (Wink, 1991). He named the two 
components Grandiosity-Exhibitionism and Vulnerability-Sensitivity. Grandiosity-Exhibitionism 
but not Vulnerability-Sensitivity was positively related to dominance, sociability, self-
acceptance, and aggression. Vulnerability-Sensitivity but not Grandiosity-Exhibitionism was 
positively related to defensiveness, anxiety, and vulnerability. Both dimensions were positively 
related to conceit, self-indulgence, and disregard of others.  
A few years afterwards, Hendin and Cheek (1997) with reference to an old 
psychoanalytically inspired scale, the Murray Narcissism Scale (1938), introduced the 
Hypersensitivity Narcissism Scale. The Hypersensitivity Narcissism Scale was developed as a 
counterpart to the NPI, which is dominated by the grandiose and exhibitionistic aspects of 
narcissism. Thus, Hendin and Cheek (1997) made sure the Hypersensitivity Narcissism Scale 
was uncorrelated with the total score of the NPI. Although the Hypersensitivity Narcissism Scale 
received little attention in the years after its introduction (Cheek, Hendin, & Wink, 2013), the 
hypersensitivity scale gained traction as a measure of vulnerable narcissism after Dickinson and 
Pincus (2003) and Cain, Pincus, and Ansellm (2008) advocated the distinction between 
grandiose and vulnerable narcissism.  
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Dickinson and Pincus (2003) advocated for the distinction because they observed that 
some people high in narcissism were less sensitive to interpersonal conflict (i.e., people high in 
grandiose narcissism) than other people high in narcissism (i.e., people high in vulnerable 
narcissism). Whereas people high in grandiose narcissism are outgoing and immune to the 
feedback and opinions of others and feast on their grandiose self-views, people high in 
vulnerable narcissism are shy, obsessed with the approval of others, and suffer from feelings of 
inadequacy, shame, and envy (see also Hendin & Cheek, 1997; Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 
1991; Pincus, Cain, & Wright, 2014; Zeigler-Hill, Clark, & Pickard, 2008). Accordingly, 
grandiose narcissism shows similarities to Freud’s (1931/1955) characterization of narcissism as 
a personality that is described by a high degree of independence and dominance (Chapter 1.1.1), 
whereas vulnerable narcissism shows similarities to Kernberg’s (1970, 1974) depiction of 
narcissism as a personality disorder that resembles borderline personality disorder (Chapter 
1.1.3; Miller & Campbell, 2008).  
On the basis of these and similar observations, Pincus et al. (2009) introduced the 
Pathological Narcissism Inventory,3 which placed more emphasis on vulnerable aspects of 
narcissism (see also Krizan & Herlache, 2017). Wright, Lukowitsky, Pincus, and Conroy (2010) 
fit a bifactor model to the Pathological Narcissism Inventory items and extracted two higher 
order factors: narcissistic grandiosity and narcissistic vulnerability. Even though these two 
higher order factors were (too) highly correlated (r = .81), the distinction between grandiose and 
vulnerable narcissism was further promoted by their study and questionnaire. 
                                                 
 
3 Pincus et al. (2009) and Pincus and Lukowitsky (2010) proposed that normal or adaptive narcissim 
should be distinguished from pathological or maladaptive narcissism: According to this view, 
normal/adaptive narcissism is researched in the field of social and personality psychology and measured 
by the NPI. Pathological/maladaptive narcissism is studied in the field of clinical psychology and 
measured by the Pathological Narcissism Inventory. Pincus and Lukowitsky (2010) stated: “the NPI does 
not assess subclinical [pathological] narcissism reflecting a continuum of functioning, but rather 
predominantly assesses nondistressed adaptive expressions of the construct [i.e., normal narcissism]” (p. 
85). This distinction might initially appear appealing, yet it brings about some ambiguities: Both the NPI 
and the Pathological Narcissism Inventory are mainly used in nonclinical populations. The NPI has often 
been described as measuring adaptive as well as maladaptive aspects of narcissism (e.g., Ackerman et 
al., 2011). Which outcomes are adaptive or maladaptive is debatable: Externalization problems 
associated with the NPI can be considered to be as maladaptive as the internalization problems 
associated with the Pathological Narcissism Inventory. Finally, how maladaptive a behavior is depends on 
the context. For example, the self-promotional behavior of people high in normal/adaptive narcissism 
might be seen as adaptive in job interviews as it increases the likelihood of getting a job (Paulhus, 
Westlake, Calvez, & Harms, 2013) but maladaptive in social situations with peers as it decreases the 
likability of the self-promoter (Scopelliti, Loewenstein, & Vosgerau, 2015). 
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Finally, Miller et al. (2011) extracted two factors (i.e., grandiose and vulnerable 
narcissism) in an exploratory factor analysis of the Hypersensitivity Narcissism Scale and the 
subscales of the NPI and the Pathological Narcissism Inventory. The two factors were weakly 
correlated (r = .23), and the nomological networks of the two factors were not very similar. 
These findings have further supported the distinction between grandiose and vulnerable 
narcissism. 
That said, the concept of vulnerable narcissism has struggled to take hold, especially in 
the field of social/personality psychology. First, the field of social/personality psychology has 
traditionally focused on grandiose rather than on vulnerable narcissism (e.g., Ackerman, Hands, 
Donnellan, Hopwood, & Witt, 2016; Miller & Campbell, 2008) presumably because the social 
consequences of vulnerable narcissism are less observable in social/personality studies than the 
social consequences of grandiose narcissism. This lack of distinct observable behavior is the 
reason why vulnerable narcissism is sometimes called covert narcissism (e.g., Hendin & Cheek, 
1997). Furthermore, some social/personality psychologists are hesitant to adopt the concept of 
vulnerable narcissism because it (sometimes) overlaps considerably with emotional stability 
(Miller et al., 2017; but see also Hendin & Cheek, 1997). 
1.2.3 Breaking up Grandiose Narcissism into Narcissistic Admiration and 
Rivalry 
The newest trend is to split up grandiose narcissism into two dimensions, which 
frequently leads to a three-dimensional construct of narcissism (i.e., two dimensions of grandiose 
narcissism and one dimension of vulnerable narcissism). This trend began with Back et al. 
(2013) who proposed the Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry Concept and Questionnaire 
(NARC and NARQ).  The NARC and NARQ break up grandiose narcissism into narcissistic 
admiration and narcissistic rivalry. Narcissistic admiration is characterized by assertive, 
charming, and self-promoting tendencies, whereas narcissistic rivalry refers to antagonistic, 
aggressive, and other-derogating tendencies.  
The breaking up of grandiose narcissism into narcissistic admiration and narcissistic 
rivalry came about in research on grandiose narcissism and other-rated popularity. Küfner, 
Nestler, and Back (2013) found that people high in grandiose narcissism (as measured by the 
NPI total score) displayed more assertive behavior, which was positively related to popularity 
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(after a group discussion). At the same time, people high in grandiose narcissism also displayed 
more antagonistic and hostile behavior, which was negatively related to popularity. Because the 
two pathways canceled each other out, grandiose narcissism was unrelated to other-rated 
popularity in their study. With the Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry Concept and 
Questionnaire (NARC and NARQ), Back et al. (2013) attempted to distinguish these two aspects 
and pathways of grandiose narcissism. 
When confronted with the NARC and NARQ, however, researchers were hesitant to 
abandon the two-dimensional view on narcissism (i.e., grandiose and vulnerable narcissism) and 
adopt a three-dimensional structure (i.e., narcissistic admiration, narcissistic rivalry, and 
vulnerable narcissism). Narcissistic rivalry was initially seen by some narcissism researchers as 
another manifestation of the vulnerable dimension of narcissism (e.g., Miller et al., 2014). 
However, more recent studies have recognized that there is a third dimension at play (Krizan & 
Herlache, 2017; Miller et al., 2016). For example, Miller et al. (2016) extracted three factors in a 
factor analysis on the 15 subscales of a very comprehensive narcissism questionnaire (i.e., the 
Five-Factor Narcissism Inventory; Glover, Miller, Lynam, Crego, & Widiger, 2012). The three 
narcissism factors that Miller et al. (2016) extracted were named Antagonism, which corresponds 
roughly to narcissistic rivalry; Neuroticism, which corresponds roughly to vulnerable narcissism; 
and Agentic Extraversion, which corresponds roughly to narcissistic admiration. 
Taken together, there has been much debate about the dimensionality of narcissism since 
its introduction into the field of personality psychology. At first, it was thought to be a 
unidimensional construct. Yet, recently it has become clear that it is at least a two-dimensional 
construct and most probably a three-dimensional construct. 
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1.3 The Consequences of Narcissism in the Educational Sphere 
Before I focus in Chapter 1.4 on how narcissism develops and how educational events 
and contexts might be related to its development, I will review the literature that has suggested 
how narcissism is related to educational processes and outcomes. Although an increasing body 
of research has emphasized the relevance of the Big Five personality traits for educational 
processes and outcomes (e.g., Damian, Su, Shanahan, Trautwein, & Roberts, 2015; Komarraju, 
Karau, Schmeck, 2009; Poropat, 2009; Spengler, Lüdtke, Martin, & Brunner, 2013), narcissism 
has rarely been studied in educational research, as Jonkmann, Becker, Marsh, Lüdtke, and 
Trautwein (2012) pointed out. Thus, we do not know much about the consequences of narcissism 
in the educational sphere. Nevertheless, here, I will review all the relevant literature to draw 
inferences on how narcissism should be related to four educationally relevant domains of 
behavior: (a) intellectual self-enhancement and academic self-concept, (b) academic motivation, 
(c) academic performance, and (d) social behavior in the classroom and other educational 
settings. 
Most of the past research on narcissism did not distinguish various dimensions of 
narcissism. Mostly, the NPI total score has been used as an indicator of narcissism. Because the 
NPI items measure narcissistic admiration rather than narcissistic rivalry and vulnerable 
narcissism (Back et al., 2013; see also Miller et al., 2016), most of the findings I will review 
apply more to narcissistic admiration than to narcissistic rivalry and vulnerable narcissism. 
Where possible, I will nevertheless try to distinguish these three dimensions of narcissism 
because these three dimensions of narcissism should show divergent relationships with core 
educational variables. For example, whereas narcissistic admiration has not been found to be 
related to academic performance (Jonkmann et al., 2012; see also Westerman, Bergman, 
Bergman, & Daly, 2011), narcissistic rivalry and vulnerable narcissism should be negatively 
related to academic performance—I will explain why below. As another example, in social 
groups in educational settings (e.g., project teams), narcissistic admiration should be associated 
with striving for social influence through self-promotion and assertiveness, whereas narcissistic 
rivalry should be associated with striving for social influence through other-derogation and 
intimidation. 
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1.3.1 Narcissism, intellectual self-enhancement, and academic self-concept 
Narcissism, especially narcissistic admiration, should be positively related to intellectual 
self-enhancement. Intellectual self-enhancement is the tendency to evaluate one’s own 
knowledge/ability in an unrealistically positive fashion. Unrealistically positive self-views are a 
central aspect of grandiose narcissism as measured by the NPI (e.g., Campbell & Foster, 2007). 
In fact, the NPI has sometimes even been called a measure of trait self-enhancement (Paulhus, 
Harms, Bruce, & Lysy, 2003). Thus, it is not surprising that the NPI total score has often been 
found to be associated with intellectual self-enhancement (Ames & Kammrath, 2004; Farwell & 
Wohlwend-Lloyd, 1998; Gabriel, Critelli, & Ee, 1994; Gebauer, Sedikides, Verplanken, & Maio, 
2012; John & Robins, 1994; Paulhus & Williams, 2002; Paulhus, et al., 2003; Robins & Beer, 
2001). For example, the NPI has been found to be positively correlated with overclaiming bias, 
that is, illegitimate claims of familiarity with (non)existent general knowledge items (persons, 
concepts, places, etc.; e.g., Paulhus & Williams, 2002; Paulhus et al., 2003).  
Indeed, self-enhancement is a case in point for illustrating how narcissistic people 
prioritize agentic or ego goals (superiority, uniqueness, grandiosity, fame, status) above 
communal or non-ego goals (affiliation, tolerance, communal feelings). Others perceive that self-
enhancers, compared with non-self-enhancers, are more competent/intelligent (Paulhus, 
Westlake, Calvez, & Harms, 2013) and assign a higher status to them in groups (Anderson, 
Brion, Moore, & Kennedy, 2012). On the other hand, self-enhancement runs counter to 
communal or non-ego goals (affiliation, tolerance, communal feelings) and self-
acceptance/growth motives because self-enhancers ignore performance feedback (Jordan & 
Audia, 2012) and are perceived as cold and arrogant by others after several interactions (Paulhus, 
1998). Some studies have even shown that intellectual self-enhancement is negatively related to 
academic performance (Chiu & Klassen, 2010; Dunlosky & Rawson, 2012; Paulhus & Dubois, 
2014). However, this link has been contested (e.g., Gramzow, Johnson, & Willard, 2014; Willard 
& Gramzow, 2009).  
 Even though intellectual self-enhancement might have a negative influence on academic 
performance, the positive self-views of people high in (grandiose) narcissism might also be 
beneficial in the educational sphere. For example, narcissistic admiration (as measured by the 
narcissism items from the TOSCA study) has been found to be positively related to mathematics 
self-concept (Jonkmann et al., 2012). Academic self-concept is—in turn—a predictor of 
19    
  
educational learning, motivation, and performance (e.g., Marsh & Martin, 2011; Marsh & 
Yeoung, 1997; Seaton, Parker, Marsh, Craven, & Yeung, 2014). Thus, there might be two 
pathways from (grandiose) narcissism to academic performance: a negative pathway via self-
enhancement and a positive pathway via self-concept that cancel each other out (Figure 1.1). 
 
Figure 1.1. Illustration of two potential pathways from narcissistic admiration to academic performance. 
 
 Are all dimensions of narcissism positively related to self-enhancement and self-views? 
Research has suggested that only narcissistic admiration but not narcissistic rivalry or vulnerable 
narcissism is positively linked to intellectual self-enhancement and academic self-concept. 
Narcissistic rivalry seems to be related to putting other people down rather than to self-
enhancement. People high in narcissistic rivalry tend to harm and devaluate others and engage in 
deliberate cheating rather than self-enhance in order to reach ego goals such as status, 
superiority, and power (Back et al., 2013; Brown et al., 2009). Vulnerable narcissism is linked to 
grandiose fantasies and high standards (e.g., Pincus et al., 2009). However, in contrast to 
narcissistic admiration (Sedikides et al., 2004), vulnerable narcissism is also associated with a 
depressive mood and feelings of resentment, anger, shame, and envy (e.g., Pincus et al., 2014). 
The latter associations suggest that people high in vulnerable narcissism do not self-enhancingly 
perceive that they have met their grandiose fantasies and standards. In fact, narcissistic rivalry 
and vulnerable narcissism are negatively correlated with positive self-regard and self-esteem 
(e.g., Back et al., 2013; Leising et al., 2013). Furthermore, narcissistic rivalry is negatively 
related to better-than-average self-evaluations (Back et al., 2013). Thus, narcissistic rivalry and 
vulnerable narcissism might even be negatively related to self-enhancement and academic self-
concept. 
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1.3.2 Narcissism and academic motivation  
The three dimensions of narcissism might be related not only to academic self-concept 
but also to a range of other motivational constructs in the educational sphere. Because all three 
dimensions of narcissism are characterized by a striving for agentic or ego goals (superiority, 
uniqueness, grandiosity, fame, status) above communal or non-ego goals (affiliation, tolerance, 
communal feelings), they might be related to intrinsic/extrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000), 
mastery/performance goals (e.g., Ames 1992; Nicholls, 1984), performance 
approach/performance avoidance goals (Elliot, McGregor, & Gable, 1999; Kaplan & Maehr, 
2007), the regulation of performance approach goals for autonomous/controlled reasons (e.g., 
Vansteenkiste et al., 2010), task/ego involvement (e.g., Nicholls, 1984), and 
adaptive/maladaptive or neurotic perfectionism (e.g., Dunkley, Blankstein, Masheb, & Grilo 
2006; Hamachek, 1978). 
As an example, I will discuss the relationship between narcissism and intrinsic/extrinsic 
motivation in the following section. Intrinsic aspirations such as self-acceptance, affiliation, and 
altruism are goals that are congruent with the three basic needs of humans: autonomy, 
competence, and relatedness (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2000). On the other hand, extrinsic aspirations 
such as fame, wealth, and physical attractiveness are characterized by the desire to obtain others’ 
approval and recognition.  
The relationship between narcissism and intrinsic motivation is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, all dimensions of narcissism might be negatively related to intrinsic motivation because 
they are characterized by a low level of communal motivation (e.g., Campbell & Foster, 2007; 
Chapters 1.1 and 1.2). A below average communal motivation runs counter to the intrinsic goals 
of affiliation and altruism and to the intrinsic basic need of relatedness: friendships, family, and 
getting along with others are less important to people high in narcissism (e.g., Campbell & 
Foster, 2007). In line with this reasoning, the NPI total score has been found to be negatively 
related to intrinsic motivation (Kasser & Ryan, 1996). On the other hand, people high in 
narcissism might also be motivated to increase their autonomy and competence given their 
agentic motivation (i.e., motivation to achieve superiority, uniqueness). Thus, future studies need 
to clarify whether narcissism is related to all forms of intrinsic motivation.  
Narcissism should be less ambiguously related to extrinsic motivation. All three 
dimensions of narcissism are characterized by a striving for fame and status (e.g., Campbell & 
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Foster, 2007; Morf et al., 2000; Chapters 1.1 and 1.2), and thus, all three dimensions should be 
characterized by the extrinsic motivation to obtain others’ approval and recognition. In line with 
this reasoning, the NPI total score has been found to be positively related to extrinsic motivation 
(Kasser & Ryan, 1996), and people with high NPI scores want others to confirm their 
grandiosity (e.g., Horvath & Morf, 2010). Vulnerable narcissism, the dimension that is not well-
captured by the NPI, might be even more strongly associated with extrinsic motivation because 
vulnerable narcissism is most strongly related to a dependence on others’ approval and 
recognition (e.g., Pincus et al., 2009; Zeigler-Hill et al., 2008).  
What are the educational consequences of a lack of intrinsic motivation and a highly 
extrinsic motivation? A lack of intrinsic motivation might be problematic because intrinsic 
motivation is related to a number of beneficial educational tendencies such as mastery 
orientation, interest, satisfaction, preference for challenge, engagement, and deep process 
learning strategies (e.g., Jang, Reeve, Ryan, & Kim, 2009; Yamauchi & Tanaka, 1998). That 
said, narcissism is related to the aspects of intrinsic motivation (affiliation, altruism, relatedness) 
that might not be related to these beneficial educational tendencies. A highly extrinsic motivation 
might lead to task disengagement and self-handicapping to avoid negative feedback and feelings 
of shame. 
1.3.3 Narcissism and academic performance 
Narcissistic admiration should be relatively unrelated to academic performance (i.e., 
grades) because it is associated with performance-decreasing factors (e.g., low intrinsic 
motivation or self-enhancement tendencies) but also with performance-increasing factors (e.g., 
high self-concept; Chapter 1.3.1: Figure 1.1). In line with this reasoning, Jonkmann et al. (2012) 
found that narcissistic admiration is unrelated to math achievement. Furthermore, Westerman et 
al. (2011) found that the NPI total score—which is more influenced by narcissistic admiration 
than by the other two narcissism dimensions—was unrelated to grade point average among 
business and psychology students.  
In contrast to narcissistic admiration, vulnerable narcissism and narcissistic rivalry are 
mainly related to performance-decreasing factors. People high in narcissistic rivalry and 
vulnerable narcissism have a low academic self-concept (e.g., Back et al., 2013; Pincus et al., 
2009) and a high extrinsic motivation (Chapter 1.3.2). Furthermore, albeit people high in 
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narcissistic rivalry or vulnerable narcissism might be motivated to avoid negative performance 
feedback, they are usually impulsive and lack a long-term focus (e.g., Back et al., 2013; Wink, 
1991). Thus, their avoidance motivation should rather lead to self-handicapping and task 
disengagement than to studying harder. Taken together, I would expect narcissistic rivalry and 
vulnerable narcissism to be negatively related to academic performance. To my knowledge, 
however, no studies have investigated the associations of narcissistic rivalry and vulnerable 
narcissism with academic performance. 
1.3.4 Narcissism and Social Behavior in the Classroom and Other 
Educational Settings 
Narcissism should shape not only students’ learning attitude, engagement, and motivation 
but also classroom group dynamics and students’ interactions with peers. The stronger than usual 
desire for status and power that is common to all three dimensions of narcissism might lead to 
several more or less problematic classroom behaviors such as aggressive behavior and conduct 
problems. In fact, the association between narcissism and aggressive behavior is one of the most 
established findings in the field of narcissism research. Narcissism has been found to predict 
various forms of aggression in late childhood and adolescence (e.g., Ang, Tan, & Mansor, 2010; 
Fanti & Kimonis, 2012; Thomaes Stegge, Bushman, Olthof, & Denissen 2008; Barry, Grafeman, 
Adler, & Pickard, 2007; Ojanen, Findley, Fuller, 2012; Reijntjes et al., 2016; Sargeant, 2013) 
and in adulthood (e.g., Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Stucke & Sporer, 2002; Krizan & Johar, 
2015; Maxwell, Donnellan, Hopwood, & Ackerman, 2011; Twenge & Campbell, 2003). For 
example, Reijntjes et al. (2016) found that highly narcissistic boys were more likely to engage in 
direct and indirect bullying than their peers. Furthermore, in support of the argument that the 
drive for status and dominance leads to aggression, studies have suggested that the link between 
narcissism and aggression is mediated by dominance goals (Ojanen et al., 2012). Similarly, a 
study that distinguished adaptive narcissism (~ narcissistic admiration) from maladaptive 
narcissism (~ narcissistic rivalry) indicated that both kinds of narcissism predicted bullying 
behavior in pupils aged 11 to 14 and that these relationships were not mediated by a lack of 
empathy but by a need for power (Sargeant, 2013). 
Even though all three dimensions of narcissism might be related to aggressive and 
antisocial behavior, narcissistic rivalry should be most strongly related to direct forms of 
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aggression as its core characteristic is the derogation of others (Back et al., 2013). Narcissistic 
admiration should be related to only nondefensive, proactive, or instrumental forms of 
aggression (Kriszan & Johar, 2015). However, even this link to aggression might be mediated by 
narcissistic admiration’s associations with narcissistic rivalry, impulsiveness, sensation seeking, 
and anger expression (Back et al., 2013; Kriszan & Johar, 2015; Wink, 1991). With regard to 
vulnerable narcissism, scholars have pointed out that people high in vulnerable narcissism react 
to threats to their narcissistic self- and world views not only with internalization problems (i.e., 
shame and depression) but also with anger, mistrust, and narcissistic rage (Kriszan & Johar, 
2015). Thus, vulnerable narcissism has been found to be positively related to reactive and 
displaced aggression (Kriszan & Johar, 2015). 
Does narcissism lead to the higher status and influence that people high in narcissism 
strive for? Studies on adults have suggested that narcissistic admiration leads to initial 
popularity, and narcissistic rivalry causes a decline in popularity in the long run (Leckelt et al., 
2016). However, popularity is not the same as social influence. Narcissistic rivalry might lead to 
higher social influence in groups not due to popularity but due to dominance, intimidation, and 
aggression (for a study on the two pathways to social influence in groups, see Cheng, Tracy, 
Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich, 2013). 
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1.4 The Development of Narcissism in Early Adulthood 
1.4.1 The Development of the Big Five Personality Traits 
Even though personality traits are relatively stable individual differences, they can also 
change. Research on personality change has more often focused on the Big Five personality traits 
than on narcissism. Thus, I will first review the literature on Big Five development during early 
adulthood before I focus on the development of narcissism.  
The traditional view on (Big Five) personality change has been that personality traits are 
biologically based dispositions that change very little; at least they should not change after the 
age of 30 (e.g., Costa & McCrae; 1997; see also James, 1890/1950). This view has been 
challenged in the last three decades by more and more studies that have reported mean-level 
changes in personality traits (i.e., typical/normative personality changes in a specific age 
interval). Studies have reported especially strong and robust mean-level changes during early 
adulthood (i.e., from age 20 to 40). During this phase, people become on average higher in social 
dominance (i.e., a facet of extraversion), conscientiousness, emotional stability, and 
agreeableness (for a meta-analysis, see Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006). Nevertheless, 
McCrae and Costa (2008) have continued to see personality traits as basic tendencies that—in 
contrast to characteristic adaptations (e.g., self-concept, attitudes, and roles)—are influenced 
only by biological factors. Mean-level changes were considered to be part of age-related 
maturation and degeneration processes and were thus believed to follow intrinsic paths of 
development independent of environmental influences (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 2008; McCrae et 
al., 2000). According to this view, only severe environmental influences such as brain injuries 
would be able to influence personality change (see also Specht et al., 2014). 
However, the traditional view that personality is set like plaster after age 30 has been 
challenged not only by the reported mean-level changes. Longitudinal studies on the 
development of personality traits have furthermore indicated that individual differences in 
personality change are related to differences in environments (for a review, see Specht et al., 
2014). For example, individual differences in personality change have repeatedly been found to 
be related to the occurrence of major life events such as entering a romantic partnership or 
unemployment (for a review on personality change and life events, see Bleidorn, Hopwood, & 
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Lucas, 2016). Furthermore, genetically informative studies have indicated that changes in 
personality are partly driven by environmental influences (e.g., Kandler, 2012; Spengler, 
Gottschling, Spinath, 2012). 
Thus, most recent theoretical accounts of personality development assume that not only 
biological but also environmental factors influence people’s personality development. For 
example, the Neo-Socioanalytic model of personality states that people experience age-related 
transitions and investments in social and occupational roles in early adulthood. These transitions 
and new roles lead to an increasing number of expectations from and commitments to friends, 
family, and coworkers. These expectations and commitments in turn are believed to result in 
increases in conscientiousness, emotional stability, and agreeableness during early adulthood 
(Roberts & Davis, 2016; Roberts & Wood, 2006; see also Bleidorn et al., 2013; Hogan & 
Roberts, 2004). The maturity principle and the social investment principle also provide similar 
theoretical accounts on the influence of the environment on these personality changes (e.g., Lodi-
Smith & Roberts, 2007; Roberts, Wood, & Caspi, 2008). 
A few previous studies have also investigated whether individual differences in 
personality change are related to educational aspects of the environment. One of the largest 
endeavors to investigate the interplay between the development of personality traits and the 
educational aspects of the environment is the Transformation of the Secondary School System 
and Academic Careers study (TOSCA; Köller, Watermann, Trautwein, & Lüdtke, 2004; 
Trautwein, Neumann, Nagy, Lüdtke, & Maaz, 2010). In this multi-cohort longitudinal study, 
several thousand students responded to an extensive questionnaire that covered a broad range of 
personality traits, life events, and educational trajectories every second year from the last year of 
high school onwards.  
Studies based on the TOSCA data have supported the view that educational aspects of the 
environment are associated with personality change. For example, Lüdtke et al. (2011) found that 
people who started to work after high school showed larger increases in conscientiousness in 
their early 20s than people who went to university after high school. Furthermore, in their study, 
several educational (and noneducational) life events were related to changes in the Big Five. For 
example, a negatively evaluated change in or termination of the educational path was negatively 
associated with changes in emotional stability, extraversion, and openness. Notably, the 
association between life events and changes in the Big Five depended on whether the event was 
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positively or negatively evaluated. Only a negatively but not a positively evaluated change in or 
termination of the educational path was related to changes in any of the Big Five traits. 
In another study based on the TOSCA data, Jackson, Thoemmes, Jonkmann, Lüdtke, and 
Trautwein, (2012) found that military training was related to changes in personality: People who 
received military training had lower agreeableness scores after the training than a matched 
control group that did not undergo military training. The differences in agreeableness between 
the two groups persisted even 5 years after the military training. These findings also suggest that 
educational contexts can have a long-lasting effect on the development of personality in early 
adulthood. 
In one of the few studies on personality change and education that was not based on 
TOSCA data, educational demands that occurred before high school graduation were related to 
changes in conscientiousness (Bleidorn, 2012). The conscientiousness levels of high school 
students increased during the time when the students were preparing for the Abitur (i.e., the final 
high school exam in Germany, which serves as a graduation certificate and a university entrance 
exam). In line with the increases in conscientiousness, the preparation for the final exam requires 
task and goal orientation, delay of gratification, organization, and persistence.  
In summary, research on the development of the Big Five personality traits has revealed 
that mean-level changes in personality are substantial during early adulthood and occur even 
after the age of 30. Furthermore, several studies have indicated that changes in the Big Five 
personality traits are related to certain aspects of the environment (including educational life 
events and contexts). These findings suggest that environmental demands, major transitions, and 
meaningful experiences can elicit profound and long-lasting personality changes in young adults. 
In the current dissertation, I attempted to extend the longitudinal research on the Big Five to a 
personality trait that is less often studied longitudinally: narcissism. 
1.4.2 Mean-Level Development of Narcissism in Early Adulthood 
Early adulthood can be a challenging time. Young adults need to gain their independence 
from the influence of their parents, which means they increasingly need to make decisions 
autonomously. They need to decide, for example, which social and occupational roles they want 
to take on. And once they have made these momentous decisions, they need to handle various 
demands, expectations, and commitments. They need to master normative developmental tasks 
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during the transition to adulthood, especially to establish themselves within the workplace. But at 
the same time, they are still highly engaged in ego and identity development. 
Given these challenges, how would we expect the mean levels of the three dimensions of 
narcissism to develop during early adulthood? On the basis of a broad range of literature, Hill 
and Roberts (2011, 2012) argued that some narcissistic features (e.g., inflated sense of self, 
individualism, and self-focus) might be adaptive during adolescence and early adulthood. 
According to this perspective, features of narcissistic admiration might be adaptive during the 
challenging transition to adulthood. For example, unrealistically positive self-views, optimism, 
and assertiveness (Back et al., 2013) might provide a buffer against internalization problems 
(e.g., depression) during the challenging time of early adulthood. In line with this reasoning, 
Sedikides et al. (2004) found that narcissism (as measured by the NPI) was positively related to 
psychological health and that this effect was accounted for by self-esteem. Because narcissistic 
admiration’s relationship to self-esteem is similar to that of the NPI, the effects of narcissistic 
admiration on psychological health might be similar as well. Furthermore, Hill and Roberts 
(2012) found that the two NPI subscales most similar to narcissistic admiration (NPI 
Leadership/Authority and NPI Grandiose Exhibitionism) were positively related to life 
satisfaction in young adults under the age of 25. The associations of the two NPI subscales with 
life satisfaction were not significant in the age groups comprising people who were older than 
25, suggesting that these narcissistic features are helpful during the first years of early adulthood 
but not thereafter. Furthermore, the higher level of openness to experience among people high in 
narcissistic admiration (Back et al., 2013) might be adaptive from age 20 to 30 given that this is 
the time period in which young people in highly industrialized countries such as Germany tend 
to continue to explore various opportunities rather than committing to social and occupational 
roles (e.g., Arnett, 2000). Taken together, several features of narcissistic admiration might be 
adaptive. Thus, the mean levels of narcissistic admiration might tend to be level or even to 
increase from age 20 to 30. 
When the phase of exploration is over and occupational roles have been mastered, 
narcissistic admiration with its unrealistically positive self-views and focus on agency might be 
less beneficial than before. Correspondingly, narcissistic admiration might be reduced by social 
roles that demand an increasing number of expectations from and commitments to friends and 
family (for a similar argument, see Roberts, Edmonds, & Grijalva, 2010). Hence, at least from 
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the age of 25 onwards, narcissistic admiration might be increasingly maladaptive and might thus 
be expected to decrease.  
In contrast to narcissistic admiration, both narcissistic rivalry and vulnerable narcissism 
might be maladaptive and might thus decrease across the entire phase of early adulthood. 
Narcissistic rivalry and vulnerable narcissism do not embody the features of narcissistic 
admiration that might be helpful during the challenging transition to adulthood (optimism, self-
esteem; e.g., Back et al., 2013; Pincus et al., 2009). On the contrary, features related to 
narcissistic rivalry and vulnerable narcissism such as dysfunctional relationships (Back et al., 
2013) and emotional dysregulation (Krizan & Johar, 2012) might be risk factors for a derailed 
development during early adulthood. Accordingly, narcissistic rivalry and vulnerable 
narcissism—which share features that are often perceived as immature (e.g., Buchanan & 
Holmbeck, 1998)—should be curbed by the expectations, demands, and commitments that come 
along with social and occupational roles (see also Neo-Socioanalytic model, social investment 
theory, and maturity principle; e.g., Roberts et al., 2010; Roberts & Wood, 2006; Roberts et al., 
2008). In line with this reasoning, the two Big Five traits that are substantially negatively related 
to narcissistic rivalry and vulnerable narcissism (i.e., agreeableness and emotional stability; Back 
et al., 2013; Miller et al., 2016) have been repeatedly found to increase during early adulthood 
(e.g., Roberts et al., 2006; Lüdtke et al., 2011). In summary, past research has suggested that 
narcissistic rivalry and vulnerable narcissism are rather maladaptive during early adulthood and 
should thus decrease from age 20 to 40.  
Unfortunately, the development of narcissistic admiration, narcissistic rivalry, or 
vulnerable narcissism during early adulthood has not been directly investigated in previous 
studies. However, there are some cross-sectional and longitudinal studies that have investigated 
the development of narcissism as measured by the NPI. These studies have revealed rather mixed 
findings. On the one hand, cross-sectional studies have suggested that narcissism declines in 
early adulthood: Several researchers have reported negative relationships between age and total 
scores on the NPI (e.g., Foster, Twenge, & Campbell, 2003: r = -.17; Hill & Roberts, 2012: r = -
.32; Roberts, Edmonds, & Grijalva, 2010: r = -.32). On the other hand, two longitudinal studies 
on narcissism in early adulthood did not find declining trends: Carlson and Gjerde (2009) studied 
narcissism in young adulthood using a Q-sort methodology (Block, 1961). They detected no 
significant decrease in narcissism from age 18 to 23. Orth and Luciano (2015) reported virtually 
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no descriptive differences in NPI scores across a 2-year period during early adulthood consisting 
of four measurement occasions. But admittedly, the two longitudinal studies were concerned 
with only the first years of early adulthood.  
Taken together, research and theory on the development of narcissism during early 
adulthood is scare. On the basis of the features inherent to the three dimensions of narcissism, I 
would expect the mean levels of the three dimensions to decline during early adulthood: An 
increasing number of social and occupational commitments and expectations should curb 
narcissistic tendencies, at least after the initial years of early adulthood from age 30 to 40. In line 
with this reasoning, cross-sectional studies have suggested a decline in narcissism in early 
adulthood. Conversely, longitudinal studies have suggested that narcissism does not increase or 
decrease in the first years of early adulthood. However, the time frames explored in these 
longitudinal studies have been too short to draw any solid conclusions. 
1.4.3 Narcissism Development, the Studying of Economics, and Life Events 
1.4.3.1 Economics majors 
An environmental context that I have not discussed yet but that might be related to the 
development of the three dimensions of narcissism is the university major. In particular, the 
choice to major in economics might be related to the development of narcissism because students 
from economics majors have been found to have higher NPI scores than students from other 
majors (Westerman et al., 2011; but see also Sautter, Brown, Littvay, Sautter, & Bearnes, 2008).  
That said, even if economics students are higher in narcissism, it remains unclear whether 
students from economics majors are higher in narcissism (a) because high school students who 
are high in narcissism tend to decide to major in economics more often than students low in 
narcissism, (b) because studying economics makes students more narcissistic, or (c) both. Here, 
we encounter the distinction between two effects that are often labeled selection and 
socialization effects in research on personality development (e.g., Headey & Wearing, 1989; 
Roberts & Robins, 2004). Selection effects refer to the influence of narcissism on the likelihood 
of experiencing a certain environment: to select or to be selected by a certain environment. 
Socialization effects refer to the influence of certain environments or experiences on the 
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development of narcissism. With regard to studying economics, there are reasons and evidence 
for both of the effects. 
Individuals high in narcissism might be more likely to select an economics major because 
studying economics requires and rewards characteristics that are related to narcissism. Persons 
high in narcissism are motivated to achieve agentic or ego goals (superiority, uniqueness, 
grandiosity, fame, status) above communal or non-ego goals (affiliation, tolerance, communal 
feelings; e.g., Campbell & Foster, 2007; Crocker & Park, 2004; Miller & Campbell, 2008; Morf 
et al., 2000; Wink, 1991). Such motivations might enhance a person’s likelihood of selecting an 
economics major because the economics domain emphasizes agency and neglects communion, 
gives access to extensive resources and future leadership positions, and thus has the potential to 
satisfy narcissistic goals.  
Higher levels of narcissism among economics students might also be the consequence of 
socialization effects. Studying business and economics might foster narcissism because 
economics majors tend to embody the core characteristics of narcissism such as competitiveness 
(Luchner, Houston, Walker, & Houston, 2011), selfishness (Brown, Sautter, Littvay, Sautter, & 
Bearnes, 2010), an agentic focus, and a neglect of communal goals (e.g., Campbell & Foster, 
2007). The field of business and economics is dominated by neoclassic economics with its focus 
on self-interest, pleasure, and consumer goods (Etzioni, 2015). And the bedrock of economics 
(i.e., rational-choice theory) characterizes humans as self-interested agents. This has most 
prominently been bemoaned by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986):  
The absence of considerations of fairness and loyalty from standard economic theory is 
one of the most striking contrasts between this body of theory and other social sciences—
and also between economic theory and lay intuitions about human behavior. (p. 285) 
 
As the assumption of selfishness and rationality have still been the cornerstones of most 
economic analyses thirty years later (Kahneman, 2003), the studying economics might foster 
narcissism.  
There is no direct evidence that choosing to major in economics has an influence on 
narcissism, but longitudinal studies on ethical behavior have suggested that choosing this major 
might have an influence on narcissism. Longitudinal studies on ethical behavior have indicated 
that (a) the level of cooperation increased more strongly for noneconomics students than for 
economics students between the freshman and senior years, and (b) students who attended a 
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class on game theory became more cynical and less honest over the course of one semester than 
students who took an astronomy class (Frank, Gilovich, & Regan, 1993). More recently, 
Faravelli (2007) found that senior economics students were less likely to support egalitarian 
solutions to distribution problems than freshman economics students. Even though some other 
studies have been less conclusive regarding the socialization effects of studying economics on 
unethical tendencies (for a review, see Etzioni, 2015), the choice to study economics might be 
positively linked to changes in narcissism in early adulthood. 
1.4.3.2 Life Events 
Selection and socialization effects might also occur with regard to life events. Life events 
include (a) normative transitions in life such as graduating from high school or starting regular 
work after graduation, (b) meaningful changes such as transferring to another university or 
quitting smoking, and (c) major individual experiences such as winning an academic award (e.g., 
Sarason, Johnson, & Siegel, 1978; Specht, Egloff, & Schmukle, 2011; Vaidya, Gray, Haig, & 
Watson, 2002). Although life events were traditionally seen as events that occur independently 
of one’s personality, an increasing number of studies have demonstrated that personality traits 
can predict the occurrence of life events (e.g., Headey & Wearing, 1989; Lüdtke et al., 2011; 
Specht et al., 2011). Narcissism might predict how frequently (negative) life events occur 
because it has been found to be positively related to impulsivity (Vazire & Funder, 2006), risky 
behavior (Foster, Shenesey, & Goff, 2009), and approach motivation as well as negatively 
related to avoidance motivation (e.g., Foster, Misra, & Reidy, 2009; Foster & Trimm, 2008). In 
fact, one of the few studies that included narcissism as a predictor of life events found a selection 
effect of narcissism on the occurrence of stressful life events (Orth & Luciano, 2015). Thus, 
narcissism might also predict other (negative) life events. 
However, the main focus of this dissertation was not on selection effects but on 
socialization effects: How are life events linked to individual differences in the development of 
narcissism during early adulthood? Relevant life events have hardly ever been identified in 
previous research. Orth and Luciano (2015) tested whether experiencing stressful life events is 
linked to changes in narcissism in early adulthood but did not find evidence for it. In a 
prospective longitudinal study with children, Brummelman et al. (2015) found that when parents 
believe their children are more special and entitled than other children, narcissism increases over 
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time. Thus, Brummelman et al. (2015) concluded—with reference to social learning theory—that 
an overvaluation by one’s parents fosters narcissism (see also e.g., Otway & Vignoles, 2006; 
Thomaes, Brummelman, Bushman, & Reijntjes, 2013). However, we do not know whether and 
how this finding could be transferred to the phase of early adulthood.  
Thus, my reasoning was guided by tendency of people high in narcissism to desire 
agentic or ego goals (superiority, uniqueness, grandiosity, fame, status) above communal or non-
ego goals (affiliation, tolerance, communal feelings; e.g., Campbell & Foster, 2007; Crocker & 
Park, 2004; Miller & Campbell, 2008; Morf et al., 2000; Wink, 1991). My general supposition 
was that narcissism in early adulthood is fostered by life events that reward and demand a 
motivation high in agency (i.e., events positively related to competence, extraversion, 
uniqueness, separation, and focus on the self) and events that reward and demand a motivation 
low in communion (i.e., events negatively related to warmth, agreeableness, relatedness, 
connection, and focus on others; Gebauer et al., 2012; see also Bakan, 1966). Positive agentic 
events and negative communal events might reinforce the emphasis on the agency and the 
ignorance of the communion domain, respectively. Thus, positive agentic and negative 
communal events should foster narcissism, whereas negative agentic and positive communal 
events should curb narcissism.  
Taken together, I expected changes in narcissism to be positively associated with 
studying economics at university and the occurrence of positive agentic events and negative 
communal events. Furthermore, I expected changes in narcissism to be negatively associated 
with the occurrence of negative agentic events and positive communal events. That said, on the 
basis of the existing research on narcissism, it was very difficult to derive expectations about the 
influence of the environment on the development of narcissism. Clearly, there is a need for 
longitudinal studies on narcissism, especially in early adulthood. 
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1.5 Research Questions and Outline of Studies 
The current dissertation investigated the assessment, dimensionality, and development of 
narcissism in early adulthood. Studies 1 and 2 investigated the assessment and dimensionality of 
narcissism because previous research did not clearly indicate the best way to assess narcissism or 
how many dimensions of narcissism exist (Chapter 1.2). Previous research has indicated that the 
most established narcissism questionnaire, the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & 
Hall, 1979; Raskin & Terry, 1988), is not unidimensional. However, previous research has failed 
to come to an agreement on the dimensionality and subscale structure of the NPI—various NPI 
subscales have been proposed since the initial creation of the NPI when researchers realized that 
the NPI was not unidimensional (e.g., Raskin & Terry, 1988). Thus, it is not clear how many 
dimensions underlie the NPI or the construct of narcissism in general.   
As a response to the psychometric issues of the NPI, Back et al. (2013) developed the 
Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry Questionnaire (NARQ). In contrast to the NPI, The NARQ 
was created on the basis of a theory about grandiose narcissism: the Narcissistic Admiration and 
Rivalry Concept (Back et al., 2013). Furthermore, in contrast to the NPI, the NARQ was not 
created as a unidimensional questionnaire but as a questionnaire that clearly differentiates 
between two dimensions: an assertive dimension (i.e., narcissistic admiration) and an 
antagonistic dimension (i.e., narcissistic rivalry). The initial validation studies by Back et al. 
(2013) suggested that the NARQ has higher concurrent and predictive validity than the NPI. 
However, it remains unclear whether the NARQ outperforms the NPI only with regard to 
validity but also with regard to other psychometric properties.   
Study 1 addressed this question by comparing the NPI and NARQ subscales with regard 
to closeness to unidimensionality and measurement precision. Both the NPI and NARQ are 
believed to measure only grandiose narcissism but not vulnerable narcissism (e.g., Back et al., 
2013; Miller et al., 2011). Because the NARQ, but not the NPI, was developed on the basis of a 
theory that is believed to appropriately describe the structure of grandiose narcissism, we 
expected the NARQ subscales to show superior closeness to unidimensionality and measurement 
precision compared with the NPI subscales. In other words, if the two-dimensional narcissism 
structure (narcissistic admiration and rivalry) that is believed to underlie the NARQ is an 
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appropriate and comprehensive depiction of grandiose narcissism, the NARQ should outperform 
the NPI psychometrically. 
Study 2 again addressed the assessment and dimensionality of narcissism. We 
investigated whether the three proposed dimensions of narcissism (i.e., narcissistic admiration or 
assertive narcissism, narcissistic rivalry or antagonistic narcissism, and vulnerable narcissism) 
would show different correlations with a potential behavioral consequence of narcissism: 
overclaiming bias (i.e., the tendency to illegitimately claim knowledge). On the basis of previous 
findings (Chapter 1.3.1), we hypothesized that assertive narcissism but not antagonistic and 
vulnerable narcissism would be positively related to overclaiming bias. If the various dimensions 
of narcissism were found to have different associations with overclaiming bias, this would 
further underscore the need to distinguish between the various dimensions of narcissism. 
 Although Studies 1 and 2 clarified measurement questions and emphasized the 
importance of distinguishing between various dimensions of narcissism when predicting 
behavior, they were cross-sectional and were thus not able to shed light on the development of 
narcissism and how its development is related to the environment. Previous research has 
indicated that the Big Five personality traits show strong and robust mean-level changes during 
early adulthood (e.g., Roberts et al., 2006). Furthermore, research on the Big Five has suggested 
that the development of personality traits is shaped by the environment (i.e., socialization effects; 
e.g., Lüdtke et al., 2011; Jackson et al., 2012; Chapter 1.4). However, little research has 
investigated the development of narcissism and the interplay between the development of 
narcissism and the environment. 
Study 3 addressed these and similar questions by investigating (a) the general 
developmental trends of narcissism in early adulthood (i.e., mean-level changes) and (b) 
socialization effects (i.e., influence of certain environments or experiences on the development 
of narcissism). In particular, in Study 3, we examined how choosing an economics major at 
university and the occurrence of any of 30 life events were related to the development of 
narcissism in early adulthood.  
To investigate the development of narcissism, in Study 3, we analyzed two cohorts from 
the TOSCA study (Transformation of the Secondary School System and Academic Careers 
study; Köller et al., 2004; Trautwein et al., 2010). The TOSCA study tracks changes in the 
narcissistic admiration of several thousand German students on multiple occasions from their last 
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year of high school—before the students enter tertiary education—to around the age of 30. The 
focus in Study 3 was exclusively on narcissistic admiration because the other two dimensions of 
narcissism (narcissistic rivalry and vulnerable narcissism) were not assessed in the TOSCA 
study. However, another “dark” personality trait, Machiavellianism (i.e., the tendency to hold a 
cynical view of the world, a duplicitous interpersonal style, and pragmatic morality) has also 
been assessed in the TOSCA study. As narcissistic admiration and Machiavellianism are related 
constructs (i.e., both are characterized by a preference for agentic over communal goals), Study 3 
also examined the development of Machiavellianism. The extensive assessments of the TOSCA 
study enabled a thorough investigation of the development of narcissistic admiration and 
Machiavellianism during early adulthood. 
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Abstract 
The current study compares the closeness to unidimensionality (CU) and measurement 
precision (MP) of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Hall, 1979)—with either a 
pairwise forced-choice or 5-point Likert scale response format—to the Narcissistic Admiration and 
Rivalry Questionnaire (NARQ; Back et al., 2013). Minimum rank factor analysis and item information 
curves from item response models were utilized. The results mainly confirmed our expectations that 
NPI subscales are lower in CU and MP compared to NARQ subscales when the NPI was administered 
with its traditional forced-choice response format. When the NPI was administered with a 5-point 
Likert scale response format, the NPI subscale Leadership/Authority and NPI Grandiose Exhibitionism 
showed similarly high levels of CU and MP as the two NARQ subscales. While the NPI subscale 
Entitlement/Exploitativeness had a higher CU than the NARQ subscales it showed considerably lower 
levels of MP. 
 
Keywords: narcissism; unidimensionality; measurement precision; item response theory; explained 
common variance; reliability; 
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2. A Comparison of Unidimensionality and 
Measurement Precision of the Narcissistic 
Personality Inventory and the Narcissistic 
Admiration and Rivalry Questionnaire 
2.1 Introduction 
Several researchers bemoan that the original item creation and item selection strategy of the 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Hall, 1979) did not take into account the 
multidimensional nature of grandiose narcissism (e.g., Back et al., 2013; Brown, Budzek, & 
Tamborski, 2009; Raskin & Terry, 1988): The NPI items were selected out of a large pool of 
narcissism items with the exclusive aim to increase internal consistency and without specific 
dimensions or subscales in mind. Nevertheless, NPI subscales were proposed later on, as empirical 
evidence suggested multiple factors underlying the NPI (e.g., Ackerman et al., 2011; Corry, Merritt, 
Mrug, & Pamp, 2008; Raskin & Terry, 1988). Because NPI subscales were obtained post-hoc rather 
than by design, the NPI items of the proposed subscales might load not only on one specific factor but 
also on other factors. Due to this within-item multidimensionality the proposed NPI subscales are 
expected to be relatively low in closeness to unidimensionality (CU), which may impair the 
interpretability of the NPI subscale scores.  
In contrast to the NPI, the Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry Questionnaire (NARQ, Back et 
al., 2013) was developed based on a theory that clearly differentiates two dimensions of grandiose 
narcissism: the Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry Concept (Back et al., 2013). Accordingly, the 
NARQ items were created for specific subscales, Narcissistic Admiration and Narcissistic Rivalry, 
respectively. Thus, the two NARQ subscales might show a higher CU than NPI subscales, an assertion 
put to an empirical test in the current study. 
CU gives insight into the unidimensionality of a scale, but it does not inform us with how much 
precision the underlying dimension is measured (e.g., Nunnally, 1978; Tang, Cui, & Babenko, 2014). 
Even when the CU is high, measurement precision (MP) might be low if the amount of error or item-
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specific variance is disproportionally high. Therefore, the current study additionally investigates the 
MP of NPI and NARQ subscales. 
2.1.1 Closeness to Unidimensionality 
CU is defined as the proportion of common variance that is explained by the first factor in a 
factor analysis (Ten Berge & Sočan, 2004; see also Shapiro & Ten Berge, 2002), where the common 
variance is the variance explained by all factors. For example a CU of .85 means that the first factor 
explains 85% of the common variance in item response behavior, which is a relatively high level of 
CU. A low CU (e.g., less than .50) means that less than half of the common variance is explained by 
the first factor. It is crucial that the data of a scale show high CU for at least two reasons. 
(1) A high CU facilitates a clear interpretation of scale scores (i.e., sum or average of the scores 
on all scale items). A low CU hampers the interpretation of scale scores because more than one latent 
attribute might have a strong influence on the scale score; thus it is unclear how each latent attribute is 
influencing the scale score (e.g., Briggs & Cheek, 1986; Reise, Bonifay, & Haviland, 2013; Stout, 
1987). Imagine Person A scored on average higher than Person B on a set of narcissism items that 
assessed two attributes—exhibitionism and vanity. In this case, it is unclear whether Person A scored 
higher than Person B because of a higher standing on exhibitionism, on vanity, or on both. Unless 
exhibitionism and vanity are very highly associated, the scale score is not clearly interpretable in terms 
of its constituent components. 
In addition, it remains unclear whether an association between the scale score of item responses 
with low CU and a specific behavioral outcome is driven by all or only some of the underlying 
dimensions of that item set. Some dimensions of the item set might not show the association found for 
the scale score, which is often observable when a scale is split up into subscales. For example, 
Ackerman et al. (2011) found that the NPI total score correlates positively with self-esteem while the 
Entitlement/Exploitativeness subscale of the NPI did not correlate with self-esteem at all. 
An existing association between the scale score and a behavior of interest might even be 
masked if some of the dimensions of the scale are positively associated with the behavior while other 
dimensions are negatively associated to that behavior. For example, Briggs and Cheek (1986) split up 
the self-monitoring scale into subscales and showed that some subscales are negatively related to social 
anxiety while other subscales are positively related to social anxiety. As the two associations canceled 
each other out, the total scale score—that was often exclusively used before 1986—was largely 
unrelated to social anxiety. 
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(2) Many measurement models in structural equation modeling assume unidimensionality. A 
violation of the unidimensionality assumption biases parameter estimates (e.g., too high loadings, too 
low error estimates) and thus relations among measured variables might be inaccurate (i.e., structural 
coefficient bias; Reise, Bonifay, et al., 2013; Reise, Scheines, Widaman, & Haviland, 2013). To decide 
whether the data are “unidimensional enough” to prohibit severe bias in model parameters, researchers 
commonly look at the model fit statistics of a structural equation model. However, fit indices have 
several confounds and limitations (e.g., Reise, Scheines, et al., 2013; Saris, Satorra, & Van der Veld, 
2009; West, Tailor, & Wu, 2012). Reise, Scheines, et al. (2013) showed that the fit indices RMSEA, 
SRMR, and CFI—in combination with the percentage of contaminated correlations among items—are 
less prognostic of parameter bias in structural equation modelling than CU in combination with the 
percentage of contaminated correlations. It seems more useful then to assess the degree of CU rather 
than inspecting fit indices to investigate the strength of structural coefficient bias. 
Taken together, low CU might cause (1) an ambiguous interpretation of scale scores and their 
associations and (2) coefficient bias in structural equation modeling. Thus, scales with response data 
that show low CU may be more appropriately modeled as multidimensional, split up into subscales, 
revised, or abandoned altogether.  
2.1.2 Is the NPI Close to Unidimensionality? 
The NPI was created based on DSM-III behavioral criteria for narcissistic personality (Raskin 
& Terry, 1988), which was based on clinical observations of narcissistic phenomena (Tyrer, Reed, & 
Crawford, 2015). Out of a larger item pool of 220, 54 items were selected with the exclusive aim to 
increase internal consistency of the total scale to represent a general construct of narcissism (Raskin & 
Terry, 1988). However, the selection of items only reduced—but did not eradicate—the heterogeneity 
of the total scale (Raskin & Terry, 1988). Raskin and Terry (1988) attempted to eliminate this flaw by 
selecting 40 out of the 54 items highlighted in a principal component analysis. Unfortunately, their 
attempt (and later attempts) to resolve the issue yielded neither the desired unidimensionality for the 40 
NPI items nor a factor structure that was confirmed by later studies. 
Aside from the review and study by Raskin and Terry (1988), ample research suggests that data 
for the NPI total scale is low in CU. That is, researchers have repeatedly found more than one factor in 
exploratory factor analyses (e.g., Ackerman et al., 2011; Ackerman et al., 2016; Brown et al., 2009; 
Corry et al., 2008) and different facets of the NPI show different correlations with external criteria 
(e.g., Ackerman et al., 2011; Brown et al., 2009; Exline, Baumeister, Bushman, Campbell, & Finkel, 
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2004; Zeigler-Hill & Besser, 2013). Hence, many researchers have proposed NPI subscales (e.g., 
Ackerman et al., 2011; Corry et al., 2008). However, are responses to the NPI subscales high in CU? 
This question has rarely been addressed in previous studies. Ackerman et al. (2012) concluded 
based on a bifactor analysis that the unidimensionality assumption holds for several NPI subscales (and 
the NPI total scale) before they conducted an item response theory (IRT) analysis. However, they did 
not test how close to unidimensionality the NPI subscales were. 
The NPI subscales seem to be relatively low in CU because different studies proposed different 
factor structures for the NPI. The lack of consistency of factor structure across studies might be partly 
caused by different methods and criteria used to investigate the factor structure and/or by sampling 
error. However, if the NPI subscales were high in CU, we would expect the same subscale structure to 
emerge regardless of the method, criteria, and sampling error.  
2.1.3 Do the NARQ Subscales Show a High Degree of Closeness to 
Unidimensionality? 
The NARQ was also designed to measure grandiose narcissism but—in contrast to the NPI—
the construction was based on a theory that explicitly distinguishes between the self-promoting or 
assertive aspects of grandiose narcissism (narcissistic admiration) and the other-derogative or 
antagonistic aspects of grandiose narcissism (narcissistic rivalry; Back et al., 2013). Back and 
colleagues’ subscale-specific test construction approach seems promising and initial evidence suggests 
that the two NARQ subscales have a higher concurrent and predictive validity than the NPI subscales 
(Back et al, 2013; but see also Miller et al., 2014). For example, the NARQ outperformed the NPI in 
predicting self-reported interpersonal orientations and close relationship conflict and observer-rated 
agentic and communal behavior. Even though we would expect the NARQ subscales to outperform the 
NPI subscales with regard to CU, this possibility has not been empirically tested. 
2.1.4 Measurement Precision at Different Levels of the Latent Trait 
In classical test theory, MP is reflected by the standard error of measurement (i.e., the estimated 
standard deviation expected for observed scores when the true score is held constant; Dudek, 1979). 
This is a single value of precision that is used for all persons regardless of their true score level. 
Because this single value does not allow for variability in MP across score levels, it has become 
standard to report IRT based item- and test information curves as additional indicators of MP. The test 
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information may vary across the trait scale and it is inversely related to the standard errors of IRT 
scores. The more information an item or set of items provides at a specific trait level, the smaller the 
standard error of latent trait estimates of respondents who score in that trait range (Embretson & Reise, 
2000). For example, the NARQ Narcissistic Rivalry item “Other people are worth nothing” might 
estimate the level of rivalry more precisely in people high in rivalry than in people low to medium in 
rivalry. The item will not differentiate well between people low and medium in rivalry because almost 
all people low or medium in rivalry will choose the lowest response category (i.e., “not agree at all”). 
However, it will potentially differentiate very well between high and very high levels of rivalry because 
people high and very high in rivalry might vary in their responses.  
High MP is a crucial feature not only for assessing narcissism in clinical settings, where it 
entails narrow confidence intervals of individual diagnosis (e.g., Embretson, 1996), but also for 
empirical research. The higher the average MP in a sample, the higher the reliability and thus the lower 
the number of participants required to conduct empirical studies with sufficient power and without bias 
in parameter or standard error estimates (e.g., Wolf, Harrington, Clark, & Miller, 2013; Zimmerman & 
Williams, 1986). Furthermore, if MP is low at particular ranges of the latent variable, the results of a 
scale can be distorted even if the scale has an acceptable Cronbach’s alpha. For example, Fraley, 
Waller, and Brennan (2000) showed in a data simulation that low precision in the low latent trait area 
can lead to misleading results with regard to trait stability over time even if alpha is as high as .81. 
Thus, researchers interested in changes in narcissism over time likely want to know to what extent the 
NPI and NARQ subscales show an acceptable MP across the latent trait continuum. 
We expect the NPI subscales to have lower MP than the NARQ subscales as the forced-choice 
response format of the NPI, which involves a choice between two alternatives, is disadvantageous 
compared to the 6-point Likert scale format of the NARQ. The reason is that item information can be 
increased with the addition of response categories (Koch, 1983; Samejima, 1969). Furthermore, the MP 
of some NPI subscales might be lower because of their shorter test length (e.g., the NPI 
Entitlement/Exploitativeness subscale is comprised of four items; Ackerman et al., 2011) compared to 
the two NARQ subscales with nine items each. Third, the absence of a multifaceted theory on 
narcissism when constructing the NPI might have hampered not only the CU but also the 
discriminative power of NPI subscale items, which lowers their MP. For all these reasons, we expect 
the NPI subscales, particularly the Entitlement/Exploitativeness subscale, to be lower in MP than the 
NARQ subscales. 
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2.1.5 The Present Study 
The current study empirically tests and compares the CU and MP of NPI and NARQ subscales. 
We focus on the subscales instead of the total scales because the NPI total scale has already been found 
to lack CU (e.g., Ackerman et al., 2011) and the NARQ was not developed as a single unidimensional 
measure (Back et al., 2013). Particularly, we will compare the CU and MP of the three NPI subscales 
proposed by Ackerman et al. (2011), Leadership/Authority, Grandiose Exhibitionism, and 
Entitlement/Exploitativeness, to the CU and MP of the two NARQ subscales, Narcissistic Admiration 
and Narcissistic Rivalry. We used the Ackerman et al. (2011) NPI subscale structure for the 
comparison because it is—in contrast to other subscale structures—based on a large sample and 
validated by exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, nomological network analysis, and self- and 
other reported personality and behavior. We additionally report the CU and MP for NPI subscales 
proposed by Ackerman et al. (2016), Corry et al. (2008), and Raskin and Terry (1988) in Chapter 2.6 
(Table 2.3; Figures 2.3 to 2.5). 
In order to assess CU, minimum rank factor analysis was used to calculate the explained 
common variance (ECV; Ten Berge & Kiers, 1991). Minimum rank factor analysis was based on 
tetrachoric or polychoric correlations to account for the categorical response format of the items. 
Similarly, in order to assess MP, the current study uses IRT rather than classical indicators of MP such 
as Cronbach’s alpha or the average inter-item correlation (Cronbach, 1951) because the logistic IRT 
models are more adequate for the analysis of the categorical NPI and NARQ items than the linear 
models. 
To examine the generalizability of our results, we analyzed NPI and NARQ data from a 
German (Sample 1) and from a US sample (Sample 2). Furthermore, using NPI data from another US 
sample (Sample 3), we investigated the CU and MP of an NPI version that was not administered with 
the traditional pairwise forced-choice response format but, similar to the NARQ, with a 5-point Likert 
scale response format. The reason why we compared the NPI data with a 5-point Likert scale, and not 
NPI data with a 6-point Likert scale, to NARQ data with its 6-point Likert scale (Sample 1 and 2) was 
that only 5-point Likert scale NPI data with an adequate sample size were available. Although using the 
exact same Likert scale would have been preferable, the comparison should provide a close enough 
estimation regarding to what extent differences in CU and MP can be explained by differences in 
response format. That said, the influence of the response format is not a core question of the current 
study (see Ackerman et al., 2016; Boldero, Bell, & Davies, 2015; Wetzel, Roberts, Fraley, & Brown, 
 STUDY 1  62 
   
2016 for studies that investigated the influence of response format on the psychometric properties of 
the NPI). 
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Participants and Procedure 
Sample 1 comprised 1,949 German speaking Internet users (65% females; 1856 complete 
responses); a subsample of Sample 1 has been used in Back et al. (2013). Sample 2 comprised 695 US 
American University students (56% females; 666 complete responses) from a lab-based study 
examining the effects of narcissism on emotional interference (i.e., a Stroop Task; not previously 
published). Sample 3 comprised 5,234 English speaking Internet users (70% females; 5,232 complete 
responses) who filled out an autoscoring personality test about narcissism at www.yourpersonality.net. 
The complete Sample 3 was analyzed in full by Wetzel et al. (2016) and a portion of the data was also 
analyzed by Ackermann et al. (2016). The first two samples filled out the NPI and NARQ with the 
original item and response format. The third sample answered NPI items with a 5-point Likert scale 
response format but did not answer any NARQ items. 
In all three samples, participants received research participation credit, personality feedback for 
their participation, and/or took part in a lottery as an incentive. The mean age was 26.7 (range: 18-73) 
in Sample 1, 18.9 (range: 16-27) in Sample 2, and 30.7 (range: 18-75) in Sample 3.  
The data for Sample 1 and 2, the R syntax, and supplemental figures and tables are available at 
the Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/xg6gn. The data for Sample 3 is available at 
https://osf.io/khrn2 (file name: "rating_scale_data_npi_facets.dat"). 
2.2.2 Measures 
2.2.2.1 The Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI) 
The NPI consists of 40 pairwise forced-choice items in which participants select one out of two 
options, a narcissistic and a non-narcissistic one. In the 5-point Likert scale version (Sample 3), 
participants read each narcissistic and non-narcissistic statement separately and indicated how much 
they agreed with each statement, resulting in 80 5-point Likert scale items. In the current study, we 
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only analyzed the responses to the 40 Likert items with narcissistic indicative statements because the 
NARQ also comprises exclusively of narcissistic indicative statements. 
The three subscales proposed by Ackerman et al. (2011) are Leadership/Authority (eleven 
items, e.g., Item 10: narcissistic indicative answer “I see myself as a good leader” vs. non-narcissistic 
indicative answer “I am not sure if I would make a good leader.”), Grandiose Exhibitionism (ten items; 
e.g., Item 7: narcissistic answer “I like to be the center of attention” vs. non-narcissistic answer “I 
prefer to blend in with the crowd”), and Entitlement/Exploitativeness (four items; e.g., Item 24: 
narcissistic answer “I expect a great deal from other people“ vs. non-narcissistic answer “I like to do 
things for other people“). We needed to exclude one item, Item 30, from the Grandiose Exhibitionism 
subscale because the content of Item 30 (narcissistic answer “I really like to be the center of attention” 
vs. non-narcissistic answer “It makes me uncomfortable to be the center of attention”) overlaps 
considerably with the content of Item 7 (see above). The exclusion was necessary because the overlap 
caused large item misfit, poor model fit, correlated residuals, and inflated information curves (for 
results of the full scale, see Chapter 2.6: Tables 2.4 to 2.7 and Figure 2.6; see also Ackerman et al., 
2012). 
2.2.2.2 The Narcissism Admiration and Rivalry Questionnaire (NARQ)  
The NARQ consists of 18 items, scored from 1 = “not agree at all” to 6 = “agree completely”. 
According to Back et al. (2013), the NARQ measures two dimensions of narcissism: narcissistic 
admiration (e.g., Item 1: “I am great.”) and narcissistic rivalry (e.g., Item 9: “I want my rivals to fail.”). 
Each dimension is measured by nine items, including three cognitive, three affective-motivational, and 
three behavioral items. 
2.2.3 Data Analysis 
2.2.3.1 Closeness to Unidimensionality  
The CU analyses were based on tetrachoric (dichotomously scored items) and polychoric 
correlation matrices (polytomously scored items), respectively (Olsson, 1979). Tetrachoric or 
polychoric correlations are developed for discrete responses, assuming multivariate normality at the 
latent variable level. We used polychoric correlations instead of Pearson correlations because factor 
analysis based on polychoric correlations (but not factor analysis based on Pearson correlations) can 
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adequately estimate the loadings of the NPI and NARQ items that show floor or ceiling effects (e.g., 
floor effect of the very unpopular NARQ item “Other people are worth nothing”) (e.g., Garrido, Abad, 
Ponsoda, 2013; Kubinger, 2003). Because tetrachoric or polychoric correlations do not allow missing 
values, incomplete responses were not included (i.e., listwise deletion) in the CU analyses. 
Following Morizot, Ainsworth, and Reise (2009), we assessed CU in more than one way. First, 
we investigated the explained common variance (ECV) under the one-factor minimum rank factor 
analysis model. Second, a one-factor confirmatory factor analysis model was fit to data of each 
subscale and model fit indices and the residual correlations were inspected. The focus will be on the 
ECV as it aligns most closely to the definition of CU. 
2.2.3.2 Explained Common Variance 
The ECV was obtained by calculating the percentage of common variance that is explained by 
the first factor of the reduced correlation matrix, which is based on the one-factor solution of a 
minimum rank factor analysis (Ten Berge & Sočan, 2004; see also Shapiro & Ten Berge, 2002). More 
specifically, let J be the number of items indexed by j, and let  (j = 1 ,…, J) be the eigenvalues of the 
reduced inter-item correlation matrix. The ECV equals the ratio of the first eigenvalue to the sum of all 
eigenvalues, times 100 to yield percent: 
100
...
  ECV
J1
1 



     (1) 
The denominator in Equation 1 is the common variance, which is the part of the total variance 
that is explained by all factors in the minimum rank factor analysis. The part of total variance that is not 
present in the equation because it is explained by none of the factors is the error or item-specific 
variance. Common and error variance always add up to 100% (i.e., total variance). 
The ECV, common variance, and error variance of each minimum rank factor analysis were 
calculated using the PC software package FACTOR (version 9.3.1; Lorenzo-Seva & Ferrando, 2006). 
Minimum rank factor analysis (Ten Berge & Kiers, 1991) was used instead of other factor analytic 
methods, such as principal axis factor analysis, because the reduced correlation matrix of the latter 
methods may be non-positive definite (i.e., some eigenvalues are negative) and thus the ECV cannot be 
properly computed (Lorenzo-Seva, 2013; Shapiro & Ten Berge, 2002). 
An ECV of 100 would indicate perfect unidimensionality; that is, that 100% of the common 
variance can be explained by only one factor. However, a value of 100% is unrealistic given that minor 
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common factors are normally present (MacCallum & Tucker, 1991). There are no generally accepted 
benchmarks developed for the ECV yet. Reise, Scheines, et al. (2013) examined the role of the ECV in 
a simulation study investigating the influence of measurement model misspecification on structural 
parameter bias in structural equation modelling. Based on their results, they proposed an ECV of 60% 
as a tentative benchmark for cases when more than 20% of the item-pair correlations are contaminated 
by the specification of a unidimensional measurement model to data with a multidimensional bifactor 
structure. Correlations between item-pairs are contaminated when the model-implied correlations 
deviate from the observed ones, that is, when the item-pair correlation is not sufficiently modeled by 
the specified general factor. For NPI and NARQ subscales that had an ECV below 60%, we 
investigated the percentage of contaminated item-pair correlations based on the number of loadings ≥ 
.20 on group factors in exploratory bifactor models (see also Reise, Scheines, et al., 2013; Schmid & 
Leiman, 1957). To run these bifactor analyses, we used the function “omega” of the R package psych 
(version 1.5.1; Revelle, 2014).  
Yet, Reise, Scheines, et al. (2013) emphasized the limitations of ECV benchmarks by pointing 
out that the severity of structural parameter bias is context dependent. Even a small degree of parameter 
bias can distort relations in complex structural equation models with many paths. Thus, the higher the 
ECV, the better it is when unidimensional measurement models are used. 
2.2.3.3 Global Model Fit Indices and Residual Correlations 
The R package lavaan (version 0.5-18; Rosseel, 2012) was used to fit a one-factor confirmatory 
factor analysis model to every NARQ and NPI subscale. Consistent with basing the analysis on the 
tetrachoric/polychoric correlations, the weighted least squares mean and variance adjusted (WLSMV) 
estimator was applied. For the model of each subscale, three global model fit indices were computed: 
the CFI (Hu & Bentler, 1999), the RMSEA (Browne & Cudeck, 1993), and the SRMR (Bentler, 1995; 
Hu & Bentler, 1999). We use the benchmarks for adequate fit proposed by Hu and Bentler (1999): CFI 
= .95; RMSEA = .06, and SRMR = .08.  
Furthermore, we counted the number of residual correlations (i.e., differences between the 
observed and model implied correlations) above |.20| for the one factor model of each subscale. 
Morizot et al. (2009) suggested that residual correlations above |.20| can be interpreted as signs for 
multidimensionality. Inspecting the residual correlations is usually seen as a test of the pairwise local 
independence assumption (i.e., two items are independent of each other conditional on the latent 
variable). However, many authors argue that unidimensionality is defined through local independence 
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(Hambleton, Swaminathan, & Rogers, 1991; McDonald, 2000) or unidimensionality implies local 
dependence (Birnbaum, 1968). Thus, we inspected the residual correlations as another way to assess 
CU.  
2.2.3.4 Measurement Precision 
In order to estimate the information curves of the NPI and NARQ subscales, we fitted the two-
parameter logistic model (Birnbaum, 1968) to each NPI subscale (i.e., a separate model for each 
subscale) and the graded response model (Samejima, 1969) to each NARQ subscale using the R 
package mirt (version 1.9; Chalmers, 2012; for details on how to estimate the information curves see 
Embretson & Reise, 2000). The two-parameter logistic model is a logistic model for dichotomous 
items, and the graded response model is a generalization of the two-parameter logistic model to 
ordered-polytomously scored items (e.g., Embretson & Reise, 2000; Koch, 1983; Samejima, 1969). 
Assumptions of the two-parameter logistic model and graded response model include 
unidimensionality and local independence. The unidimensionality and local independence assumptions 
were tested in the course of the CU investigations. Furthermore, we used the R package mirt version 
1.9 to obtain the S-X2 item fit statistics (Orlando & Thissen, 2000; Kang & Chen, 2011). To assess the 
size of the misfit, we transformed the S-X2 into Z values (Kenny, 2015) and the Z values into the effect 
size r (Rosenthal & DiMatteo, 2001; for details, see Chapter 2.6: Tables 2.8 to 2.20). 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Are the NARQ Subscales Higher in Closeness to Unidimensionality Than the 
NPI Subscales? 
For each study sample, Table 2.1 shows the results of the minimum rank factor analysis (i.e, 
ECV, common variance, and error variance) of each NPI and NARQ subscale. Table 2.1 additionally 
depicts, for each subscale, the three fit indices and the number of residual correlations above |.20| under 
the one-factor confirmatory factor analysis model. 
All ECVs were higher than 50%, indicating that the first factor of each NPI and NARQ subscale 
explained most of the common variance of its subscale in all samples. Furthermore, the subscales 
almost always met the Reise, Scheines, et al. (2013) 60% benchmark—the one exception will be 
described below—, which suggests that the parameter bias in structural equation modelling will often 
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be negligible. However, there were also differences among the subscales with regard to the ECVs, the 
fit indices, and the residual correlations. In the following, we first compare the CU of the NPI forced-
choice version (Sample 1 and 2) to the CU of the NARQ (Sample 1 and 2) and afterwards the CU of 
the NPI Likert-scale version (Sample 3) to the CU of the NARQ (Sample 1 and 2). 
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Table 2.1 
Closeness to Unidimensionality of various NPI and NARQ Facets 
  NPI  NARQ 
  L/A GEa E/E  ADM RIV 
Number of items  11 9 4  9 9 
Sample 1: GERMAN - NPI forced-choice vs. NARQ 6-point Likert 
ECV  63 65 88  79 71 
CV  65 59 30  61 69 
EV  35 41 70  39 31 
CFI  .949 .954 .999  .987 .952 
RMSEA  .071 .064 .010  .083 .150 
SRMR  .092 .079 .016  .046 .092 
resid r‘s > |.2|  3 1 0  0 1 
Sample 2: ENGLISH - NPI forced-choice vs. NARQ 6-point Likert 
ECV  65 55 74  71 66 
CV  70 71 31  51 64 
EV  30 29 69  49 36 
CFI  .985 .937 1.000  .986 .948 
RMSEA  .045 .074 .000  .061 .147 
SRMR  .065 .092 .024  .044 .098 
resid r‘s > |.2|  0 1 0  0 3 
Sample 3: ENGLISH - NPI 5-point Likert 
ECV  73 66 91    
CV  58 52 28    
EV  42 48 72    
CFI  .982 .948 .997    
RMSEA  .085 .116 .023    
SRMR  .050 .070 .010    
resid r‘s > |.2|  1 0 0    
Note. All analyses were based on tetrachoric/polychoric correlations. The ECVs of the subscales are boldfaced as these are 
the main results. Information about which residual inter-item correlations were above |.2| can be found in Chapter 2.6: 
Figures 2.8 to 2.20. ECV = Percentage of Explained Common Variance by first factor (minimum rank factor analysis); CV = 
Percentage of Common Variance (minimum rank factor analysis); EV = Percentage of Error or Item-Specific Variance 
(minimum rank factor analysis); CFI = comparative fit index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; SRMR = 
standardized root mean square residual; resid r‘s > |.2| = number of residual inter-item correlations above |.2|; NPI = 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory; L/A = Leadership/Authority; GE = Grandiose Exhibitionism; E/E = 
Entitlement/Exploitativeness; NARQ = Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry Questionnaire; ADM = Narcissistic Admiration; 
RIV = Narcissistic Rivalry. 
a Item 30 was excluded from the NPI Grandiose Exhibitionism subscale because the item content of Item 30 overlaps 
considerably with the content of NPI Item 7, and the overlap caused item misfit, model misfit, correlated residuals, and 
inflated information curves (see Chapter 2.6: Tables 2.4 to 2.7). 
 
2.3.1.1 NPI with Forced-Choice Response Format Versus NARQ 
We expected the NPI subscales to show lower levels of CU than the NARQ subscales. This 
expectation was partly supported by the data when the NPI was administered with its traditional forced-
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choice response format (Sample 1 and Sample 2). In line with our expectation, NPI 
Leadership/Authority and NPI Grandiose Exhibitionism showed lower levels of CU than the two 
NARQ subscales (Table 2.1). Although the ECVs of Leadership/Authority (63% and 65%) and 
Grandiose Exhibitionism in the German sample (65%) were still fair, the ECV for Grandiose 
Exhibitionism in the English sample (55%) did not meet the 60% ECV benchmark, and its percentage 
of contaminated correlations was higher than 20% (i.e., 27%) in this sample. This suggests the presence 
of non-negligible parameter bias in structural equation models when unidimensionality is imposed for 
the forced-choice items of the English NPI Grandiose Exhibitionism subscale (Reise, Scheines, et al., 
2013). The low levels of CU of the Grandiose Exhibitionism data also indicate that the interpretation of 
its scale scores and the associations thereof are somewhat ambiguous, because it is unclear to what 
extent the scale score or associations are driven by the first dimension or another dimension. 
In contrast to our expectation, NPI Entitlement/Exploitativeness showed higher ECVs (88% and 
74%) than Narcissistic Admiration (79% and 71%) and Narcissistic Rivalry (71% and 66%). Moreover, 
better fit indices and the lower number of residual correlations (Table 2.1) indicated that the 
Entitlement/Exploitativeness data were higher in CU than the data of the NARQ subscales. However, 
these differences need to be interpreted with caution as the number of items is different between NPI 
Entitlement/Exploitativeness and the NARQ subscales (four vs. nine) and a higher number of items 
almost surely entails a higher number of dimensions (Shapiro, 1982; see also Ten Berge & Sočan, 2004 
and Chapter 2.6: Table 2.3). Thus, the difference in number of items might have partly caused the 
relatively higher CU of the NPI Entitlement/Exploitativeness data. 
2.3.1.2 NPI with Likert Scale Response Format Versus NARQ 
When we compared the NPI Likert scale version to the NARQ, our expectation that the NARQ 
outperforms the NPI with regard to CU was not confirmed. The ECV of NPI Leadership/Authority 
(73%) was similar to the ECVs of Narcissistic Admiration (79% and 71%) and slightly better than the 
ECVs of Narcissistic Rivalry (71% and 66%). The ECV of NPI Grandiose Exhibitionism (66%) was 
similar to the ECVs of NARQ Rivalry but lower than the ECV of NARQ Admiration. The ECV of the 
NPI Entitlement/Exploitativeness subscale (91%) was excellent and higher than the ECVs of the 
NARQ subscales (Table 2.1). 
As a side note, the degree of common variance was very low for the NPI 
Entitlement/Exploitativeness subscale—around 30% common variance and thus around 70% error or 
item specific variance (Table 2.1)—even when compared to NPI subscales with similar length (Chapter 
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2.6: Table 2.3). This indicates that the response behavior to the four Entitlement/Exploitativeness items 
is not only determined by the common latent traits of Entitlement/Exploitativeness but also by random 
error and/or uncommon latent traits (i.e., traits that are only measured by one of the four 
Entitlement/Exploitativeness items). Therefore, Entitlement/Exploitativeness is probably measured 
with a low degree of MP—a question that will be addressed below. 
2.3.2 Are the NARQ Subscales Higher in Measurement Precision Than the NPI 
Subscales? 
Before we plotted the test information curves for each NARQ and NPI subscale, we assessed 
how well the responses to each item were described by the 2-PLM and graded response model, 
respectively. The IRT models fit well for most items in Sample 1 and Sample 2. In the largest sample, 
Sample 3, many items showed significant misfit (Chapter 2.6: Tables 2.8 to 2.20). That said, after 
excluding NPI Item 30 (see Method section), none of the items showed large misfit (r > .20). 
The amount of information delivered by the subscales of the NPI and NARQ are depicted in 
Figure 2.1. A higher amount of information indicates a higher degree of MP. We superimposed grey 
lines that indicate a reliability of .60, .70, .80, and .90, assuming a standard normally distributed theta 
in the population. In the latent trait range where these lines are exceeded by the information curve, the 
precision of the test score is comparable to that obtained using a test for which the reliability is above 
.60, .70, .80, and .90, respectively. 
We superimposed the information curves of the same subscale from different samples onto each 
other (Figure 2.1). Furthermore, the information curves of different subscales are comparable because 
the mean and variance of the latent trait of each subscale are fixed to zero and one, respectively. That 
said, the various NPI and NARQ subscales do not measure the same latent traits (for correlations 
among traits and their nomological networks, see Chapter 2.6: Table 2.21). Thus, it is not correct to say 
that any subscale measures the same latent trait with more MP than any other subscale. Rather, the 
interpretation is that one subscale measures its latent trait with more MP, say, one standard deviation 
above the mean than the other subscales measures its latent trait one standard deviation above the 
mean. 
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Figure 2.1. Test information as a function of standing on the latent trait for the NPI and NARQ subscales. The 
superimposed grey lines represent a reliability level of .60, .70, .80, and .90. The reliability can be derived from the 
information by the following formulas Rel =  Var(θ) / (Var(θ) + Var(ε)) 
The R package mirt automatically fixes the population variance of the latent variable to 1 to identify the model. Plus, the 
error variance Var(ε) is equal to 1/I(θ) (Samejima, 1994). Thus, 
Rel = 1 / (1 + 1/I(θ)) 
where Rel is the total-score reliability. GER = German version; ENG = English version; Likert = 5-Point Likert scale 
response format; NPI = Narcissistic Personality Inventory; L/A = Leadership/Authority; GE = Grandiose Exhibitionism; 
E/E = Entitlement/Exploitativeness; NARQ = Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry Questionnaire; ADM = Narcissistic 
Admiration; RIV = Narcissistic Rivalry. 
 
2.3.3 NPI with forced-choice response format versus NARQ 
We expected that the NPI would measure its latent traits with less MP than the NARQ. In line 
with this expectation, two subscales of the forced-choice NPI, Leadership/Authority and Grandiose 
Exhibitionism, measured their respective dimension with relative high MP (reliability ≥ .80) in a 
narrower theta range (i.e., depending on the subscale and data somewhere between -1 to +1) than 
NARQ Admiration and Rivalry (-2 to +3 and -1 to +4, respectively; Figure 2.1). In other words, 
narcissistic admiration and rivalry were—in contrast to the two NPI facets—not only measured with 
high MP among people with an average degree of admiration and rivalry but also among people with 
an above (and below) average degree of admiration and rivalry, respectively. The third NPI subscale, 
Entitlement/Exploitativeness, showed relatively low MP (reliability < .60) across the whole latent trait 
continuum in the two forced-choice samples and thus was clearly inferior to the NARQ subscales 
(Figure 2.1). The NPI forced-choice results were similar to previous MP results for the three NPI 
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subscale data (Ackerman et al., 2012), but the degree of MP of Entitlement/Exploitativeness was a bit 
lower in the current study than found by Ackerman et al. (2012). Yet, the levels of MP of 
Entitlement/Exploitativeness reported by Ackerman et al. (2012) were still distinctly lower than the 
levels of MP of NARQ Admiration and Rivalry that we found (Figure 2.1). Taken together, in line with 
our expectations, the subscales of the NARQ showed more desirable MP properties than the subscales 
of the NPI using its original forced-choice response format. 
2.3.4 NPI with Likert scale response format versus NARQ 
When the NPI was administered using the 5-point Likert scale response format, the latent trait 
range that was measured with high MP was similarly wide for NPI Leadership/Authority and NPI 
Grandiose Exhibitionism as for NARQ Admiration and Rivalry (Figure 2.1: dashed lines). NPI 
Leadership/Authority and NARQ Admiration were measured with high MP across a particularly broad 
theta range, -3 to +2.5 and -2.5 to +3, respectively. Also, the information curve of NPI 
Leadership/Authority climbed similarly high in the average latent trait range as the curves of the two 
NARQ subscales in the German sample (Sample 1) and higher than the curve of NARQ Admiration in 
the English sample (Sample 2). 
The MP of NPI Entitlement/Exploitativeness was lower than the MP of the two NARQ 
subscales even when the NPI was administered with a Likert scale response format (Figure 2.1: dashed 
lines). The information curve for Entitlement/Exploitativeness did not reach or come close to the .80 
reliability line at any range of the latent trait continuum. It is worth noting that the NPI 
Entitlement/Exploitativeness subscale has fewer items than the two NARQ subscales. This is certainly 
a handicap for MP because the test information function is the sum of the item information functions. 
In order to control for the impact of test length on the MP results, we compared the average 
information per item of the Entitlement/Exploitativeness subscale to the average information per item 
of the two NARQ subscales: We divided the test information of the subscales by their number of 
items—for completeness we did so for all five NPI and NARQ subscales (Figure 2.2). Although the 
difference between Entitlement/Exploitativeness and the two NARQ subscales was somewhat smaller 
in this comparison than in the whole scale comparison (Figure 2.1), the MP of 
Entitlement/Exploitativeness was smaller than the MP of the two NARQ subscales almost across the 
whole latent trait continuum. Furthermore, other short NPI subscales, such as the Vanity subscale 
which was proposed by Raskin and Terry (1988) and Ackerman et al. (2016), showed a higher MP and 
percentage of common variance (Chapter 2.6: Figures 2.3 and 2.5, Table 2.3) than 
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Entitlement/Exploitativeness (Figure 2.1, Table 2.1). These results indicate that the low MP of 
Entitlement/Exploitativeness is not only due to the low number of items but also due to the low 
percentage of common variance among Entitlement/Exploitativeness items (Table 2.1). 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Average amount of information delivered per item as a function of standing on the latent trait for the 
NPI and NARQ subscales. The average amount of information was calculated by dividing the test information function by 
the number of items. GER = German version; ENG = English version; Likert = 5-Point Likert scale response format; NPI = 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory; L/A = Leadership/Authority; GE = Grandiose Exhibitionism; E/E = 
Entitlement/Exploitativeness; NARQ = Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry Questionnaire; ADM = Narcissistic 
Admiration; RIV = Narcissistic Rivalry. 
 
2.4 Discussion 
The results partly corroborate our conjecture that the disregard of the multidimensional nature 
of grandiose narcissism during NPI creation has led to a lower CU and MP of the data of NPI 
subscales. In line with our expectations, NPI Grandiose/Exhibitionism did not match the NARQ 
subscales—at least not Narcissistic Admiration—with regard to CU. Further, NPI 
Entitlement/Exploitativeness did not match the NARQ subscales with regard to MP, even when the 
NPI was administered with a Likert-scale response format. However, in contrast to our expectations, 
the Likert-scale data of NPI Leadership/Authority were at least as high in CU and MP as the two 
NARQ subscales (Table 2.1, Figure 2.1). The lack of a theory that distinguishes various aspects of 
narcissism and the strive for unidimensionality of the NPI total scale seems to have led to an 
overemphasis on Leadership/Authority and an underrepresentation or distorted assessment of other 
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aspects of narcissism in the NPI (see also Back et al., 2013; Pincus et al., 2009). This lack of emphasis 
is especially marked with regard to NPI Entitlement/Exploitativeness, as reflected in its short test 
length (four items), its low degree of common variance (Table 2.1), and its relatively low MP 
compared to other short NPI subscales (e.g., Vanity; Ackerman et al., 2016; Raskin & Terry, 1998; 
Chapter 2.6: Figures 2.3 to 2.5). That the focus of the NPI is primarily on Leadership/Authority rather 
than on Entitlement/Exploitativeness is unfortunate for researchers interested in clinically relevant 
features of narcissism. Entitlement/Exploitativeness is the NPI subscale most strongly linked to 
maladaptive outcomes (e.g., Ackerman et al., 2011), and Leadership/Authority has often been linked to 
adaptive traits and outcomes (e.g., Ackerman et al., 2011; Stanton et al., 2016).  
The subscale of the NARQ that is most strongly associated to maladaptive outcomes, 
Narcissistic Rivalry (e.g., Back et al., 2013; Wurst et al., in press), measures its trait more precisely in 
the medium and high latent trait range than NPI Entitlement/Exploitativeness. This indicates that the 
Rivalry scale comes with less attenuation of effect sizes and lower sample size requirements to test an 
effect with enough power than the NPI Entitlement/Exploitativeness scale (see also Wolf et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, the high MP is directly related to lower standard errors (e.g., Embretson, 1996). Low 
standard errors in the high latent trait area would be a desirable feature if the Rivalry scale were to be 
applied in clinical settings (e.g., as a screening instrument). There is still room for improvement in the 
low latent trait area of the Rivalry scale though. Furthermore, the CU of Rivalry was lower than the CU 
of other NPI and NARQ subscales (Table 2.1). Future research might substitute existing Rivalry items 
with items (1) that assess rivalry with high MP in the low latent trait range and (2) that increase the CU 
of the scale. 
Interestingly, the data of all three NPI subscales showed higher CU and MP when the NPI items 
were administered with a 5-point Likert scale response format than when administered with the 
traditional forced-choice response format (for an overview see Table 2.2). This finding confirms our 
expectation that the differences in MP between the data of the NPI forced-choice subscales and the data 
of the NARQ subscales are at least partly due to differences in response format. Having five response 
options (5-point Likert scale) compared to having two response options (pairwise forced-choice) seems 
to induce a broader range of high MP. The latter observation is in line with the assertion that every 
additional response category can add information (Koch, 1983; Samejima, 1969).  
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Table 2.2 
Overview and Evaluation of Results 
  NPI  NARQ 
  L/A GEa E/E  ADM  RIV 
Closeness to Unidimensionality 
Forced-choice  fair fair / poor very good / good  - - 
Likert  good fair excellent  good good / fair 
Measurement Precision 
Forced-choice  good fair very poor  - - 
Likert  very good very good fair  very good very good 
Note. Please note the evaluations only refer to two psychometric properties of the subscales, closeness to 
unidimensionality and measurement precision. When you select a narcissism subscale you want to take into account other 
psychometric properties as well, especially the validity of the subscales (for research on the validity see e.g., Back et al., 
2013; Gentile, Miller, Carter, Hoffman, & Campbell, 2016; Miller et al., 2014). To evaluate the measurement precision, we 
calculated the marginal reliabilities for latent traits from a normal (Gaussian) distribution using the marginal_rxx function 
of the R package mirt (version 1.9; Chalmers, 2012; for R code see https://osf.io/mzj7p/). We classified as ‘excellent’ (ECV 
> 90%; marginal reliability > .90), 'very good' (ECV = 80-90%; marginal reliability = .80-.90), 'good' (ECV = 70-80%; marginal 
reliability = .70-.80), 'fair' (ECV = 60-70%; marginal reliability = .60-.70), “poor' (ECV = 50-60%; marginal reliability = .50-
.60), and 'very poor' (ECV < 50%; marginal reliability < .50; for detailed results see Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1). NPI = 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory; L/A = Leadership/Authority; GE = Grandiose Exhibitionism; E/E = 
Entitlement/Exploitativeness; NARQ Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry Questionnaire; ADM = Narcissistic Admiration; RIV 
= Narcissistic Rivalry. 
a Item 30 was excluded from the NPI Grandiose Exhibitionism subscale because the item content of Item 30 overlaps 
considerably with the content of NPI Item 7, and the overlap caused item misfit, model misfit, correlated residuals, and 
inflated information curves (see Chapter 2.6: Tables 2.4 to 2.7). 
 
Surprisingly, the response format also influenced the CU of the NPI subscales. In the traditional 
forced-choice version of the NPI, each item comprised of both narcissistic and non-narcissistic 
statements, and participants are asked to select the statement with which they identify most. One issue 
of the traditional format is that the “narcissistic” and “non-narcissistic” statements of the same item 
sometimes tap different dimensions (Ackerman et al., 2016; Wetzel et al., 2016). Hence, some forced-
choice NPI items elicits individual differences with regard to more than one dimension, which reduces 
the CU, as the current results indicate. In the Likert scale version of the NPI, respondents are asked 
how much they agree with each of the two forced-choice statements in isolation. Thus, in the Likert 
scale version, the reduction of CU can be avoided through analyzing exclusively responses to 
narcissistic statements, as was done in the current study. Therefore, from a CU and MP perspective, the 
NPI 5-point Likert version and the NARQ with its 6-point Likert scale are preferable over the original 
NPI forced-choice version. 
2.4.1 Limitations and Future Research 
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A limitation of our comparison is that the Likert scale of the NPI and the Likert scale of the 
NARQ had a different number of response options, five and six, respectively. Recently, Boldero et al. 
(2015) found that the NPI administered with a binary response format (disagree vs. agree) yields 
slightly different results than the NPI with a 6-point Likert scale (“strongly disagree” to “strongly 
agree”). Potentially, respondents react differently to a 5-point Likert response format than to a 6-point 
Likert response format. For example, the presence or absence of a mid-point answer category might 
influence response behavior. Future research needs to probe into this issue. 
Another limitation of the current study is that only two narcissism instruments were investigated 
regarding CU and MP. In recent years, an array of narcissism instruments have been developed, for 
example the Five Factor Narcissism Inventory (Glover, Miller, Lynam, Crego, & Widiger, 2012) or the 
Pathological Narcissism Inventory (Pincus et al., 2009). Although some of these instruments are not 
intended to measure grandiose narcissism or normal narcissism, future research might want to 
investigate to what extent these other instruments overlap with the NPI and NARQ and—if so—to 
what extent they are viable alternatives to the NPI and NARQ regarding CU and MP. 
Finally, the current study does not investigate whether the dominant latent trait measured by the 
respective subscale is the latent trait of interest (construct validity) and how the latent trait is related to 
behaviors or other relevant outcomes (criterion validity). Both construct and criterion validity are—
however–also crucial features of a scale which researchers need to take into account when choosing a 
narcissism scale (for research that investigates and discusses the construct and criterion validity of the 
forced-choice and Likert version of the NPI and the NARQ see Back et al., 2013; Gentile, Miller, 
Carter, Hoffman, & Campbell, 2016; Miller et al., 2014). 
2.4.2 Conclusion and Recommendations 
Taken together, with regard to CU and MP, the subscales of the NARQ (Admiration and 
Rivalry) mostly outperformed the subscales of the NPI (Leadership/Authority, Grandiose 
Exhibitionism, and Entitlement/Exploitativeness) when the NPI was administered with its traditional 
pairwise forced-choice format but not when the NPI was administered with a 5-point Likert response 
format. Thus, from a CU and MP perspective, we recommend using the two NARQ subscales and/or 
NPI Leadership/Authority and Grandiose Exhibitionism with a Likert scale response format rather than 
the NPI with a forced-choice response format to measure the various aspects of grandiose narcissism. 
The NPI Entitlement/Exploitativeness scale showed substantial weaknesses with regard to MP and low 
percentages of common variance regardless of the response format. Thus, it should, in its current form, 
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not be applied. Future psychometric research on the NPI and NARQ subscales should try to improve 
the CU of NPI Grandiose Exhibitionism and NARQ Rivalry and the MP of NPI 
Entitlement/Exploitativeness. 
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2.6 Supplemental Material 
   
Table 2.3 
Closeness to Unidimensionality of Various NPI Facets 
  Ackerman et al. (2015)   
Corry et al. 
(2008) 
 Raskin and Terry (1988) 
  Man Exh Lead Van Sup  L/A Ex/En  Auth Exh Sup Ent Expl S-S Van 
Number of 
items 
 5 3 6 3 4  9 14  8 7 5 6 5 6 3 
GERMAN - NPI forced-choice (Sample 1) 
ECV  82 100 81 100 90   66 46   71 64 68 73 72 54 100 
CV  46 60 65 67 48   72 61   69 60 55 41 48 45 67 
EV  54 40 35 33 52  28 39  31 40 45 59 52 55 33 
CFI  .973 1.000 .982 1.000 .997  .959 .872  .965 .974 .914 .978 .937 .896 1.000 
RMSEA  .054 .000 .068 .000 .027  .078 .086  .078 .067 .105 .028 .074 .051 .000 
SRMR  .045 .000 .056 .000 .027  .095 .110  .082 .074 .099 .039 .060 .059 .000 
resid r‘s > 
|.2| 
 0 0 0 0 0  2 10  1 2 1 0 0 0 0 
ENGLISH - NPI forced-choice (Sample 2) 
ECV  81 100 79 100 83  68 43  71 62 68 71 76 61 100 
CV  43 63 68 64 54  76 66  76 62 65 35 47 29 64 
EV  57 37 32 36 46  24 34  24 38 35 65 53 71 36 
CFI  .997 1.000 .995 1.000 .992  .989 .903  .990 .987 .858 .975 .983 .929 1.000 
RMSEA  .017 .000 .038 .000 .053  .046 .079  .047 .051 .168 .027 .041 .031 .000 
SRMR  .035 .000 .041 .000 .049  .062 .110  .058 .073 .129 .047 .049 .048 .000 
resid r‘s > 
|.2| 
 0 0 0 0 0  0 14  0 0 3 0 0 0 0 
ENGLISH - NPI 5-point Likert (Sample 3) 
ECV  94 100 89 100 89  81 55  84 77 87 84 88 76 100 
CV  47 68 58 63 68  59 53  58 50 41 30 45 33 63 
EV  53 32 42 37 32  41 47  42 50 59 70 55 67 37 
CFI  .999 1.000 .997 1.000 .985  .992 .936  .992 .996 .994 .989 .996 .978 1.000 
RMSEA  .027 .000 .053 .000 .195  .067 .132  .072 .063 .052 .034 .042 .046 .000 
SRMR  .013 .000 .026 .000 .048  .037 .087  .038 .037 .026 .020 .020 .027 .000 
resid r‘s >  0 0 0 0 0  0 6  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
    
|.2| 
Note. All analysis are based on tetrachoric/polychoric correlations. The ECVs of the subscales are boldfaced as these are the main results. 
ECV = Percentage of Explained Common Variance by first factor (minimum rank factor analysis); CV = Percentage of Common Variance 
(minimum rank factor analysis); EV = Percentage of Error or Item-Specific Variance (minimum rank factor analysis); CFI = comparative fit 
index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; SRMR = standardized root mean square residual; resid r‘s > |.2| = number of 
residual inter-item correlations above |.2|. For Ackerman et al. (2015; for 5-point Likert scale version of NPI) facets: Man = 
Manipulativeness; Exh = Exhibitionism; Lead = Leadership; Van = Vanity; Sup = Superiority. For Corry et al. (2008) facets: L/A = 
Leadership/Authority; Ex/En = Exhibitionism/Entitlement. For Raskin & Terry (1988) facets: Auth = Authority; Exh = Exhibitionism; Sup = 
Superiority; Ent = Entitlement; Expl = Exploitativeness; S-S = Self-Sufficiency; Van = Vanity. 
   
 
Table 2.4 
Closeness to Unidimensionality of the NPI Grandiose Exhibitionism Subscale with and without NPI Item 7 or NPI Item 30 
  Sample 1 (German)  Sample 2 (English)  Sample 3 (English Likert) 
  Full w/o Item 7 
w/o Item 
30 
 Full w/o Item 7 
w/o Item 
30 
 Full w/o Item 7 
w/o Item 
30 
Number of items  10 9 9  10 9 9  10 9 9 
ECV  59 63 65  52 55 55  64 65 66 
CV  68 60 59  76 71 71  58 53 52 
EV  32 40 41  24 29 29  42 47 48 
CFI  .923 .958 .954  .906 .932 .937  .946 .948 .948 
RMSEA  .099 .060 .064  .116 .078 .074  .170 .118 .116 
SRMR  .104 .075 .079  .127 .095 .092  .100 .071 .070 
resid r‘s > |.2|  6 2 1  9 1 1  6 0 0 
Note. All analysis are based on tetrachoric/polychoric correlations. The ECVs of the subscales are boldfaced as these are the main results. ECV = Percentage of 
Explained Common Variance by first factor (minimum rank factor analysis); CV = Percentage of Common Variance (minimum rank factor analysis); EV = Percentage of 
Error or Item-Specific Variance (minimum rank factor analysis); CFI = comparative fit index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; SRMR = standardized 
root mean square residual; resid r‘s > |.2| = number of residual inter-item correlations above |.2|. 
 
 
    
Table 2.5 
Residual Inter-Item Correlations, Standardized Factor Loadings and S-X2 item fit statistics for full Grandiose Exhibitionism subscale 
(Sample 1) 
 npi4 npi7 npi15 npi19 npi20 npi26 npi28 npi29 npi30 npi38 loading S-X2 df p r 
npi4      .28     .52 8.11 7 .323 .01 
npi7    -.34    -.26   .86 31.43 6 
≤ 
.001 
.10 
npi15           .72 4.61 7 .707 -.01 
npi19  -.34      .22 -.32  .74 5.72 7 .572 -.01 
npi20           .33 8.73 7 .273 .01 
npi26 .28          .55 4.83 6 .566 .00 
npi28          .21 .40 8.68 7 .277 .01 
npi29  -.26  .22       .67 3.32 6 .768 -.02 
npi30    -.32       .83 9.89 6 .13 .03 
npi38       .21    .49 5.74 7 .571 .00 
Note. The table displays the residual inter-item correlations above |.20| and the standardized factor loadings after fitting a one factor confirmatory factor analysis model 
to the subscale data, applying the WLSMV estimator. The columns on the right indicate the S-X2 item fit statistics for the fitted IRT models (Orlando & Thissen, 2000; 
Kang & Chen, 2011). We transformed the S-X2 into Z values by the following formula from http://davidakenny.net/cm/fit.htm: 
Z =  √(2χ2) - √(2df - 1) 
Afterwards, we transformed the Z values into the effect size r by the following formula from Rosenthal & DiMatteo (2001) 
r = Z/√ (N).  
Whenever S-X2 is below the expected value of the χ2 distribution (i.e., df), the r is negative. The rs for the items with content overlap, Item 7 and Item 30, are in bold. 
loading = standardized factor loading. 
 
 
   
 
Table 2.6 
Residual Inter-Item Correlations, Standardized Factor Loadings and S-X2 item fit statistics for full Grandiose Exhibitionism subscale 
(Sample 2) 
 npi4 npi7 npi15 npi19 npi20 npi26 npi28 npi29 npi30 npi38 loading S-X2 df p r 
npi4      .44     .57 15.34 7 .032 .07 
npi7   -.26 -.32    -.24   .87 21.05 6 .002 .12 
npi15  -.26  .23     -.27  .68 5.95 6 .429 .01 
npi19  -.32 .23     .22 -.36  .68 5.23 6 .515 .00 
npi20           .48 5.02 7 .658 -.02 
npi26 .44          .55 9.86 6 .131 .04 
npi28           .31 8.61 7 .282 .02 
npi29  -.24  .22     -.27  .65 7.38 6 .288 .02 
npi30   -.27 -.36    -.27   .87 16.73 6 .01 .09 
npi38           .50 10.91 7 .143 .04 
Note. The table displays the residual inter-item correlations above |.20| and the standardized factor loadings after fitting a one factor confirmatory factor analysis model 
to the subscale data, applying the WLSMV estimator. The columns on the right indicate the S-X2 item fit statistics for the fitted IRT models (Orlando & Thissen, 2000; 
Kang & Chen, 2011). We transformed the S-X2 into Z values by the following formula from http://davidakenny.net/cm/fit.htm: 
Z =  √(2χ2) - √(2df - 1) 
Afterwards, we transformed the Z values into the effect size r by the following formula from Rosenthal & DiMatteo (2001) 
r = Z/√ (N).  
Whenever S-X2 is below the expected value of the χ2 distribution (i.e., df), the r is negative. The rs for the items with content overlap, Item 7 and Item 30, are in bold. 
loading = standardized factor loading. 
 
 
    
 
Table 2.7 
Residual Inter-Item Correlations, Standardized Factor Loadings and S-X2 item fit statistics for full Grandiose Exhibitionism subscale 
(Sample 3) 
 npi4 npi7 npi15 npi19 npi20 npi26 npi28 npi29 npi30 npi38 loading S-X2 df p r 
npi4           .26 185.01 110 
≤ 
.001 
.06 
npi7   -.20 -.34    -.29   .89 601.71 66 
≤ 
.001 
.32 
npi15  -.20       -.20  .62 259.79 101 
≤ 
.001 
.12 
npi19  -.34       -.34  .72 283.49 103 
≤ 
.001 
.13 
npi20           .55 134.15 93 .003 .04 
npi26           .42 192.62 97 
≤ 
.001 
.08 
npi28           .46 161.51 104 
≤ 
.001 
.05 
npi29  -.29       -.28  .70 326.81 100 
≤ 
.001 
.16 
npi30   -.20 -.34    -.28   .89 771.85 66 
≤ 
.001 
.38 
npi38           .43 146.03 104 .004 .04 
Note. The table displays the residual inter-item correlations above |.20| and the standardized factor loadings after fitting a one factor confirmatory factor analysis model 
to the subscale data, applying the WLSMV estimator. The columns on the right indicate the S-X2 item fit statistics for the fitted IRT models (Orlando & Thissen, 2000; 
Kang & Chen, 2011). We transformed the S-X2 into Z values by the following formula from http://davidakenny.net/cm/fit.htm: 
Z =  √(2χ2) - √(2df - 1) 
Afterwards, we transformed the Z values into the effect size r by the following formula from Rosenthal & DiMatteo (2001) 
r = Z/√ (N).  
Whenever S-X2 is below the expected value of the χ2 distribution (i.e., df), the r is negative. The rs for the items with content overlap, Item 7 and Item 30, are in bold. 
loading = standardized factor loading. 
   
Table 2.8 
Residual Inter-Item Correlations, Standardized Factor Loadings and S-X2 item fit statistics for NPI Leadership Authority (Sample 1) 
 npi1 npi5 npi10 npi11 npi12 npi27 npi32 npi33 npi34 npi36 npi40 loading S-X2 df p r 
npi1    .20        .61 7.73 6 .259 .01 
npi5            .41 10.69 8 .22 .02 
npi10            .88 11.72 6 .068 .03 
npi11 .20     -.26      .62 20.82 7 .004 .06 
npi12            .61 10.23 8 .249 .01 
npi27    -.26        .66 3.53 7 .832 -.02 
npi32            .83 11.41 7 .122 .03 
npi33            .71 6.66 7 .465 .00 
npi34           .28 .41 7.62 8 .471 .00 
npi36            .67 10.69 8 .22 .02 
npi40         .28   .37 16.91 8 .031 .04 
Note. The table displays the residual inter-item correlations above |.20| and the standardized factor loadings after fitting a one factor confirmatory factor analysis model 
to the subscale data, applying the WLSMV estimator. The columns on the right indicate the S-X2 item fit statistics for the fitted IRT models (Orlando & Thissen, 2000; 
Kang & Chen, 2011). We transformed the S-X2 into Z values by the following formula from http://davidakenny.net/cm/fit.htm: 
Z =  √(2χ2) - √(2df - 1) 
Afterwards, we transformed the Z values into the effect size r by the following formula from Rosenthal & DiMatteo (2001) 
r = Z/√ (N).  
Whenever S-X2 is below the expected value of the χ2 distribution (i.e., df), the r is negative. loading = standardized factor loading. 
    
Table 2.9 
Residual Inter-Item Correlations, Standardized Factor Loadings and S-X2 item fit statistics for NPI Leadership Authority (Sample 2) 
 npi1 npi5 npi10 npi11 npi12 npi27 npi32 npi33 npi34 npi36 npi40 loading S-X2 df p r 
npi1            .62 6.53 7 .480 .00 
npi5            .41 16.48 8 .036 .07 
npi10            .86 4.24 6 .645 -.02 
npi11            .60 6.40 8 .602 -.01 
npi12            .76 5.25 8 .731 -.02 
npi27            .58 6.51 8 .591 -.01 
npi32            .8 8.76 7 .270 .02 
npi33            .83 3.49 7 .836 -.04 
npi34            .37 17.75 8 .023 .08 
npi36            .76 9.31 7 .232 .03 
npi40            .44 16.58 8 .035 .07 
Note. The table displays the residual inter-item correlations above |.20| and the standardized factor loadings after fitting a one factor confirmatory factor analysis model 
to the subscale data, applying the WLSMV estimator. The columns on the right indicate the S-X2 item fit statistics for the fitted IRT models (Orlando & Thissen, 2000; 
Kang & Chen, 2011). We transformed the S-X2 into Z values by the following formula from http://davidakenny.net/cm/fit.htm: 
Z =  √(2χ2) - √(2df - 1) 
Afterwards, we transformed the Z values into the effect size r by the following formula from Rosenthal & DiMatteo (2001) 
r = Z/√ (N).  
Whenever S-X2 is below the expected value of the χ2 distribution (i.e., df), the r is negative. loading = standardized factor loading. 
 
 
   
 
Table 2.10 
Residual Inter-Item Correlations, Standardized Factor Loadings and S-X2 item fit statistics for NPI Leadership Authority (Sample 3) 
 npi1 npi5 npi10 npi11 npi12 npi27 npi32 npi33 npi34 npi36 npi40 loading S-X2 df p r 
npi1            .64 117.41 102 .141 .01 
npi5            .39 194.05 123 0 .06 
npi10            .83 89.46 79 .198 .01 
npi11            .57 172.74 107 
≤ 
.001 
.06 
npi12            .60 134.72 105 .027 .03 
npi27            .60 128.47 107 .077 .02 
npi32            .65 140.39 99 .004 .04 
npi33            .77 138.30 91 .001 .04 
npi34           .24 .55 178.04 114 
≤ 
.001 
.05 
npi36            .82 113.85 82 .012 .03 
npi40         .24   .59 116.14 111 .35 .01 
Note. The table displays the residual inter-item correlations above |.20| and the standardized factor loadings after fitting a one factor confirmatory factor analysis model 
to the subscale data, applying the WLSMV estimator. The columns on the right indicate the S-X2 item fit statistics for the fitted IRT models (Orlando & Thissen, 2000; 
Kang & Chen, 2011). We transformed the S-X2 into Z values by the following formula from http://davidakenny.net/cm/fit.htm: 
Z =  √(2χ2) - √(2df - 1) 
Afterwards, we transformed the Z values into the effect size r by the following formula from Rosenthal & DiMatteo (2001) 
r = Z/√ (N).  
Whenever S-X2 is below the expected value of the χ2 distribution (i.e., df), the r is negative. loading = standardized factor loading. 
 
 
    
 
Table 2.11 
Residual Inter-Item Correlations, Standardized Factor Loadings and S-X2 item fit statistics for NPI Grandiose Exhibitionism without Item 
30 (Sample 1) 
 npi4 npi7 npi15 npi19 npi20 npi26 npi28 npi29 npi38 loading S_X2 df p r 
npi4      .26    .54 5.87 6 .438 .00 
npi7          .57 14.68 6 .023 .05 
npi15          .78 9.62 5 .087 .03 
npi19          .83 24.18 5 .000 .09 
npi20          .32 5.76 6 .451 .00 
npi26 .26         .55 3.44 5 .633 -.01 
npi28          .43 12.50 6 .052 .04 
npi29          .74 12.64 5 .027 .05 
npi38          .51 9.74 6 .136 .02 
Note. The table displays the residual inter-item correlations above |.20| and the standardized factor loadings after fitting a one factor confirmatory factor analysis model 
to the subscale data, applying the WLSMV estimator. The columns on the right indicate the S-X2 item fit statistics for the fitted IRT models (Orlando & Thissen, 2000; 
Kang & Chen, 2011). We transformed the S-X2 into Z values by the following formula from http://davidakenny.net/cm/fit.htm: 
Z =  √(2χ2) - √(2df - 1) 
Afterwards, we transformed the Z values into the effect size r by the following formula from Rosenthal & DiMatteo (2001) 
r = Z/√ (N).  
Whenever S-X2 is below the expected value of the χ2 distribution (i.e., df), the r is negative. loading = standardized factor loading. 
 
 
   
 
Table 2.12 
Residual Inter-Item Correlations, Standardized Factor Loadings and S-X2 item fit statistics for NPI Grandiose Exhibitionism without Item 
30 (Sample 2) 
 npi4 npi7 npi15 npi19 npi20 npi26 npi28 npi29 npi38 loading S_X2 df p r 
npi4      .42    .60 6.75 6 .345 .01 
npi7          .51 10.86 6 .093 .05 
npi15          .77 5.53 5 .355 .01 
npi19          .79 11.28 5 .046 .07 
npi20          .49 2.82 6 .831 -.04 
npi26 .42         .56 4.17 5 .526 .00 
npi28          .33 5.74 6 .453 .00 
npi29          .75 7.16 4 .128 .04 
npi38          .53 16.13 6 .013 .09 
Note. The table displays the residual inter-item correlations above |.20| and the standardized factor loadings after fitting a one factor confirmatory factor analysis model 
to the subscale data, applying the WLSMV estimator. The columns on the right indicate the S-X2 item fit statistics for the fitted IRT models (Orlando & Thissen, 2000; 
Kang & Chen, 2011). We transformed the S-X2 into Z values by the following formula from http://davidakenny.net/cm/fit.htm: 
Z =  √(2χ2) - √(2df - 1) 
Afterwards, we transformed the Z values into the effect size r by the following formula from Rosenthal & DiMatteo (2001) 
r = Z/√ (N).  
Whenever S-X2 is below the expected value of the χ2 distribution (i.e., df), the r is negative. loading = standardized factor loading. 
 
 
    
 
Table 2.13 
Residual Inter-Item Correlations, Standardized Factor Loadings and S-X2 item fit statistics for NPI Grandiose Exhibitionism without Item 
30 (Sample 3) 
 npi4 npi7 npi15 npi19 npi20 npi26 npi28 npi29 npi38 loading S_X2 df p r 
npi4          .28 171.45 97 .000 .06 
npi7          .60 178.24 87 .000 .08 
npi15          .69 177.40 75 .000 .09 
npi19          .80 295.34 72 .000 .17 
npi20          .53 137.10 89 .001 .04 
npi26          .42 192.47 86 .000 .09 
npi28          .48 193.96 89 .000 .09 
npi29          .78 209.10 72 .000 .12 
npi38          .43 133.52 92 .003 .04 
Note. The table displays the residual inter-item correlations above |.20| and the standardized factor loadings after fitting a one factor confirmatory factor analysis model 
to the subscale data, applying the WLSMV estimator. The columns on the right indicate the S-X2 item fit statistics for the fitted IRT models (Orlando & Thissen, 2000; 
Kang & Chen, 2011). We transformed the S-X2 into Z values by the following formula from http://davidakenny.net/cm/fit.htm: 
Z =  √(2χ2) - √(2df - 1) 
Afterwards, we transformed the Z values into the effect size r by the following formula from Rosenthal & DiMatteo (2001) 
r = Z/√ (N).  
Whenever S-X2 is below the expected value of the χ2 distribution (i.e., df), the r is negative. loading = standardized factor loading. 
   
 
Table 2.14 
Residual Inter-Item Correlations, Standardized Factor Loadings and S-X2 item fit statistics for NPI Entitlement/Exploitativeness (Sample 1) 
 npi13 npi14 npi24 npi25 loading S-X2 df p r 
npi13     .36 0.24 1 .623 -.01 
npi14     .39 1.49 1 .223 .02 
npi24     .58 4.24 1 .039 .04 
npi25     .66 0.76 1 .382 .01 
Note. The table displays the residual inter-item correlations above |.20| and the standardized factor loadings after fitting a one factor confirmatory factor analysis model 
to the subscale data, applying the WLSMV estimator. The columns on the right indicate the S-X2 item fit statistics for the fitted IRT models (Orlando & Thissen, 2000; 
Kang & Chen, 2011). We transformed the S-X2 into Z values by the following formula from http://davidakenny.net/cm/fit.htm: 
Z =  √(2χ2) - √(2df - 1) 
Afterwards, we transformed the Z values into the effect size r by the following formula from Rosenthal & DiMatteo (2001) 
r = Z/√ (N).  
Whenever S-X2 is below the expected value of the χ2 distribution (i.e., df), the r is negative. loading = standardized factor loading. 
 
 
    
 
Table 2.15 
Residual Inter-Item Correlations, Standardized Factor Loadings and S-X2 item fit statistics for NPI Entitlement/Exploitativeness (Sample 2) 
 npi13 npi14 npi24 npi25 loading S-X2 df p r 
npi13     .35 0.18 1 .668 -.01 
npi14     .41 1.83 1 .177 .03 
npi24     .54 2.22 1 .136 .04 
npi25     .51 0.18 1 .674 -.02 
Note. The table displays the residual inter-item correlations above |.20| and the standardized factor loadings after fitting a one factor confirmatory factor analysis model 
to the subscale data, applying the WLSMV estimator. The columns on the right indicate the S-X2 item fit statistics for the fitted IRT models (Orlando & Thissen, 2000; 
Kang & Chen, 2011). We transformed the S-X2 into Z values by the following formula from http://davidakenny.net/cm/fit.htm: 
Z =  √(2χ2) - √(2df - 1) 
Afterwards, we transformed the Z values into the effect size r by the following formula from Rosenthal & DiMatteo (2001) 
r = Z/√ (N).  
Whenever S-X2 is below the expected value of the χ2 distribution (i.e., df), the r is negative. loading = standardized factor loading. 
 
 
   
 
Table 2.16 
Residual Inter-Item Correlations, Standardized Factor Loadings and S-X2 item fit statistics for NPI Entitlement/Exploitativeness (Sample 3) 
 npi13 npi14 npi24 npi25 loading S-X2 df p r 
npi13     .32 134.56 29 ≤ .001 .12 
npi14     .55 95.23 28 ≤ .001 .09 
npi24     .34 87.89 29 ≤ .001 .08 
npi25     .70 74.55 27 ≤ .001 .07 
Note. The table displays the residual inter-item correlations above |.20| and the standardized factor loadings after fitting a one factor confirmatory factor analysis model 
to the subscale data, applying the WLSMV estimator. The columns on the right indicate the S-X2 item fit statistics for the fitted IRT models (Orlando & Thissen, 2000; 
Kang & Chen, 2011). We transformed the S-X2 into Z values by the following formula from http://davidakenny.net/cm/fit.htm:  
Z =  √(2χ2) - √(2df - 1) 
Afterwards, we transformed the Z values into the effect size r by the following formula from Rosenthal & DiMatteo (2001) 
r = Z/√ (N).  
Whenever S-X2 is below the expected value of the χ2 distribution (i.e., df), the r is negative. loading = standardized factor loading. 
 
 
    
 
Table 2.17 
Residual Inter-Item Correlations, Standardized Factor Loadings and S-X2 item fit statistics for NARQ Narcissistic Admiration (Sample 1) 
 narq1 narq2 narq3 narq5 narq7 narq8 narq15 narq16 narq18 loading S-X2 df p r 
narq1          .69 125.98 114 .209 .02 
narq2          .66 131.05 115 .145 .02 
narq3          .73 114.03 103 .215 .02 
narq5          .55 130.61 120 .239 .02 
narq7          .67 127.32 121 .329 .01 
narq8          .77 121.33 96 .041 .04 
narq15          .74 129.52 111 .11 .03 
narq16          .77 84.10 100 .873 -.03 
narq18          .60 99.17 120 .917 -.03 
Note. The table displays the residual inter-item correlations above |.20| and the standardized factor loadings after fitting a one factor confirmatory factor analysis model 
to the subscale data, applying the WLSMV estimator. The columns on the right indicate the S-X2 item fit statistics for the fitted IRT models (Orlando & Thissen, 2000; 
Kang & Chen, 2011). We transformed the S-X2 into Z values by the following formula from http://davidakenny.net/cm/fit.htm: 
Z =  √(2χ2) - √(2df - 1) 
Afterwards, we transformed the Z values into the effect size r by the following formula from Rosenthal & DiMatteo (2001) 
r = Z/√ (N).  
Whenever S-X2 is below the expected value of the χ2 distribution (i.e., df), the r is negative. loading = standardized factor loading. 
 
 
   
 
Table 2.18 
Residual Inter-Item Correlations, Standardized Factor Loadings and S-X2 item fit statistics for NARQ Narcissistic Admiration (Sample 2) 
 narq1 narq2 narq3 narq5 narq7 narq8 narq15 narq16 narq18 loading S-X2 df p r 
narq1          .66 77.79 76.63 .443 .01 
narq2          .57 91.47 80.13 .183 .03 
narq3          .69 56.49 68.73 .853 -.04 
narq5          .44 102.30 77.53 .032 .07 
narq7          .59 74.84 80.10 .644 -.01 
narq8          .62 99.28 81.40 .088 .05 
narq15          .68 83.95 79.83 .356 .01 
narq16          .76 68.88 56.63 .129 .04 
narq18          .35 92.12 87.23 .341 .02 
Note. The table displays the residual inter-item correlations above |.20| and the standardized factor loadings after fitting a one factor confirmatory factor analysis model 
to the subscale data, applying the WLSMV estimator. The columns on the right indicate the S-X2 item fit statistics for the fitted IRT models (Orlando & Thissen, 2000; 
Kang & Chen, 2011). We transformed the S-X2 into Z values by the following formula from http://davidakenny.net/cm/fit.htm: 
Z =  √(2χ2) - √(2df - 1) 
Afterwards, we transformed the Z values into the effect size r by the following formula from Rosenthal & DiMatteo (2001) 
r = Z/√ (N).  
Whenever S-X2 is below the expected value of the χ2 distribution (i.e., df), the r is negative. loading = standardized factor loading. 
    
 
Table 2.19 
Residual Item-Pair Correlations, Standardized Factor Loadings and S-X2 item fit statistics for NARQ Narcissistic Rivalry (Sample 1) 
 narq4 narq6 narq9 narq10 narq11 narq12 narq13 narq14 narq17 loading S-X2 df p r 
narq4      .21    .70 125.90 88 .005 .06 
narq6          .76 89.72 89 .459 .00 
narq9          .79 81.02 91 .764 -.02 
narq10          .76 78.24 92 .846 -.02 
narq11          .41 116.77 112 .36 .01 
narq12 .21         .66 103.86 91 .168 .02 
narq13          .71 112.19 115 .557 .00 
narq14          .74 60.09 51 .18 .02 
narq17          .78 96.35 89 .279 .01 
Note. The table displays the residual inter-item correlations above |.20| and the standardized factor loadings after fitting a one factor confirmatory factor analysis model 
to the subscale data, applying the WLSMV estimator. The columns on the right indicate the S-X2 item fit statistics for the fitted IRT models (Orlando & Thissen, 2000; 
Kang & Chen, 2011). We transformed the S-X2 into Z values by the following formula from http://davidakenny.net/cm/fit.htm: 
Z =  √(2χ2) - √(2df - 1) 
Afterwards, we transformed the Z values into the effect size r by the following formula from Rosenthal & DiMatteo (2001) 
r = Z/√ (N).  
Whenever S-X2 is below the expected value of the χ2 distribution (i.e., df), the r is negative. loading = standardized factor loading. 
 
 
   
 
Table 2.20 
Residual Item-Pair Correlations, Standardized Factor Loadings and S-X2 item fit statistics for NARQ Narcissistic Rivalry (Sample 2) 
 narq4 narq6 narq9 narq10 narq11 narq12 narq13 narq14 narq17 loading S-X2 df p r 
narq4          .61 58.66 65.00 .693 -.02 
narq6          .83 75.61 54.37 .036 .07 
narq9          .83 53.69 54.90 .522 .00 
narq10          .74 49.44 52.60 .598 -.01 
narq11          .48 79.73 78.37 .437 .01 
narq12          .62 48.79 52.37 .614 -.01 
narq13        .22 .24 .55 64.52 70.83 .687 -.02 
narq14       .22  .24 .47 50.47 41.53 .165 .04 
narq17       .24 .24  .62 58.63 52.37 .263 .02 
Note. The table displays the residual inter-item correlations above |.20| and the standardized factor loadings after fitting a one factor confirmatory factor analysis model 
to the subscale data, applying the WLSMV estimator. The columns on the right indicate the S-X2 item fit statistics for the fitted IRT models (Orlando & Thissen, 2000; 
Kang & Chen, 2011). We transformed the S-X2 into Z values by the following formula from http://davidakenny.net/cm/fit.htm: 
Z =  √(2χ2) - √(2df - 1) 
Afterwards, we transformed the Z values into the effect size r by the following formula from Rosenthal & DiMatteo (2001) 
r = Z/√ (N).  
Whenever S-X2 is below the expected value of the χ2 distribution (i.e., df), the r is negative. loading = standardized factor loading. 
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Table 2.21 
Correlations among Various Narcissistic Latent Traits 
 NPI L/A NPI GEa NPI E/E ADM RIV 
NPI L/A 1     
NPI GEa .39 (.49) 1    
NPI E/E .50 (.37) .24 (.34) 1   
ADM .60 (.59) .52 (.54) .45 (.30) 1  
RIV .20 (.10) .19 (.24) .72 (.55) .49 (.35) 1 
Note. The displayed correlation coefficients are based on correlations between IRT based latent variable scores (Weighted 
Likelihood Estimator; Warm, 1989) disattenuated for unreliability. Coefficients outside the brackets are from the German 
sample (Sample 1; N = 1856). Coefficients inside the brackets are from the English Sample (Sample 2; N = 666). NPI = 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory; NARQ Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry Questionnaire; L/A = Leadership/Authority; 
GE = Grandiose Exhibitionism; ADM = Narcissistic Admiration; RIV = Narcissistic Rivalry. 
a Item 30 was excluded from the Grandiose Exhibitionism subscale proposed by Ackerman et al. (2011) because the item 
content of Item 30 overlaps considerably with the content of Item 7, and the overlap caused item misfit, model misfit, 
correlated residuals, and inflated information curves (see Chapter 2.6: Tables 2.4 to 2.7). 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Figure 2.3. Test information of NPI subscales proposed by Ackerman et al. (2015) as a function of standing on the latent trait. The superimposed grey lines represent a 
reliability level of .60, .70, .80, and .90. The reliability can be derived from the information by the following formulas 
Rel =  Var(θ) / (Var(θ) + Var(ε)) 
The R package mirt automatically fixes the population variance of the latent variable to 1 to identify the model. Plus, the error variance Var(ε) is equal to 1/I(θ) 
(Samejima, 1994). Thus, 
Rel = 1 / (1 + 1/I(θ)) 
where Rel is the total-score reliability. Man = Manipulativeness; Exh = Exhibitionism; Lead = Leadership; Van = Vanity; Sup = Superiority. 
    
 
Figure 2.4. Test information of NPI subscales proposed by Corry et al. (2008) as a function of standing on the latent trait. The superimposed grey lines represent a 
reliability level of .60, .70, .80, and .90. The reliability can be derived from the information by the following formulas 
Rel =  Var(θ) / (Var(θ) + Var(ε)) 
The R package mirt automatically fixes the population variance of the latent variable to 1 to identify the model. Plus, the error variance Var(ε) is equal to 1/I(θ) 
(Samejima, 1994). Thus, 
Rel = 1 / (1 + 1/I(θ)) 
where Rel is the total-score reliability. L/A = Leadership/Authority; Ex/En = Exhibitionism/Entitlement. 
   
 
Figure 2.5. Test information of NPI subscales proposed by Raskin & Terry (1988) as a function of standing on the latent trait. The superimposed grey lines represent a 
reliability level of .60, .70, .80, and .90. The reliability can be derived from the information by the following formulas 
Rel =  Var(θ) / (Var(θ) + Var(ε)) 
The R package mirt automatically fixes the population variance of the latent variable to 1 to identify the model. Plus, the error variance Var(ε) is equal to 1/I(θ) 
(Samejima, 1994). Thus, 
Rel = 1 / (1 + 1/I(θ)) 
where Rel is the total-score reliability. Auth = Authority; Exh = Exhibitionism; Sup = Superiority; Ent = Entitlement; Expl = Exploitativeness; S-S = Self-Sufficiency; 
Van = Vanity. 
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Figure 2.6. Test information as a function of standing on the latent trait for three versions of the NPI Grandiose 
Exhibitionisms scale across three different samples (Sample 1 to 3). The black line depicts the information curve for the full 
scale. The red line depicts the information curve for the scale without NPI Item 7 and the green line depicts the scale 
without NPI Item 30. The superimposed grey lines represent a reliability level of .60, .70, .80, and .90. The reliability can be 
derived from the information by the following formulas 
Rel =  Var(θ) / (Var(θ) + Var(ε)) 
The R package mirt automatically fixes the population variance of the latent variable to 1 to identify the model. Plus, the 
error variance Var(ε) is equal to 1/I(θ) (Samejima, 1994). Thus, 
Rel = 1 / (1 + 1/I(θ)) 
where Rel is the total-score reliability. NPI GE = Grandiose Exhibitionism facet of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory. 
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Abstract 
The present research investigated how different dimensions of narcissism (i.e., assertive, 
antagonistic, and vulnerable) and content-specific forms of assertive narcissism (i.e., 
intellectual ability, physical attractiveness, social dominance) are related to overclaiming bias 
(i.e., the tendency to illegitimately claim knowledge). The analysis of data from a large-scale 
online study (N = 1,682) confirmed our hypothesis: We found that assertive narcissism was 
more positively related to overclaiming bias than antagonistic and vulnerable narcissism were. 
Furthermore, and partly in line with our other hypotheses, intellectual-ability-specific and 
social-dominance-specific assertive narcissism were more positively related to overclaiming 
bias than physical-attractiveness-specific assertive narcissism was. Finally, multiple 
regression analyses suggested that the narcissism-overclaiming link is most robust for social-
dominance-specific assertive narcissism. 
 
Keywords: narcissism; overclaiming; self-enhancement; overconfidence; social dominance; 
intellectual ability 
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3. A Dimension- and Content-Specific Approach 
to Investigate the Narcissism-Overclaiming 
3.1 Introduction 
Overclaiming bias is the tendency to illegitimately claim knowledge. It is assessed 
with the Over-Claiming Questionnaire, which asks participants how familiar they are with 
specific concepts, persons, places, events, and so forth. Because some of the concepts, places, 
persons, and events do not exist and thus cannot be known, the answers to the questionnaire 
allow an assessment of overclaiming bias to be made. The Over-Claiming Questionnaire was 
introduced as an instrument for assessing self-enhancement more objectively than better-than-
average ratings and more economically than criterion discrepancy measures (Paulhus, Harms, 
Bruce, & Lysy, 2003). Because self-enhancement is believed to be a central feature of 
narcissism, studies have repeatedly investigated the overclaiming-narcissism link, and most of 
them have found moderate positive associations between overclaiming bias and narcissism 
(e.g., Paulhus et al., 2003).  
However, recent studies have questioned whether overclaiming bias is related to the 
narcissistic tendency to be disingenuous and self-centered: In a set of studies, Dunlop et al. 
(2017) found that overclaiming bias was predicted by openness and years of formal education 
but not by honesty-humility or narcissism (as measured by the Short Dark Triad). Ludeke and 
Makransky (2015) indicated that overclaiming bias is better predicted by careless responding 
than by self-deceptive enhancement scores or narcissism.  
In order to clarify how overclaiming bias is linked to narcissism, we believe it is 
necessary to distinguish various (a) dimensions and (b) content-specific forms of narcissism. 
Unfortunately, previous research has almost exclusively used a single index to measure 
narcissism even though narcissism has been found to be multidimensional (e.g., Back et al., 
2013a; Miller et al., 2011) and content-specific (Gebauer, Sedikides, Verplanken, & Maio, 
2012).  
In terms of dimensions, the current research distinguishes vulnerable and grandiose 
narcissism (e.g., Pincus et al., 2009) and splits up the latter into assertive and antagonistic 
narcissism (e.g., Back et al., 2013a). People high in vulnerable narcissism have grandiose 
fantasies, but—as opposed to people high in grandiose narcissism—they often suffer from 
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depressive mood and feelings of resentment and shame (e.g., Pincus et al., 2009). People high 
in assertive narcissism promote themselves in order to reach narcissistic goals such as status, 
superiority, and power. People high in antagonistic narcissism harm and devaluate others and 
engage in deliberate cheating rather than self-enhancement in order to reach narcissistic goals 
(e.g., Back et al., 2013a). This suggests that people high in antagonistic and vulnerable 
narcissism do not self-enhance and that they do not perceive their ego-driven standards and 
fantasies are met. In fact, both antagonistic and vulnerable narcissism have been found to be 
negatively correlated with self-esteem (e.g., Back et al., 2013a; Pincus et al., 2009) and thus 
might even be negatively related to overclaiming bias. Thus, we hypothesized that assertive 
narcissism would be more strongly positively correlated to overclaiming bias than 
antagonistic and vulnerable narcissism would be. 
In terms of content-specificity, the current research distinguished intellectual-ability-
specific assertive narcissism (NARQ_ADM_INT4), physical-attractiveness-specific assertive 
narcissism (NARQ_ADM_ATTR), and social-dominance-specific assertive narcissism 
(NARQ_ADM_DOM). We focused on the content-specific forms of only assertive narcissism 
because antagonistic and vulnerable narcissism should not be related to overclaiming bias. 
People high in NARQ_ADM_INT promote themselves with regard to intellectual ability: 
They believe they are extraordinarily intelligent. People high in NARQ_ADM_ATTR 
promote themselves with regard to their physical appearance: They believe they are 
extraordinarily physically attractive. People high in NARQ_ADM_DOM promote themselves 
with regard to social dominance: They see themselves as extraordinary authorities with 
extraordinary leadership qualities. NARQ_ADM_INT, in particular, should be related to 
overclaiming bias given that (a) “overclaiming is the tendency to claim knowledge about non-
existent items” (Paulhus et al., 2003; p. 891) and (b) Paulhus et al.’s (2003) Over-Claiming 
Questionnaire contains mainly items from the intellectual ability sphere (e.g., fine arts, 
language, physical sciences). Thus, we hypothesized that NARQ_ADM_INT would be more 
strongly positively correlated to overclaiming bias than NARQ_ADM_ATTR, 
NARQ_ADM_DOM, or content-unspecific assertive narcissism would be. 
                                                 
 
4 These abbreviations contain “NARQ-ADM” because the items used to measure these 
constructs are content-specific items inspired by the NARQ subscale Narcissistic Admiration 
(Back et al., 2013b). 
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3.1.1 The Present Study 
To investigate the relations between the various dimensions and content-specific forms 
of narcissism and overclaiming bias, pre-existing data from a large German online study were 
analyzed (for details see Method Section: Analysis Plan). We included overclaiming accuracy 
and openness to experience in some analyses as control variables because previous studies 
have shown that these two variables can be related to overclaiming bias (e.g., Dunlop et al., 
2017). 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants and Procedure  
The sample consisted of 1,682 German Internet users (72% female; 1,343 complete 
responses) who filled out an online questionnaire that contained various measures of 
narcissism, the Over-Claiming Questionnaire, and various self-report instruments that were 
not relevant to the current study. All participants were sampled via diverse mailing lists and 
snowball sampling. Participants received personality feedback for their participation and were 
entered into a lottery as an incentive. The mean age was 27.27 (Range: 18-73). 
3.2.1.1 Pre-registration  
Before we conducted the analyses, we pre-registered the hypotheses and analysis plan 
at the Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/b6xfh. At the time of pre-registration, the data 
had already been collected, and parts of the data had been analyzed with regard to other 
research questions (e.g., Back et al., 2013a). 
3.2.2 Measures 
3.2.2.1 Overclaiming bias 
Overclaiming bias was measured with a German version of the Over-Claiming 
Questionnaire-150 (OCQ-150; Erler, 2009): Participants were asked how familiar they were 
with 150 specific terms (person, concept, place, etc.; from 0 = I have never heard of the term 
to 4 = I am very familiar with the term). Thirty of the 150 terms referred to nonexistent foils. 
We applied signal detection theory to calculate the bias index (i.e., criterion location c), which 
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indicates how strong the sense of familiarity has to be for a person to endorse an item 
(Paulhus et al., 2003). 
Three Over-Claiming Questionnaire responses were recoded as missing values 
because two persons chose the lowest answer category (i.e., I have never heard of the term) 
for every one of the 150 overclaiming items, and one person did so for the last 45 items.  
3.2.2.2 Narcissism 
Assertive, antagonistic, and vulnerable narcissism were assessed with various 
subscales from the NPI (Raskin & Hall, 1979), the Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry 
Questionnaire (NARQ; Back et al., 2013a), and the Pathological Narcissism Inventory (PNI; 
Pincus et al., 2009; Wright, Lukowitsky, Pincus & Conroy, 2010; see Figure 2.1). The three 
kinds of content-specific assertive narcissism (NARQ_ADM_INT, NARQ_ADM_ATTR, and 
NARQ_ADM_DOM) were assessed with 15 items each (Back et al., 2013b; see Chapter 3.6: 
Table 3.2). Example items are “I am a genius,” “I am a very attractive person,” and “I am a 
leader,” respectively. 
3.2.2.3 Control variables 
To assess overclaiming accuracy, we calculated the d′ index from signal detection 
theory (Paulhus et al., 2003). The d′ index indicates how well a person is able to discriminate 
between real and nonexistent Over-Claiming Questionnaire items. Openness was assessed 
with three items from the Big Five Inventory-15 (BFI-15; Schupp & Gerlitz, 2005).  
3.2.3 Analysis Plan  
First, we calculated a correlation matrix with overclaiming bias and the scale scores 
from the NPI, NARQ, and PNI subscales. The scale scores were based on the unweighted 
mean of the item scores. Next, we tested the hypotheses with structural equation modeling 
(SEM). All hypotheses were tested with one-tailed tests. Nonhypothesized relations were 
tested with two-tailed tests. These analyses were computed with the software Mplus (version 
7.3; Muthén & Muthén, 2014) and the R package MplusAutomation (version 0.6-3; Hallquist 
& Wiley, 2014). Data and R Code are available at: https://osf.io/w2yq2. 
To test the dimension-specific hypotheses, we tested whether assertive narcissism was 
more strongly correlated with overclaiming bias than antagonistic and vulnerable narcissism 
were, respectively. The three dimensions of narcissism were modeled as second-order factors 
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(Figure 3.1). In this analysis, we deviated from the pre-registered analysis plan in three ways 
due to inadequate model fit and computational issues (for results obtained by following the 
original analysis plan, see Chapter 3.6: Tables 3.3 and 3.4): (a) Instead of using individual 
items as indicators, we used the average item score from the NPI, NARQ, and PNI 
subscales—an approach sometimes called internal consistency parceling. (b) The PNI facet 
Entitlement Rage loaded not only on vulnerable narcissism but also on antagonistic 
narcissism. (c) The errors of NPI Leadership/Authority and NPI Entitlement/Exploitativeness 
were allowed to correlate (Figure 3.1). To additionally test the incremental contribution of 
each dimension, we computed multiple regressions with overclaiming bias as the dependent 
variable and the three dimensions as independent variables, both with and without 
overclaiming accuracy and openness as control variables. 
Figure 3.1. Second order factor model of various dimensions of narcissism and their relations to overclaiming 
bias. N = 1,682. Bidirectional arrows indicate latent correlations. The numbers next to the unidirectional arrows 
are standardized factor loadings. The fit indices for the model were: CFI = .912; RMSEA = .076. NARQ = 
Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry Questionnaire; ADM_G = Grandiosity facet of Admiration; ADM_U = 
Uniqueness facet of Admiration; ADM_C = Charmingness facet of Admiration; RIV_D = Devaluation facet of 
Rivalry; RIV_S = facet of Rivalry Supremacy; RIV_A = Aggressiveness facet of NARQ Rivalry; NPI = 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory; LA = Leadership/Authority (Ackerman et al., 2011); GE = Grandiose 
Exhibitionism; EE = Entitlement/Exploitativeness; PNI = Pathological Narcissism Inventory; CSE = Contingent 
Self-Esteem; HS = Hiding the Self; DEV = Devaluation; ER = Entitlement Rage.  
* p ≤ .001. 
 
To test the content-specific hypotheses, we tested whether NARQ_ADM_INT was 
more strongly correlated with overclaiming bias than NARQ_ADM_ATTR and 
NARQ_ADM_DOM were, respectively. In contrast to the three dimensions, the three 
content-specific forms of assertive narcissism were modeled without parceling and without a 
second-order structure: Each item loaded directly on one of the three latent variables. Because 
the univariate distributions of some ordinal items were skewed, we used the WLSMV 
estimator in this analysis (for results obtained with maximum likelihood estimation, see 
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Chapter 3.6: Tables 3.5 and 3.6). Again, we additionally conducted multiple regressions with 
overclaiming bias as the dependent variable and the three content-specific forms as 
independent variables, both with and without overclaiming accuracy and openness as control 
variables. 
Finally, we tested whether NARQ_ADM_INT was more strongly correlated with 
overclaiming bias than content-unspecific assertive narcissism was. Both kinds of narcissism 
were measured as in the models above (for results obtained original analysis, see Chapter 3.6: 
Tables 3.7 and 3.8). We also computed multiple regressions with overclaiming bias as the 
dependent variable and the two kinds of narcissism as independent variables, both with and 
without overclaiming accuracy and openness as control variables. 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Manifest correlations 
 
Table 3.1 shows the intercorrelations between overclaiming bias and all narcissism 
scales. In line with previous research, the correlation between the NPI total score and 
overclaiming bias was positive (r = .13, p ≤ .001, 95% CI [.08, .18]), but the effect size was 
smaller than in most previous studies (e.g., Paulhus et al., 2003: r = .35; Gebauer et al., 2012: 
r = .20; but see also Ludeke & Makransky, 2016: r = .11). Out of the 16 narcissism scales, 
only five scales had correlations with overclaiming bias that were higher than .10 (i.e., the 
NPI total scale, NPI Leadership Authority, NARQ Charmingness, NARQ_ADM_INT, and 
NARQ_ADM_DOM). It is noteworthy that the three content-unspecific scales (i.e., NPI total 
scale, NPI Leadership Authority, and NARQ Charmingness) showed strong associations with 
NARQ_ADM_DOM (manifest rs = .71, .75, and .77, respectively), suggesting that these 
three scales largely overlap with NARQ_ADM_DOM. 
 Table 3.1 
Intercorrelations Between Overclaiming Bias and Various Subscales From Narcissism Questionnaires 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. OC bias .89                  
2. NPI total .13 .84                 
Assertive Narcissism Subscales 
3. NPI LA .15 .83 .75                
4. NPI GE .06 .70 .36 .73               
5. NARQ ADM_G .07 .60 .48 .42 .73              
6. NARQ ADM_U .05 .53 .39 .42 .67 .71             
7. NARQ ADM_C .15 .63 .56 .39 .56 .59 .76            
Antagonistic Narcissism Subscales 
8. NPI EE .03 .52 .37 .20 .24 .27 .31 .41           
9. NARQ RIV_D .00 .27 .20 .07 .30 .25 .23 .37 .72          
10. NARQ RIV_S -.04 .28 .17 .15 .28 .36 .25 .43 .48 .83         
11. NARQ RIV_A -.02 .29 .17 .24 .29 .37 .27 .40 .35 .54 .65        
Vulnerable Narcissism Subscales 
12. PNI CSE -.07 -.02 -.13 .05 .06 .18 .05 .26 .16 .33 .47 .91       
13. PNI HS -.02 .01 -.01 -.09 .02 .13 .08 .26 .23 .32 .31 .53 .82      
14. PNI DEV .02 -.05 -.06 -.08 .06 .14 .05 .23 .23 .28 .36 .61 .60 .84     
15. PNI ER -.01 .30 .17 .20 .32 .40 .30 .48 .34 .54 .67 .65 .46 .54 .87    
Content-Specific Assertive Narcissism Scales 
16. NARQ_ADM_INT .12 .55 .46 .28 .67 .66 .66 .37 .44 .41 .38 .17 .21 .21 .42 .94   
17. NARQ_ADM_ATTR .06 .56 .32 .65 .55 .57 .53 .24 .22 .30 .33 .19 .07 .10 .34 .50 .94  
18. NARQ_ADM_DOM .14 .71 .75 .37 .58 .61 .77 .40 .28 .38 .35 .06 .13 .09 .37 .65 .50 .94 
Note. N varied from 1,343 to 1,682. Cronbach’s alphas are displayed on the diagonal. The correlations are Pearson correlations between overclaiming bias and the scale scores, which were 
based on the unweighted mean of the item scores. OC bias = Overclaiming Bias; NPI = Narcissistic Personality Inventory; LA = Leadership/Authority (Ackerman et al., 2011); GE = 
Grandiose Exhibitionism; EE = Entitlement/Exploitativeness; NARQ = Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry Questionnaire; ADM_G = Grandiosity facet of Narcissistic Admiration; ADM_U = 
Uniqueness facet of Narcissistic Admiration; ADM_C = Charmingness facet of Narcissistic Admiration; RIV_D = Devaluation facet of Narcissistic Rivalry; RIV_S = Supremacy facet of 
Narcissistic Rivalry; RIV_A = Aggressiveness facet of Narcissistic Rivalry; PNI = Pathological Narcissism Inventory; CSE = Contingent Self-Esteem; HS = Hiding the Self; DEV = 
Devaluation; ER = Entitlement Rage; NARQ_ADM_INT = Intellectual ability Specific Assertive Narcissism; NARQ_ADM_DOM = Social Dominance Specific Assertive Narcissism; 
NARQ_ADM_ATTR = Physical Attractiveness Specific Assertive Narcissism. 
119    
3.3.2 Dimension-specific results 
We hypothesized that overclaiming bias would be more strongly related to assertive 
narcissism than to antagonistic and vulnerable narcissism. The SEM model showed an 
acceptable fit given the complexity of the model (CFI = .912; RMSEA = .076; Figure 3.1; 
Chapter 3.6: Table 3.3). In line with the hypotheses, overclaiming bias was more strongly 
correlated with assertive narcissism (r = .11, p ≤ .001, 95% CI [.05, .18]) than it was with 
antagonistic narcissism (r = - .02, p = .64, 95% CI [-.08, .05]; for the difference in rs: t = 4.70, 
p ≤ .001) or vulnerable narcissism (r = - .03, p = .37, 95% CI [-.09, .04]; for the difference in 
rs: t = 3.44, p ≤ .001). The correlation between overclaiming bias and antagonistic narcissism 
did not differ from its correlation with vulnerable narcissism (t = 0.70, p = .48). In the 
multiple regressions, assertive narcissism was also more strongly associated to overclaiming 
bias than antagonistic and vulnerable narcissism were (Chapter 3.6: Table 3.4). 
3.3.3 Content-specific results 
We hypothesized that overclaiming bias would be more strongly correlated with 
NARQ_ADM_INT than it would be with NARQ_ADM_ATTR and NARQ_ADM_DOM. 
The SEM model showed an acceptable fit given that each content domain was assessed with 
15 items (CFI = .905; RMSEA = .077). In favor of modeling the three content-specific sets of 
items as unidimensional scales, all 45 content-specific items loaded strongly on their 
respective latent variables (all standardized loadings: .64 to .88), and the reliabilities of the 
three scales were high (all three αs = .94). Confirming our hypothesis, overclaiming bias was 
more strongly correlated with NARQ_ADM_INT (r = .12, p ≤ .001, 95% CI [.06, .17]) than 
with NARQ_ADM_ATTR (r = .06, p = .028, 95% CI [.01, .12]; for the difference in rs: t = 
1.81, p = .035). Failing to support our hypothesis, overclaiming bias was not more strongly 
correlated with NARQ_ADM_INT than it was with NARQ_ADM_DOM (r = .14, p ≤ .001, 
95% CI [.09, .19]; for the difference in rs: t = -0.50, p = .69; Chapter 3.6: Table 3.5). It is 
interesting that overclaiming bias was more strongly correlated with NARQ_ADM_DOM 
than it was with NARQ_ADM_ATTR (for the difference in rs: t = 2.28, p = .023). In the 
multiple regressions, overclaiming bias was not more strongly associated with 
NARQ_ADM_INT than with NARQ_ADM_DOM or NARQ_ADM_ATTR; 
NARQ_ADM_DOM was again more strongly associated with overclaiming bias than 
NARQ_ADM_ATTR was (Chapter 3.6: Table 3.6). 
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3.3.4 Intellectual ability-specific assertive narcissism versus unspecific 
assertive narcissism 
We furthermore hypothesized that overclaiming bias would be more strongly 
correlated with NARQ_ADM_INT than it would be with unspecific assertive narcissism. The 
model fit was poor5 but acceptable given the complexity of the model (CFI = .904; RMSEA = 
.108). Failing to support our hypothesis, overclaiming bias was not more strongly correlated 
with NARQ_ADM_INT (r = .12, p ≤ .001, 95% CI [.06, .17]) than it was with unspecific 
assertive narcissism (r = .13, p ≤ .001, 95% CI [.07, .19]; for the difference in rs: t = -0.40, p 
= .65; Chapter 3.6: Table 3.7). The hypothesis was also not confirmed by the multiple 
regressions (Chapter 3.6: Table 3.8). Overclaiming bias was also not more strongly correlated 
with NARQ_ADM_DOM than it was with unspecific assertive narcissism; but these results 
need to be interpreted with caution given that the models fit poorly and contained strong 
correlations between NARQ_ADM_DOM and unspecific assertive narcissism (rs > .90; 
Chapter 3.6: Tables 3.9 and 3.10). 
3.4 Discussion 
In line with our hypotheses, overclaiming bias was related only to some dimensions 
and content-specific forms of narcissism. These findings buttress previous research that had 
argued that (a) it is important to differentiate between various dimensions of narcissism (e.g., 
Back et al., 2013a; Pincus et al., 2009) and (b) narcissism is content-specific (Gebauer et al., 
2012). Future research on overclaiming bias and narcissism should more often distinguish 
between the various dimensions and content-specific forms of narcissism. 
Not in line with our hypotheses, NARQ_ADM_DOM was an equally strong and more 
robust predictor of overclaiming bias than NARQ_ADM_INT. Similarly, the narcissism 
facets that had the strongest correlations with NARQ_ADM_DOM (e.g., NPI 
Leadership/Authority, NARQ Charmingness) were most strongly related to overclaiming bias 
(Table 3.1). Although this finding was unexpected because we thought overclaiming would be 
found to be a behavior that was specific to the intellectual ability sphere, the finding is in line 
with Anderson et al.’s (2012) research, which showed that people who overclaim achieve a 
                                                 
 
5 The poor fit was probably due to unspecified cross-loadings given that NARQ_ADM_INT and unspecific 
assertive narcissism were highly correlated in the various SEM models: rs = .80 to .90 (see also Table 3.1). 
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higher social status in groups. Overclaiming bias seems to be a strategy that people high in 
NARQ_ADM_DOM use to achieve and maintain their social status and leadership positions 
in groups. 
Furthermore, also not in line with our hypotheses, the content-specific forms of 
narcissism were not stronger predictors of overclaming bias than content-unspecific assertive 
narcissism was. This finding seems to be at odds with findings by Brunswik (1956), who 
pointed out that a predictor is stronger when it is on the same level of abstraction as the 
criterion. There are several reasons for this unexpected finding. First, perhaps overclaiming is 
a less domain-specific behavior than expected, given that the purpose of overclaiming might 
be to enhance one’s status and not to bolster one’s self-esteem in a specific domain. Second, 
unspecific assertive narcissism has a strong conceptual overlap with NARQ_ADM_DOM: 
Both are characterized by a drive for status, social potency, and dominance. 
It is also important to note that unspecific assertive narcissism and 
NARQ_ADM_DOM were related to overclaiming bias even after we controlled for openness 
to experience. This finding extends the findings of Dunlop et al. (2017), who indicated that 
overclaiming bias is related to the dispositional tendency to be curious and exploratory 
(openness) but not to the tendencies to be disingenuous or self-centered. Our results suggest 
that the relation between narcissism and overclaiming bias is not driven (only) by openness 
but (also) by narcissistic self-promotion in the social dominance domain (i.e., beliefs in and 
striving for social status and leadership). Future overclaiming research might want to further 
test this idea by pitting unspecific assertive narcissism or NARQ_ADM_DOM not only 
against openness but also against honesty-humility, disingenuousness, and self-centeredness. 
Taken together, the current study demonstrates that distinguishing various dimensions 
and content-specific forms of narcissism can facilitate a deeper understanding of the relations 
between narcissism and external criteria such as overclaiming bias. We thus encourage future 
research to further explore nuanced narcissism questionnaires.  
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 Table 3.2 
Content-Specific Assertive Narcissism Items (in German and English) for Intellectual Ability, Physical Attractiveness, and Social Dominance 
 Intellectual ability  Physical attractiveness  Social dominance 
Item 
number 
German (original) English 
 
German (original) English 
 
German (original) English 
1 
Ich bin ausgesprochen 
intelligent. 
I am extraordinarily 
intelligent. 
 
Ich sehe sehr gut aus. 
I am very good 
looking. 
 Ich bin sehr 
durchsetzungsfähig. 
I am very 
assertive. 
2 Ich bin ein Genie. I am a genius. 
 Ich bin ein sehr 
attraktiver Mensch. 
I am a very 
attractive person. 
 Ich bin eine 
Führungspersönlichkeit. 
I am a leader. 
3 Ich bin klüger als andere. 
I am smarter than 
others. 
 
Ich bin attraktiver als die 
meisten anderen 
Menschen. 
I am more 
attractive than 
most other 
people. 
 
Ich bin anderen 
übergeordnet. 
I am superior to 
others.  
4 
Ich kenne nur wenige 
Menschen, die mir 
intellektuell das Wasser 
reichen können. 
I know only a few 
people who match 
me intellectually. 
 
Man wird mich wegen 
meiner Schönheit 
bewundern. 
I will be admired 
for my beauty. 
 
Ich werde eine bedeutsame 
Führungsposition innehaben 
I will occupy a 
significant 
leadership 
position. 
5 
Ich werde für 
herausragende 
intellektuelle Leistungen 
bekannt sein. 
I will be famous for 
my outstanding 
intellectual 
achievements. 
 Ich verdiene 
Bewunderung für mein 
außergewöhnlich gutes 
Aussehen. 
I deserve 
admiration for my 
remarkably good 
looks. 
 
Man sollte meine Autorität 
anerkennen. 
People should 
recognize my 
authority. 
6 
Man sollte mich wegen 
meiner 
außergewöhnlichen 
Intelligenz anerkennen. 
People should 
acknowledge me 
for my 
extraordinary 
intelligence.  
 
Ich bin bestrebt, ein 
anziehendes Äußeres zu 
präsentieren. 
I am striving to 
present an 
attractive 
appearance. 
 
Ich strebe danach, Autorität 
über andere zu haben 
I strive for 
authority over 
others. 
7 
Ich möchte, dass meine 
überlegenen 
intellektuellen Fähigkeiten 
zur Geltung kommen. 
I want my superior 
intellectual abilities 
to be noticed. 
 
Mein gutes Äußeres gibt 
mir viel Kraft. 
My good looks 
give me a lot of 
strength. 
 
Ich genieße es, eine 
einflussreiche Person zu 
sein. 
I enjoy being an 
influential person. 
8 
Ich bin begeistert von 
meinen intellektuellen 
Fähigkeiten. 
I am amazed by my 
intellectual abilities. 
 
Ich betrachte mich gerne 
im Spiegel. 
I like to look at 
myself in the 
mirror. 
 
Andere anzuführen macht 
mir Freude. 
I take pleasure in 
leading others. 
         
         
    
9 
Es gibt nichts Schöneres 
als anderen zu zeigen, 
wie schlau ich bin. 
There is nothing 
better than showing 
how smart I am. 
 Ich fühle mich unheimlich 
gut dabei, von anderen 
aufgrund meines 
Aussehens bewundert zu 
werden. 
I feel very good 
when others 
admire me for my 
physical 
appearance. 
 
Ich genieße es, wenn mich 
andere in meiner 
Führungsrolle bestätigen. 
I enjoy it when 
others 
acknowledge my 
leadership 
position. 
10 
Ich genieße es, wenn 
andere erkennen, wie 
klug ich bin. 
I enjoy it when 
others recognize 
how clever I am. 
 
Es ist ein gutes Gefühl, 
so viel attraktiver zu sein 
als andere Menschen. 
It is a nice feeling 
to be much more 
attractive than 
other people. 
 
Ich genieße meine Autorität 
über andere. 
I enjoy my 
authority over 
others. 
11 
Ich lasse andere 
Menschen spüren, wie 
schlau ich bin. 
I show other people 
how smart I am. 
 
Ich zeige, wie attraktiv 
ich bin. 
I show how 
attractive I am. 
 Ich zeige anderen, dass ich 
eine durchsetzungsstarke 
Person bin. 
I show others 
that I am an 
assertive person. 
12 
Ich schaffe es häufig, 
anderen mit meinen 
geistreichen Beiträgen zu 
imponieren. 
I am able to 
impress others with 
my witty 
contributions. 
 
Ich nutze mein gutes 
Aussehen, um mir 
Vorteile zu verschaffen. 
I use my good 
looks to my 
advantage. 
 
Im Umgang mit anderen 
übernehme ich häufig die 
Führungsrolle. 
I often take on 
the leadership 
role. 
13 
Mit Hilfe meines scharfen 
Verstandes überzeuge ich 
andere von meiner 
Meinung. 
With my sharp 
intellect, I convince 
others to agree 
with my opinion. 
 
Mit meinem attraktiven 
Auftreten ziehe ich 
andere in meinen Bann. 
With my attractive 
appearance, I 
fascinate others. 
 
In Diskussionen mache ich 
unmissverständlich klar, wo 
es lang geht. 
In discussions, I 
clearly spell out 
what’s what.  
14 
Ich schaffe es oft, andere 
mit meinen intelligenten 
Kommentaren zu 
beeindrucken. 
I often manage to 
impress others with 
my intelligent 
comments. 
 Meine attraktive 
Erscheinung setze ich 
häufig geschickt in 
Szene. 
I often skillfully 
draw attention to 
my attractive 
appearance.  
 
Mit meiner gewinnenden Art 
gelingt es mir meist, andere 
Menschen zu führen. 
With my winning 
way, I usually 
succeed in 
leading others. 
15 
Mit meinen originellen 
Einfällen und frischen 
Ideen bringe ich andere 
zum Staunen. 
With my original 
and fresh ideas, I 
astonish others. 
 
Wenn ich einen Raum 
betrete, ziehe ich alle 
Blicke auf mich. 
When I enter a 
room, I attract 
people’s 
attention. 
 
In Gruppensituationen 
ergreife ich häufig erfolgreich 
die Initiative. 
In groups, I often 
take the initiative 
successfully. 
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Table 3.3 
Correlation Analysis Testing how Strong Each Narcissism Dimension is Related to 
Overclaiming Bias 
 Analysis Reported in Main 
Text (Figure 1) 
 Following pre-registered 
analysis plan: (1) without 
parcelling, (2) without 
letting PNI ER load on the 
antagonistic factor, and 
(3) without correlated 
errors between NPI L/A 
and NPI E/E  
CFI .912  .766c 
RMSEA .076  .046 
 b* p  b* p 
Assertive 
Narcissism 
.11 < .001a   .11 < .001a 
Antagonistic 
Narcissism 
-.02 .64a  -.01 .82a 
Vulnerable 
Narcissism 
-.03 .37a  -.03 .37a 
Test of Difference in Unstandardized Coefficients 
 t p  t p 
Assertive vs. 
Antagonistic 
4.70 < .001b  4.41 < .001b 
Assertive vs. 
Vulnerable 
3.44  .001b  3.64 < .001b 
Antagonistic vs. 
Vulnerable 
0.71 .48a  0.95 .34a 
Note. N = 1682. In both analyses we used full information maximum likelihood estimation—robust maximum 
likelihood estimation in Mplus—to handle missing values. We did not use pairwise maximum likelihood 
estimation (PML; Katsikatsou, Moustaki, Yang-Wallentin, Jöreskog; 2012) because PML (as currently implement 
in lavaan, 0.5-17) does not handle missing data 
(https://groups.google.com/d/msg/lavaan/ik6WWC6TcYA/eLYBnRqKlAQJ). 
a = two-sided significance test 
b = one-sided significance test 
c = Additionally to the poor model fit, Mplus outputted a warning message saying that the first-order derivative 
product matrix was non-positive definite, most likely due to NPI variables being dichotomous but declared as 
continuous. 
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Table 3.4 
Multiple Regression Analysis Testing how Strong Each Narcissism Dimension is Related to 
Overclaiming Bias 
 With parceling; Letting PNI ER 
load on the antagonistic factor; 
Correlated errors between NPI 
L/A and NPI E/E 
 Without parceling; Without letting 
PNI ER load on the antagonistic 
factor; Without correlated errors 
between NPI L/A and NPI E/E 
 Without 
control 
variables 
 With control 
variables 
 Without 
control 
variables 
 With control 
variables 
CFI .912  .912  .766 c  .766 c 
RMSEA .076  .068  .046  .044 
 b* p  b* p  b* p  b* p 
Assertive 
Narcissism 
.19 < .001a 
 
.14 .006a  .18 < .001a 
 
.10 .11a 
Antagonistic 
Narcissism 
-.14 .022a 
 
-.10 .14a  -.12 .14a 
 
-.05 .60a 
Vulnerable 
Narcissism 
.03 .53a 
 
.01 .81a  < .001 .99a 
 
-.02 .72a 
Accuracy 
Index 
   
-.04 .31a  
   
.13 .008a 
Openness    .10 .003a     -.05 .25a 
Test of Difference in Unstandardized Coefficients 
 t p  t p  t p  t p 
Assertive vs. 
Antagonistic 
3.13 .001b 
 
2.01 .023b  2.43 .008b 
 
0.92 .18b 
Assertive vs. 
Vulnerable 
3.28 .001b 
 
2.53 .006b  3.36 .001b 
 
1.95 .026b 
Antagonistic 
vs. 
Vulnerable 
-1.81 .070a 
 
-1.12 .26a  -1.02 .31a 
 
-0.26 .80a 
Note. N = 1682. In both analyses we used full information maximum likelihood estimation—robust maximum 
likelihood estimation in Mplus—to handle missing values. We did not use pairwise maximum likelihood 
estimation (PML; Katsikatsou, Moustaki, Yang-Wallentin, & Jöreskog, 2012) because PML (as currently 
implement in lavaan, 0.5-17) does not handle missing data (see 
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/lavaan/ik6WWC6TcYA/eLYBnRqKlAQJ). 
a = two-sided significance test 
b = one-sided significance test 
c = Additionally to the poor model fit, Mplus outputted a warning message saying that the first-order derivative 
product matrix was non-positive definite, most likely due to NPI variables being dichotomous but declared as 
continuous. 
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Table 3.5 
Correlation Analysis Testing how Strong Each Form of Subdomain Specific Assertive 
Narcissism is Related to Overclaiming Bias 
Estimation WLSMV  MLR 
CFI .905  .821 
RMSEA .077  .069 
 b* p  b* p 
Intellectual Ability Narcissism .12 < .001a  .12 < .001a 
Physical Attractiveness Narcissism .06 .028a  .07 .029a 
Social Dominance Narcissism .14 < .001a  .15 < .001a 
Test of Difference in Unstandardized Coefficients 
 t p  t p 
intellectual vs. physical attractiveness 1.81 .035b  2.00 .023b 
intellectual vs. social dominance -0.50 .69b  -0.36 .64b 
physical attractiveness vs. social dominance -2.27 .023a  -2.40 .017a 
Note. N = 1682. WLSMV = means and variance adjusted weighted least square estimation; MLR = robust 
maximum likelihood estimation. 
a = two-sided significance test 
b = one-sided significance test 
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Table 3.6 
Multiple Regression Analysis Testing how Strong Each Form of Subdomain Specific Assertive 
Narcissism is Related to Overclaiming Bias 
 Without parceling; WLSMV 
estimator 
 Without parceling; MLR 
estimator 
 Without 
control 
variables 
 With control 
variables 
 Without 
control 
variables 
 With control 
variables 
CFI .905  .903  .821  .814 
RMSEA .077  .076  .069  .066 
 b* p  b* p  b* p  b* p 
Intellectual 
Narcissism 
.04 .33a 
 
.03 .52a  .04 .29a 
 
.02 .58a 
Physical 
Attractiveness 
Narcissism 
-.03 .39a 
 
-.05 .20a  -.02 .51a 
 
-.04 .32a 
Social Dominance 
Narcissism 
.13 .003a 
 
.13 .003a  .13 .001a 
 
.12 .006a 
Accuracy Index    
-.05 .002a  
   
.14 
< 
.001a 
Openness    
.13 
< 
.001a 
 
   
-.05 .24a 
Test of Difference in Unstandardized Coefficients 
 t p  t p  t p  t p 
intellectual vs. 
physical 
attractiveness 
1.16 .12b 
 
1.14 .13b  1.09 .14b 
 
0.95 .17b 
intellectual vs. 
social dominance 
-1.19 .88b 
 
-1.33 .91b  -1.40 .92b 
 
-1.37 .92b 
physical 
attractiveness vs. 
social dominance 
-2.60 .009a 
 
-2.83 .005a  -2.60 .009a 
 
-2.49 .013a 
Note. N = 1682. We did not use pairwise maximum likelihood estimation (PML; Katsikatsou, Moustaki, Yang-
Wallentin, & Jöreskog, 2012) because PML (as currently implement in lavaan, 0.5-17) does not handle missing 
data (see https://groups.google.com/d/msg/lavaan/ik6WWC6TcYA/eLYBnRqKlAQJ). WLSMV = means and 
variance adjusted weighted least square estimation; MLR = robust maximum likelihood estimation.  
a = two-sided significance test 
b = one-sided significance test  
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Table 3.7 
Correlation Analysis Testing Whether Intellectual Assertive Narcissism is Stronger Related to 
Overclaiming Bias than Unspecific Assertive Narcissism 
Estimation WLSMV  MLR 
CFI .904  .784 c 
RMSEA .108  .062 
 b* p  b* p 
Intellectual Ability Narcissism .12 < .001a  .12 < .001a 
Unspecific Assertive Narcissism .13 < .001a  .12 < .001a 
Test of Difference in Unstandardized Coefficients 
 t p  t p 
Intellectual vs. Unspecific -0.40 .65b  1.25 .11b 
Note. N = 1682. WLSMV = means and variance adjusted weighted least square estimation; MLR = robust 
maximum likelihood estimation. 
a = two-sided significance test 
b = one-sided significance test 
c = Additionally to the poor model fit, Mplus outputted a warning message saying that the first-order derivative 
product matrix was non-positive definite, most likely due to NPI variables being dichotomous but declared as 
continuous. 
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Table 3.8 
Multiple Regression Analysis Testing Whether Intellectual Assertive Narcissism is Stronger 
Related to Overclaiming Bias than Unspecific Assertive Narcissism 
 Partially parceling; WLSMV 
estimator 
 Without parceling; MLR 
estimator 
 Without 
control 
variables 
 With control 
variables 
 Without 
control 
variables 
 With control 
variables 
CFI .904  .903  .784c  .777c 
RMSEA .108  .103  .062  .060 
 b* p  b* p  b* p  b* p 
Intellectual 
Narcissism 
.04 .50a 
 
.06 .29a  .06 .37a 
 
.11 .14a 
Unspecific Assertive 
Narcissism 
.10 .12a 
 
.04 .56a  .06 .39a 
 
-.04 .60a 
Accuracy Index 
  
 
-.05 .003a    
 
.15 
< 
.001a 
Openness    
.12 
< 
.001a 
 
   
-.06 .17a 
Test of Difference in Unstandardized Coefficients 
 t p  t p  t p  t p 
intellectual vs. 
physical 
attractiveness 
-0.49 .69b 
 
0.21 .42b  -0.09 .54b 
 
0.94 .17b 
Note. N = 1682. We did not use pairwise maximum likelihood estimation (PML; Katsikatsou, Moustaki, Yang-
Wallentin, & Jöreskog, 2012) because PML (as currently implement in lavaan, 0.5-17) does not handle missing 
data (see https://groups.google.com/d/msg/lavaan/ik6WWC6TcYA/eLYBnRqKlAQJ). WLSMV = means and 
variance adjusted weighted least square estimation; MLR = robust maximum likelihood estimation.  
a = two-sided significance test 
b = one-sided significance test 
c = Additionally to the poor model fit, Mplus outputted a warning message saying that the first-order derivative 
product matrix was non-positive definite, most likely due to NPI variables being dichotomous but declared as 
continuous. 
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Table 3.9 
Correlation Analysis Testing Whether Social Dominance Assertive Narcissism is Stronger 
Related to Overclaiming Bias than Unspecific Assertive Narcissism 
Estimation WLSMV  MLR 
CFI .872  .753 b 
RMSEA .125  .068 
 b* p  b* p 
Social Dominance Specific Narcissism .14 < .001a  .15 < .001a 
Unspecific Assertive Narcissism .14 < .001a  .15 < .001a 
Test of Difference in Unstandardized Coefficients 
 t p  t p 
Assertive vs. intellectual 1.37 .170a  2.56 .011a 
Note. N = 1682. WLSMV = means and variance adjusted weighted least square estimation; MLR = robust 
maximum likelihood estimation. 
a = two-sided significance test 
b = Additionally to the poor model fit, Mplus outputted a warning message saying that the first-order derivative 
product matrix was non-positive definite, most likely due to NPI variables being dichotomous but declared as 
continuous. 
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Table 3.10 
Multiple Regression Analysis Testing Whether Intellectual Assertive Narcissism is Stronger 
Related to Overclaiming Bias than Unspecific Assertive Narcissism 
 Partially parceling; WLSMV 
estimator 
 Without parceling; MLR 
estimator 
 Without 
control 
variables 
 With control 
variables 
 Without 
control 
variables 
 With control 
variables 
CFI .872  .878  .753a  .753a 
RMSEA .125  .115  .068  .064 
 b* p  b* p  b* p  b* p 
Social Dominance 
Specific Narcissism 
.10 .28 
 
.19 .052  .05 .82 
 
.39 .22 
Unspecific Assertive 
Narcissism 
.05 .60 
 
-.08 .48  .11 .63 
 
-.30 .38 
Accuracy Index    -.04 .002     .19 .007 
Openness    .14 < .001     -.05 .22 
Test of Difference in Unstandardized Coefficients 
 t p  t p  t p  t p 
Social Dominance vs. 
Unspecific 
0.20 .84 
 
1.27 .20  -0.19 .85 
 
1.02 .31 
Note. N = 1682. All significance tests are two-sided. We did not use pairwise maximum likelihood estimation 
(PML; Katsikatsou, Moustaki, Yang-Wallentin, & Jöreskog, 2012) because PML (as currently implement in 
lavaan, 0.5-17) does not handle missing data (see 
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/lavaan/ik6WWC6TcYA/eLYBnRqKlAQJ). WLSMV = means and variance 
adjusted weighted least square estimation; MLR = robust maximum likelihood estimation. 
a = Additionally to the poor model fit, Mplus outputted a warning message saying that the first-order derivative 
product matrix was non-positive definite, most likely due to NPI variables being dichotomous but declared as 
continuous. 
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Abstract 
We investigated the development of narcissism and Machiavellianism (Mach) in early adulthood. 
Specifically, we examined (a) mean-level changes in narcissistic admiration (i.e., the assertive 
dimension of narcissism; Back et al., 2013) and Mach during early adulthood and (b) how 
studying economics and experiencing any of 30 life events were related to individual differences 
in changes in narcissistic admiration and Mach. We used longitudinal data from two cohorts of 
young adults in Germany (N1 = 4,962 and N2 = 2,572). Although mean levels of narcissistic 
admiration remained stable over time, life events analyses suggested that narcissistic admiration 
increased among people who experienced a positively evaluated change in their eating or 
sleeping habits, a positively evaluated romantic break-up, or a negatively evaluated failure on an 
important exam. The mean levels of Mach decreased during early adulthood in both cohorts. Life 
events analyses showed that Mach decreased for only the 91% of young adults who had started a 
new job and evaluated it positively, suggesting that mastering occupational roles mitigates Mach 
in early adulthood. The results will be discussed in the light of previous longitudinal studies on 
narcissism in early adulthood and cross-sectional studies on how age is related to narcissism and 
Mach. 
 
Keywords: narcissism; Machiavellianism; personality development; university major; life events 
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4. The Development of Narcissism and 
Machiavellianism in Early Adulthood 
4.1 Introduction 
Longitudinal research on the Big Five personality traits has revealed that comparatively 
large and robust changes in personality take place during early adulthood (e.g., Roberts, Walton, 
& Viechtbauer, 2006; Specht et al., 2014). Except for the Big Five, most personality dimensions 
such as narcissism and Machiavellianism (Mach)6 have rarely been studied longitudinally. Hence, 
it is unclear whether changes similar to those found for the Big Five take place in narcissism and 
Mach during early adulthood. For example, does the maturity principle7 (e.g., Roberts, Wood, & 
Caspi, 2008) extend to narcissism and Mach? This might entail a decrease in the mean levels of 
narcissism and Mach during early adulthood. In line with research on the Big Five, the influences 
of life experiences on trait development could be explored. The question here could be which 
types of experiences are associated with individual differences in narcissism and Mach 
development during early adulthood? To address these questions, in this study, we investigated 
(a) how mean levels in narcissism and Mach develop over a 10-year period in early adulthood—
from age 19.5 to 29.5—and (b) how studying economics and experiencing certain life events are 
related to individual differences in the development of narcissism and Mach.  
4.1.1 Narcissism and Machiavellianism 
Narcissism is a personality trait that denotes individual differences in the desire for status, 
external approval, and grandiosity. Originally, narcissism was thought to be a unidimensional 
construct (e.g., Raskin & Hall, 1979; Raskin & Terry, 1988). However, in recent years, its 
conceptualization and measurement have become multidimensional. First, grandiose narcissism 
has been contrasted with vulnerable narcissism (e.g., Dickinson & Pincus, 2003; Miller et al., 
                                                 
 
6 We focus on only two of the three traits of the “Dark Triad” (Paulhus & Williams, 2002) because psychopathy was 
not assessed in the current data. 
7 The maturity principle reflects the trend by which people become more emotionally stable, agreeable, 
conscientious, and socially dominant with age (e.g., Roberts, Wood, & Caspi, 2008). 
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2011; Wink, 1991). Second, grandiose narcissism has been further subdivided into an assertive 
dimension (i.e., narcissistic admiration) and an antagonistic dimension (i.e., narcissistic rivalry; 
Back et al., 2013; see also Brown, Budzek, & Tamborski, 2009; Küfner, Nestler, & Back, 2013; 
Paulhus, 2001). In the current study, we focused on only narcissistic admiration because repeated 
measurements were available for only this component of narcissism.  
The second personality trait we studied here is Mach. Mach was originally characterized 
by a cynical worldview, a duplicitous interpersonal style, and pragmatic morality (Christie & 
Geis, 1970; see also Jones & Paulhus, 2009). Recent conceptualizations of Mach additionally 
emphasize that people high in Mach are more strategic than impulsive: They plan ahead, form 
coalitions and alliances, and try to build and maintain a positive reputation (e.g., Jones & 
Paulhus, 2009, 2014). Christie and Geis’ (1970) construction of the prominent Mach IV scale 
was based on the assumption of three Mach dimensions (i.e., tactics, views, and morality), but 
later research was not able to confirm this structure (e.g., Corral & Calvete, 2000; Fehr, Samson, 
& Paulhus, 1992; Kuo & Marsella, 1977). Therefore, the Mach IV and other Mach questionnaires 
are often scored as unidimensional scales, and a higher order factor that is common to all Mach 
facets is sometimes assumed (Dahling, Whitaker, & Levy, 2009; Rauthmann & Will, 2011; see 
also, Fehr et al., 1992). 
People high on narcissistic admiration and Mach have been found to share some 
motivational tendencies. Both are associated with a preference for agentic goals (e.g., status, 
uniqueness, competence, and superiority) over communal goals (e.g., affiliation, warmth, 
relatedness, acceptance, and community feelings; e.g., Back et al., 2013; Campbell & Foster, 
2007; Dahling et al., 2009; Gebauer et al., 2012; McHoskey, 1999; Rauthmann, 2012; Robins, 
Tracy, & Shaver, 2001). Yet, people high on narcissistic admiration and Mach differ in the 
reasons behind their aspirations. People high in narcissistic admiration strive for agentic goals to 
maintain and aggrandize their high self-esteem and obtain external approval for their grandiose 
self-views (Back et al., 2013; see also Campbell & Foster, 2007). People high in Mach—on the 
other hand—strive for agentic goals because of their cynical world view (i.e., cynicism toward 
life, humans, and how things are run in the world). Their cynicism brings about a devaluation of 
communal goals and morality as well as fears that others will dominate, hurt, or exploit them if 
they are not agentic or powerful enough (Christie & Geis, 1970; Láng, 2015). 
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4.1.2 Mean-Level Changes in Narcissistic Admiration and Mach During Early 
Adulthood 
How should we expect narcissistic admiration and Mach to develop in early adulthood? 
Past cross-sectional research has reported negative relations between age and total scores on the 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory (e.g., Barlett & Barlett, 2015: r = -.10; Foster, Campbell, & 
Twenge, 2003: r = -.17; Hill & Roberts, 2012: r = -.32). The findings for Mach are more mixed, 
although they still generally show a negative relation with age (e.g., Barlett & Barlett, 2015: r = -
.14; Dahling et al., 2009: r = -17; Mudrack, 1989: r = -26; Wakefield, 2008: r = -.02).  
The declining trend suggested by these cross-sectional studies has not been supported by 
longitudinal studies. But admittedly, for early adulthood, we found only two suitable longitudinal 
studies on narcissism and none on Mach, and the two studies on narcissism are unique for several 
reasons. First, Carlson and Gjerde (2009) used observer ratings (i.e., the California Q-Set; Block, 
1961) to study narcissism. They detected no significant decrease in narcissism from age 18 to 23. 
Second, Orth and Luciano (2015) reported virtually no descriptive differences on Narcissistic 
Personality Inventory scores across four measurement occasions spanning a 2-year period during 
early adulthood. Because of their unique measures or short time frames, neither study provides a 
strong basis from which to hypothesize how mean levels of narcissistic admiration and Mach 
should change in early adulthood. 
Taken together, past cross-sectional studies suggest that narcissistic admiration and Mach 
decline, whereas longitudinal research shows no change. Given these mixed findings and the 
paucity of longitudinal research, we had no clear expectations for mean-level changes in 
narcissistic admiration and Mach. 
4.1.3 Experiences Related to Changes in Narcissistic Admiration and 
Machiavellianism During Early Adulthood 
Neither the existence nor the lack of mean-level differences over time implies or 
precludes interindividual differences in the development of narcissistic admiration or Mach 
(Roberts & Mroczek, 2008). For example, changes in a person characteristic may be uniform for 
all individuals, implying mean differences without interindividual differences in the trajectories. 
It is also possible for means to remain stable over time despite intraindividual variability if the 
increase in some individuals’ narcissistic admiration and Mach levels counterbalances decreasing 
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levels in other individuals in the population. Thus, we also investigated the extent to which 
individual differences in the development of narcissistic admiration and Mach exist and how such 
individual differences are linked to specific life experiences during early adulthood. The links 
between changes in personality and antecedent or concurrent life experiences are often called 
socialization effects (e.g., Orth & Luciano, 2015; Specht et al., 2014). The experiences we 
examined consisted of studying economics and a list of life events tailored to young adults. We 
focused on the choice to study economics because prior research has suggested that economics 
university students are higher in narcissism (Westerman, Bergman, Bergman, Westerman, & 
Daly, 2012) and Mach (McLean & Jones, 1992; Skinner, 1981; but see also Li-Ping Tang, Chen, 
& Sutarso, 2008) than students in other majors. Furthermore, some studies have suggested that 
university students’ immoral tendencies are fostered when they study economics (for a review, 
see Etzioni, 2015). For example, students who attended a class on game theory became more 
cynical and less honest—which is highly consistent with Mach—over the course of one semester 
than students who took an astronomy class (Frank, Gilovich, & Regan, 1993). Thus, we 
hypothesized that studying economics would be positively related to changes in narcissism and 
Mach during early adulthood.   
It is also possible that higher levels of narcissistic admiration and Mach among economics 
students (and among people who experience certain life events) are due to selection effects: 
People high in narcissistic admiration and Mach might more frequently select or be selected by 
certain environments than people low in narcissistic admiration and Mach. For example, people 
high in narcissistic admiration and Mach might be more likely to select an economics major for 
their studies because it is more in line with their preference for agentic goals over communal 
goals. The domain of economics emphasizes self-interest and rationality, neglects considerations 
of fairness and loyalty (Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986), and gives people 
access to extensive resources and future leadership positions. Hence, an association between an 
environmental factor and narcissistic admiration or Mach does not necessarily imply socialization 
effects. To prevent invalid attributions, we simultaneously tested each socialization effect with its 
corresponding selection effect. 
No previous studies have provided evidence that certain life events are related to changes 
in narcissistic admiration and Mach. Orth and Luciano (2015) tested whether the experience of 
stressful life events such as a serious accident/injury or a serious failure in education/work was 
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linked to changes in narcissism over a 2-year period in early adulthood and found no evidence for 
it. In the current research, we tested the socialization effects of 30 individual life events. We 
additionally aggregated the life events into agency event scores (i.e., events related to 
competence, extraversion, uniqueness, separation, and focus on the self) and communion event 
scores (i.e., events related to warmth, agreeableness, relatedness, connection, and focus on others; 
Gebauer et al., 2012; see also Bakan, 1966). Examples of agentic events include experiences such 
as “winning an academic award” or “starting a new job.” Examples of communal events include 
experiences such as “illness or injury of a friend” or “getting married.” Because narcissistic 
admiration and Mach are characterized by a preference for agentic goals over communal goals, 
positive agentic and negative communal events might lead to increases and negative agentic and 
positive communal events to decreases in narcissistic admiration and Mach. As there had been no 
prior longitudinal research on this topic, these analyses were entirely exploratory. 
4.1.4 The Present Research 
To investigate the development of narcissism and Mach in early adulthood and how it is 
related to studying economics and 30 life events, we analyzed data from two cohorts from the 
Transformation of the Secondary School System and Academic Careers longitudinal study 
(TOSCA; Köller, Watermann, Trautwein, & Lüdtke, 2004; Trautwein, Neumann, Nagy, Lüdtke, 
& Maaz, 2010): TOSCA-2006 and TOSCA-2002. In the TOSCA study, several thousand 
German students were surveyed regarding educational trajectories, personality, life events, and 
other constructs every second year from around age 19.5 to 25.5 in the TOSCA-2006 cohort and 
from around age 19.5 to 29.5 in the TOSCA-2002 cohort. Narcissistic admiration and Mach were 
assessed from age 19.5 onwards in the TOSCA-2006 cohort and from age 21.5 onwards in the 
TOSCA-2002 cohort. 
First, mean-level changes in narcissistic admiration and Mach during early adulthood 
were examined in both cohorts (TOSCA-2006 and TOSCA-2002). Second, in the cohort in which 
narcissistic admiration and Mach were assessed before students entered tertiary education 
(TOSCA-2006), we investigated associations between studying economics and changes in 
narcissistic admiration and Mach. Third, in the cohort in which 30 life events were assessed 
(TOSCA-2002), we investigated associations between life events and changes in narcissistic 
admiration and Mach. In all models in which associations between experiences (i.e., studying 
economics and life events) and changes in narcissistic admiration and Mach were tested, we 
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simultaneously tested for selection effects and included several control variables; results without 
control variables are reported in the supplemental online material. 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants and Procedure 
4.2.1.1 TOSCA-2006  
The TOSCA-2006 cohort was first assessed in their final year of high school (Grade 13; 
age: M = 19.45; SD = 0.72), and this group was reassessed four times with a time interval of 
roughly 2 years between the measurement occasions (for details, see Trautwein et al., 2010). 
Students voluntarily participated without any financial incentive at the first measurement 
occasion. Financial incentives were provided at the subsequent times points.  
At Time 1, the cohort consisted of 4,944 German students from 157 upper secondary 
schools—the same 147 schools as in the TOSCA-2002 cohort (see below) and 10 additional 
vocational secondary schools (“berufliche Gymnasien”). The participation rate was quite high: 
97% of the schools and around 80% of the targeted 6,177 students participated. The sample size 
for the mean-level analyses was 4,962 for narcissism and 4,934 for Mach.8  
The sample size for the analyses on the students who were studying economics was 
considerably lower (N = 1,950; 321 economics students and 1,629 noneconomics students) 
because almost half of the participants participated only at Time 1 (Chapter 4.6: Table 4.4),9 and 
some participants did not continue their studies after high school. We excluded people who did 
not indicate a university major at Time 2 (i.e., a sign that they did not continue their studies after 
high school) or who indicated that they were no longer studying at Time 3. 
                                                 
 
8 The sample size for the mean-level analysis is slightly larger than the sample size at Time 1 
because a few people participated only after Time 1. 
9 A reason for the large attrition rate could be that at Time 1, the questionnaire was administered 
in the high school, whereas after Time 1, it was administered via mail. Thus, participants might 
have felt more obliged to participate at Time 1 than thereafter. 
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4.2.1.2 TOSCA-2002 
Students and schools in the TOSCA-2002 cohort were randomly selected at Time 1 (i.e., 
Grade 13; age: M = 19.60; SD = 0.72). The sample consisted of 4,633 students from 147 
traditional and vocational secondary schools (“Allgemeinbildende und berufliche Gymnasien”). 
The participation rate was high with a school-level participation rate of 99% and a student-level 
rate of around 79%; the number of targeted students was 5,901. We excluded two persons from 
the 2002 cohort who indicated that they were older than 30 at measurement Time 1. The cohort 
was reassessed every 2 years, for a total of six times (for details, see Köller et al., 2004). Again, 
students participated voluntarily with no compensation at Time 1 and with financial incentives 
afterwards. 
 In the TOSCA-2002 cohort, narcissistic admiration and Mach were assessed at 
measurement Time 2 onwards. Thus, the sample size for the mean-level analysis was 2,571 for 
narcissistic admiration and 2,572 for Mach (i.e., 54.4% of the sample that participated at Time 1). 
In the life events analyses, the sample size increased to 4,640 in the models with control variables 
because some control variables were assessed at Time 1.  
4.2.1.3 Attrition and missing values 
Attrition effects were small in both cohorts: People who participated only at the first 
measurement occasion were a bit higher in Mach (TOSCA-2006: Cohen’s d = 0.18; TOSCA-
2002: not assessed at Time 1), had higher grade point averages (TOSCA-2006: d = 0.40; 
TOSCA-2002: d = 0.36), and were more likely to be male than people who also participated at 
later measurement occasions (for details, see Chapter 4.6: Table 4.4). It is important to note that 
cases with incomplete data were not excluded from the analyses (unless stated otherwise). 
Instead, we used full information maximum likelihood estimation to account for item 
nonresponses and attrition (Enders, 2010).  
4.2.1.4 Pre-registration of hypotheses 
Prior to analyzing the data, we pre-registered hypotheses on the socialization and 
selection effects of studying economics on the development of narcissism and Mach (see 
https://osf.io/a9y7s/?view_only=742e30db262f47f8acac69039f847eb7). We did not register any 
hypotheses on the mean-level development or life events analyses. For the preregistered 
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hypotheses, we report one-sided p-values. For the exploratory research questions, we report two-
sided p-values, and we report only effects that are significant at p ≤ .01 in the text (all effects are 
reported in the tables). 
4.2.2 Measures 
4.2.2.1 Narcissism 
Narcissism was measured with six 4-point Likert-type scale items that are German 
adaptations of items from the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Raskin & Hall, 1979; 1 = not 
true at all; 4 = completely true; all αs > .83; for item content, means, standard deviations, and 
item-total correlations, see Chapter 4.6: Table 4.5). We conducted three studies to validate the 
items. In these studies, the latent trait of the TOSCA narcissism scale was most strongly 
correlated with the latent trait of the Narcissistic Admiration subscale from the Narcissistic 
Admiration and Rivalry Questionnaire, r = .83 and .81, respectively (in one of the three 
validation studies, the Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry Questionnaire was not administered; 
for details, see Chapter 4.6: Text 4.1 and Tables 4.6 to 4.8). 
4.2.2.2 Machiavellianism 
Mach was measured with six newly created 4-point Likert-type scale items (1 = not true 
at all; 4 = completely true; all αs > .81; for item content, means, standard deviations, and item-
total correlations, see Chapter 4.6: Table 4.5). The most common Mach instrument at the time of 
the study, the Mach IV scale (Christie & Geis, 1970), was avoided due to poor psychometric 
properties (for a critical evaluation of the Mach-IV, see e.g., Dahling et al., 2009). In the 
validation studies, the latent trait of the TOSCA Mach scale was strongly correlated with the 
latent trait of the MACH-IV (Christie & Geis, 1970), r = .80, and the Mach subscale from the 
Short Dark Triad (Jones & Paulhus; 2014), r = .76. The latent trait of the TOSCA Mach scale 
was also strongly correlated with the latent trait of the Interpersonal Manipulation facet from the 
Self-Report Psychopathy Scale SRP-III (Williams, Nathanson, & Paulhus, 2003), r = .78 (for 
details, see Chapter 4.6: Text 4.1 and Tables 4.6 to 4.8). The high correlation between TOSCA 
Mach and Interpersonal Manipulation is not surprising given that established Mach scales are 
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often highly correlated with this particular facet of the SRP-III (e.g., Jones & Figueredo, 2013; 
see also Chapter 4.6: Table 4.6). 
4.2.2.3 Economics major 
University major was assessed through one open question “Which major are you currently 
studying?” The answers were categorized into economics majors (business, economics, etc.; D = 
1) and noneconomics majors (D = 0). 
4.2.2.4 Life events 
Participants from the TOSCA-2002 cohort were asked every 2 years about the experience 
of one or more of 34 life events. The list was based on a modified version of the Life Experience 
Survey (Sarason, Johnson, & Siegel, 1978; Vaidya, Gray, Haig, & Watson, 2002). Three of the 
34 events were excluded from the analyses because they were assessed at only some of the 
measurement occasions. One event (“Was detained in a prison or comparable institution”) was 
excluded because its base rate was too low (i.e., it was experienced by only four participants). We 
used only the life events reports from the last four measurement occasions because personality 
needs to be assessed before the events to control for selection effects. At each measurement 
occasion, participants were asked whether each of the 30 life events had occurred in the last 2 
years or not. If participants indicated that a life event had occurred, they were asked to rate the 
meaning of the life event (1 = very negative, 2 = negative, 3 = irrelevant, 4 = positive, 5 = very 
positive). 
Because the base rate for most life events was relatively low (i.e., only a few people 
experienced most events in a particular 2-year time period), we aggregated the responses to the 
life events questions across the four times of measurement. The aggregation was implemented to 
create a more reliable and accurate estimate of the associations between experienced events and 
change in personality. There was no one ideal way to aggregate the events. Thus, we aggregated 
them in three ways: We aggregated them into (1) 30 positive and 30 negative event dummies, (2) 
30 positive and 30 negative continuous event scores, and (3) two agency and two communion 
event scores (for detailed descriptions of the methods of aggregation, see Figure 4.1 and its 
caption). 
 
 
  
Figure 4.1. Illustration of aggregation of life events variables into three kinds of aggregate scores: (1) event dummies, (2) continuous event scores, and (3) agency 
and communion event scores. “Person 1” is a fictional person. Because the first occurrence of a particular event might impact the development of narcissistic 
admiration and Mach more than later occurrences of the same event, we (1) computed 30 positive and 30 negative event dummies that indicate whether each of the 30 
events occurred at least once over the 8-year time period as a positive and negative event, respectively. For example, Person 1 experienced the event “started a new 
job” three times over the 8-year period and that person rated these events as very negative, positive, and irrelevant, respectively. Thus, the person had a value of 1 for 
the positive event dummy and 1 for the negative event dummy for the life event “started a new job.” For some events, the frequency of the occurrence and its 
intensity (positive vs. very positive) might influence the development of narcissistic admiration and Mach. Thus, we (2) computed 30 positive and 30 negative 
continuous event scores: For each event, we calculated the mean positive and mean negative rating at the four measurement occasions, where event occurrences that 
were positively (negatively) rated were coded as 1 or 2 depending on the intensity (meaning); nonoccurrences and event occurrences that were evaluated negatively 
(positively) or irrelevant were coded 0. Accordingly, Person 1 had a value of 0.25 as a positive continuous event score and 0.50 as a negative continuous event score 
for the life event “started a new job.” To further investigate whether a whole category of events (e.g., positive agentic events) was related to the development of 
narcissistic admiration and Mach, we (3) computed agency and communion event scores. For this purpose, four authors (“experts”) of the current study rated the 30 
life events on a 6-point Likert-type scale in terms of agency and communion (e.g., “How agentic is the event? How relevant is the event for the agency domain?”). 
The interrater reliabilities of these ratings were high: the two-way mixed, consistency, average-measures ICC was .85 for agency and .80 for communion (Cicchetti, 
1994; Hallgreen, 2012; calculated by the R package irr version 0.84; Gamer, Lemon, Fellows, & Singh, 2012). We then multiplied the positive and negative 
continuous event score of every event by the average agency (communion) rating for that event if the event had an above average (> 0) agency (communion) rating. 
Events that had a below average rating (< 0) on agency (communion) were not taken into account in these calculations. Finally, we summed up the resulting products 
of all 30 events, resulting in four scores: positive agency, negative agency, positive communion, and negative communion scores. 
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Participants who did not respond to the life events questions for a specific event at all 
four measurement occasions were given a missing value on the two event dummies and two 
continuous event scores for that event. For most events, between 800 and 850 participants 
responded at all four measurement occasions (i.e., around 800 to 850 nonmissing values). 
Participants who did not respond to all life events at all four measurement occasions were given 
missing values on the agency and communion event scores, resulting in 488 nonmissing values 
on these four scores. 
4.2.2.5 Control variables 
We ran the studying economics and life events analyses with and without control 
variables. The control variables consisted of participants’ initial level of self-esteem (i.e., the 
mean score on three German items from the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale; Rosenberg, 1965; see 
also Rieger, Göllner, Trautwein, & Roberts, 2016; TOSCA-2006: α = .80, TOSCA-2002: α = 
.84), gender, age, grade point average on the Abitur (i.e., high-school diploma after 13 years of 
school), figural and verbal reasoning (weighted likelihood estimates on Subscales N2 and V4 
from the “Kognitiven Fähigkeitstest” [cognitive abilities test]; Heller & Perleth, 2000), a dummy 
for whether the participant indicated that she/he had been born abroad, a dummy for whether the 
participant indicated that her/his parents had been born abroad, and the education level of the 
participants’ parents (i.e., education of father and mother averaged). In the analyses on 
economics majors, we additionally controlled for attendance of a vocational high school focused 
on economics because graduating from such a high school was thought to influence whether a 
student would choose an economics major at university or not. In the life events analyses, we 
additionally included a dummy as a control variable that indicated whether a participant was 
studying or not at measurement Time 2: Around 76% were studying. 
4.2.3 Data-Analytic Strategy 
We ran all analyses separately for narcissistic admiration and Mach because it was not 
the goal of the current study to investigate the relations between the development of narcissistic 
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admiration and Mach, and the two traits were only weakly correlated (at Time 1 in the TOSCA-
2006 cohort: r = .14; p ≤ .001; at Time 2 in the TOSCA-2002 cohort: r = .06; p = .016). 
We took into account measurement error in narcissistic admiration and Mach by using 
structural equation models with narcissistic admiration and Mach as latent variables measured 
with six indicators per each measurement occasion. In order to quantify change in the latent 
variables over time, we assumed strong measurement invariance. 10 Hence, the factor loadings 
and intercepts of each narcissistic admiration and Mach item were set equal across measurement 
occasions for all items in both cohorts. 
Furthermore, in all models, the errors of the same indicator were allowed to correlate 
across measurement occasions to account for the item's specificity, which can cause inflated 
estimates of stability in latent variables over time (Marsh & Hau, 1996; see also Bollen & 
Curran, 2006). We used maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors in Mplus 
(version 7.3; Muthén & Muthén, 2014). Data handling and analyses were facilitated by using R 
(version 3.3.1; R Core Team, 2016) and the R package MplusAutomation (version 0.6-3; 
Hallquist & Wiley, 2014). The R code and Mplus output files can be found at: 
https://osf.io/ar7h6/?view_only=5af0caa9b0984b7d89c3ff0ba1dde563. 
4.2.3.1 Mean-level analysis 
To descriptively assess the mean levels and mean-level changes in narcissistic admiration 
and Mach across time, we first fit a latent state model (e.g., Steyer & Schmitt, 1990) to the data. 
In order to identify and scale the latent variables, we used the effects-coding method (Little, 
Slegers, & Card, 2006), which ensures that the latent traits will be scaled in the metric of the 
                                                 
 
10 In a global test of measurement invariance (∆CFI < .01; Chen, 2007), strong measurement invariance across time 
held for both scales (i.e., narcissistic admiration and Mach) in the TOSCA-2002 cohort. In the TOSCA-2006 cohort, 
there was some evidence that strong measurement invariance did not hold for both scales: The difference in CFI was 
slightly larger than .01 between the model with and the model without fixed loadings and intercepts across 
measurement occasions. Thus, we additionally ran all TOSCA-2006 analyses (i.e., mean-level change and analyses 
on economics majors) with trimmed scales: On the basis of a visual inspection of the changes in the intercept 
parameters across measurement occasions, we excluded narcissistic admiration Item 2 and Mach Item 1 from the 
narcissistic admiration and Mach scale, respectively. Because the TOSCA-2006 results for the trimmed scales were 
not meaningfully different from the results for the complete scales, we report only the results for the complete scales 
in the manuscript (for details, see https://osf.io/ar7h6/?view_only=5af0caa9b0984b7d89c3ff0ba1dde563) 
151 
 
 
items. Hence, the mean of the factor loadings of the indicators of each latent variable were fixed 
to one, and the sum of the corresponding measurement intercepts was fixed to zero.  
To test whether mean levels in narcissistic admiration and Mach significantly changed 
during early adulthood, we fitted a true individual change model (Steyer, Eid, & 
Schwenkmezger, 1997) to the data. The model is depicted in Figure 4.2. However, unlike in 
Figure 4.2, the model did not contain any predictors (studying economics, life event variables, or 
control variables) when we tested mean-level changes. The true individual change model enabled 
us to model the total change between the first and last measurement occasions (TOSCA-2006: 
T4-T1; TOSCA-2002: T6-T2) without imposing assumptions about the pattern of change. 
Therefore, in contrast to a linear latent growth curve model (Bollen & Curan, 2006), there is no 
residual variance in latent state variables, and no assumption of linear growth is imposed. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Simplified version of the true individual change model that we fit to test socialization (and selection) 
effects of majoring in economics and life events on change in narcissistic admiration (NA) and Machiavellianism 
(Mach). For simplification, the figure displays only three of the six items. Furthermore, there are five measurement 
occasions in the life events models (TOSCA-2002 cohort): from T2 to T6. 
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4.2.3.2 Studying economics (TOSCA-2006 cohort) 
We tested socialization and selection effects for economics majors also with the true 
individual change model.11 To test for socialization effects, the change in narcissistic admiration 
or Mach between the first and last measurement occasions (T4-T1) was regressed on the choice 
of major (i.e., economics vs. another major; Figure 4.2). Selection effects were tested by 
logistically regressing the choice of major on the initial level of narcissistic admiration or Mach. 
We ran the analysis on economics majors with and without control variables. Because the results 
barely changed, we report only the results with control variables in the main document (for a 
comparison of the results with and without control variables, see Chapter 4.6: Table 4.9). 
4.2.3.3 Life events (TOSCA-2002 cohort) 
To investigate socialization and selection effects with regard to the event dummies and 
continuous event scores, we fit 2 (narcissistic admiration vs. Mach) × 2 (positively vs. negatively 
evaluated) × 2 (event dummies vs. continuous event scores) models for each of the 30 life events, 
resulting in 240 true individual change models. To investigate socialization and selection effects 
regarding agency and communion event scores, we fit 2 (narcissistic admiration vs. Mach) × 2 
(agency vs. communion) × 2 (positively vs. negatively evaluated) true individual change models 
to the data, resulting in eight models. 
Analogous to the models for economics majors, the change (T6-T2) in narcissistic 
admiration or Mach was regressed on the life events variable to test for socialization effects, and 
the life events variable was regressed on the initial level of narcissistic admiration or Mach to 
test for selection effects (see Figure 4.2). Again, the results with control variables were not very 
different from the results without control variables (for a comparison of the results with and 
without control variables, see Chapter 4.6: Table 4.10 to 4.14). 
To illustrate the sizes of the significant socialization effects, for each event, we ran a 
multiple group analysis in which we fit a latent state model to the group of people who 
                                                 
 
11 We did not use latent growth curve models with linear terms to test for socialization effects because the latent 
growth curve models used to model the mean-level change indicated nonlinear patterns of change (see also Figure 
4.3), and a considerable proportion of the variance in narcissism and Mach was not explained by the linear growth 
curve models. We also did not opt for latent growth curve models with linear and quadratic terms because 
socialization effects would be difficult to interpret in such models. 
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experienced the life event and to the group of people who did not experience the life event. The 
mean-level development of the two groups was then plotted to get a sense of the effect size. To 
plot the mean levels, we used the R package ggplot2 (version 2.2.1; Wickham & Chang, 2016). 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Mean-Level Changes (TOSCA-2006 and TOSCA-2002) 
First, we investigated the mean-level changes in narcissistic admiration and Mach in both 
cohorts. The mean levels of narcissistic admiration did not decrease or increase during early 
adulthood (Figure 4.3): In both cohorts, none of the means changed more than 0.1 standard 
deviations from one measurement occasion to the next (Table 4.1). The small changes that did 
occur showed no consistent pattern. Accordingly, the mean-level change in narcissistic 
admiration from first to last measurement occasion was neither significant in the TOSCA-2006 
cohort (d = -.01; p = .70) nor in the TOSCA-2002 cohort (d = .03; p = .051). 
Fig
ure 4.3. Mean-level change in narcissistic admiration and Machiavellianism in both cohorts (TOSCA-2006 and 
TOSCA-2002). The results are based on latent state models (e.g., Steyer & Schmitt, 1990). The response format of 
the narcissistic admiration and Machiavellianism items was a 4-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = not true at 
all to 4 = completely true (for item content, see Chapter 4.6: Table 4.5). 
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By contrast, Mach gradually declined in early adulthood (Figure 4.3). Mean levels 
decreased in each of the seven time lags (across both studies) except for one (Table 4.1). One 
decrease was even more than one third of the pooled standard deviation. Accordingly, the mean-
level change in Mach from first to last measurement occasion was significant in the TOSCA-
2006 cohort (d = -.40; p ≤ .001) and in the TOSCA-2002 cohort (d = -.34; p ≤ .001). 
 
 
Table 4.1  
Results for Latent State Models: Mean Levels, Mean-Level Changes, and Fit Indices 
 Narcissistic admiration  Machiavellianism 
Measurement  
Time 
TOSCA-2006 
N = 4962 
TOSCA-2002 
N = 2571 
 TOSCA-2006 
N = 4934 
TOSCA-2002 
N = 2572  
Means 
T1 2.82 -  2.29 - 
T2 2.80 2.71  2.19 2.15 
T3 2.78 2.74  2.16 2.22 
T4 2.81 2.76  2.07 2.19 
T5 - 2.75  - 2.00 
T6 - 2.74  - 1.99 
Pooled standard deviations 
 0.48 0.47  0.57 0.54 
Mean-level changes (d) 
T12 -0.04 -  -0.16 - 
T23 -0.03 0.07  -0.06 0.13 
T34 0.07 0.03  -0.15 -0.06 
T45 - 0.00  - -0.34 
T56 - -0.04  - -0.03 
Fit indices 
CFI .967 .977  .973 .977 
RMSEA .028 .024  .025 .023 
SRMR .040 .042  .032 .030 
Note. The response format for the narcissistic admiration and Machiavellianism items was a 4-point Likert-type 
scale ranging from 1 = not true at all to 4 = completely true (for item content, see Chapter 4.6: Table 4.5). d = 
(mean - mean of previous measurement time) / pooled standard deviation. 
4.3.2 Selection Effects 
Although the focus of this study is on mean-level changes and socialization effects, we 
will also briefly report selection effects for completeness and because we had hypotheses about 
selection effects for economics majors. 
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4.3.2.1 Studying economics (TOSCA-2006) 
In contrast to our hypotheses, people who were high in narcissistic admiration at Time 1 
did not show higher odds of selecting an economics university major than people who were low 
in narcissistic admiration (with control variables: OR = 0.92; one-sided p-value = .72; Chapter 
4.6: Table 4.9). In other words, there was no selection effect of narcissistic admiration on 
choosing an economics major. In line with our hypotheses, the probability of choosing an 
economics major increased with the level of Mach at Time 1 (with control variables: OR = 2.13; 
one-sided p-value ≤ .001; Chapter 4.6: Table 4.9). 
4.3.2.2 Life events (TOSCA-2002) 
We report only the results for the agency and communion event scores in the main 
document (for selection effects on event dummies and continuous event scores, see Chapter 4.6: 
Tables 4.10 and 4.11). Narcissistic admiration at Time 1 was positively associated with the 
subsequent occurrence of negative agency events, and Mach was negatively associated with the 
subsequent occurrence of positive communion events (Table 4.2; see also Chapter 4.6: Table 
4.12). In other words, people high in narcissistic admiration at age 21 experienced negative 
agency events in the following years more often than people low in narcissistic admiration at age 
21, and people high in Mach experienced positive communion events less often than people low 
in Mach. 
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Table 4.2 
Selection and Socialization Effects for Agency and Communion Event Scores 
 Selection effects  Socialization effects 
Event score 
Narcissistic 
admiration 
Machiavellianism  
Narcissistic 
admiration 
Machiavellianism 
Positive agency .07 .11
 
 .08 -.05 
Negative agency  .16** -.04  .08 .09 
Positive 
communion 
.02 -.16** 
 
-.04 -.07 
Negative 
communion 
.13* .08 
 
.02 .07 
Note. Standardized regression coefficients from 16 separate regression analyses that were performed in eight 
different true individual change models (Figure 4.2). In all models, we controlled for initial level of self-esteem, 
gender, age, grade point average, figural and verbal reasoning, a dummy for whether the participant indicated having 
been born abroad, a dummy for whether the participant indicated that her/his parents had been born abroad, the 
education of the participants’ parents, and a dummy that indicated whether a participant was studying. In the 
socialization effects models, we additionally controlled for the initial level of narcissistic admiration or initial level 
of Machiavellianism (depending on the dependent variable). For results without control variables, see Chapter 4.6: 
Table 4.12. DV = dependent variable; IV = independent variable. 
* p ≤ .05,  ** p ≤ .01. 
 
4.3.3 Experiences Related to Changes in Narcissistic Admiration and 
Machiavellianism During Early Adulthood (Socialization Effects) 
In the following, standardized coefficients (β) are reported if available, that is, when no 
categorical variables were in the model (i.e., models with continuous event scores and agency 
and communion event scores). If there were categorical variables in the model (i.e., models with 
economics majors or event dummies), only unstandardized coefficients (b) are reported because 
Mplus (version 7.3; Muthén & Muthén, 2014) did not provide standardized coefficients. 
4.3.3.1 Studying economics (TOSCA-2006) 
In contrast to our hypotheses that majoring in economics would have a socialization 
effect on narcissism and Mach, majoring in economics was not associated with the change in 
narcissistic admiration or Mach between age 19.5 and 25.5 (narcissistic admiration: b = -0.01, p 
= .65; Mach: b = 0.06, p = .087; both p-values are one-sided; Chapter 4.6: Table 4.9).  
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4.3.3.2 Life events (TOSCA-2002)  
4.3.3.2.1 Event dummies and continuous event scores 
Several individual life events were associated with change in narcissistic admiration 
(Table 4.3). 
  
    
Table 4.3 
Results of Regressions of Changes in Narcissistic Admiration and Machiavellianism on 30 Life Events (Socialization Effects) 
 
 
Expert rating  
Base rate  
(dum = 1) 
 Narcissistic admiration  Machiavellianism 
  
Agency 
Comm 
-union 
 
Positive Negative 
 Positive  Negative  Positive  Negative 
Event 
 
  
dum 
b  
cont 
β 
 
dum 
b  
cont 
β 
 
dum 
b  
cont 
β 
 dum b  
cont 
β 
Started a new job 
 
1.67 -0.89  91% 7%  .03 .06  .01 .00  
-
.20** 
-
.12** 
 .10 .07 
Won an academic award 
or prize 
 
1.67 -1.40  45% 1%  .04 .07*  -a -a  .01 .02  -a -a 
Got promoted at work  1.51 -0.89  41% 0%  -.02 -.02  -a -a  .05 .04  -a -a 
Began regular work after 
graduation 
 
1.51 -0.38  51% 3%  .02 .07  .01 .00  -.01 -.02  .16 .06 
Increased working hours  1.34 -1.06  21% 44%  -.04 -.02  .03 .05  -.04 -.03  .07 .08 
Change in financial 
situation (much better or 
worse) 
 
1.18 -0.89  84% 29%  -.03 .01  .05 .09*  -.03 -.03  .07 .06 
Quit a job / Lay-off  1.18 -0.38  5% 19%  .10 .06  .02 .00  -.10 -.06  .05 .05 
Changed major/stopped 
university 
studies/apprenticeship 
 
1.02 -0.89  17% 4%  .05 .08  .04 .06  -.04 -.02  .13 .06 
Failed an important 
exam 
 
0.86 -1.06  8% 29%  -.04 -.01  .10** .06  -.06 -.04  -.01 -.01 
Changed to another 
university/apprenticeship 
 
0.86 -0.38  22% 3%  .08* .11**  .04 .06  .00 .01  -.06 -.01 
Went abroad  0.38 -0.03  95% 2%  -.15* -.04  .14 .07*  .01 -.01  .11 .06 
Moved out of home  0.05 0.48  54% 4%  -.06 .00  .03 .00  .00 .00  -.03 -.01 
Borrowed a large 
amount of money (more 
than €1,000) 
 
0.05 -0.72  8% 15%  -.03 -.03  .06 .06  .02 .01  -.02 .00 
Own injury or illness  -0.27 -0.38  3% 54%  .03 .00  .03 .06  -.15 -.05  .04 .06 
Quit smoking  -0.27 -0.72  17% 1%  -.03 -.01  -a -a  .09 .07  -a -a 
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Change in eating habits 
(much more or less food 
intake) 
 
-0.43 -0.89  34% 26%  .10** .11**  -.05 -.04  .05 .03  .03 .00 
Convicted for a minor 
offence (fare dodging, 
speeding, etc.) 
 
-0.59 -0.55  4% 24%  -.04 -.01  .02 .02  .11 .03  -.02 -.01 
Started psychotherapy 
 
-0.59 0.48  13% 2%  .07 .08  -.06 -.05  .04 -.01  -.17 
-
.05* 
Broke off a relationship 
with a 
boyfriend/girlfriend 
 
-0.75 1.16  18% 48%  .11** .10**  .00 .02  .01 .02  .08* .08 
Illness or injury of a 
family member 
 
-0.75 1.16  2% 77%  .01 .01  -.01 .00  -.02 -.02  -.02 .01 
Illness or injury of a 
friend 
 
-0.75 1.16  1% 45%  -a -a  .02 .06  -a -a  -.05 -.03 
Change in sleeping 
habits (much more or 
less sleep) 
 
-0.75 -1.06  15% 39%  .14** .11***  .04 .02  -.06 -.06  .01 .03 
Sexual problems  -0.91 0.14  1% 25%  -a -a  .05 .08*  -a -a  .06 .05 
Death of a friend  -0.91 0.65  0% 16%  -a -a  .03 .03  -a -a  .09 .04 
Had an abortion (self or 
partner) 
 
-0.91 0.31  0% 2%  -a -a  .02 -.01  -a -a  .07 .03 
Got pregnant (self or 
partner) 
 
-0.91 2.02  20% 1%  -.07 -.04  -a -a  -.08* -.04  -a -a 
Entered a new 
relationship (lasting at 
least 1 month) 
 
-1.08 2.02  63% 7%  .03 .02  .10 .02  .03 .04  .20* .10* 
Death of a family 
member 
 
-1.08 0.65  1% 62%  -a -a  -.04 -.02  -a -a  -.05 -.01 
Parents broke up or 
divorced 
 
-1.08 0.31  2% 4%  .13 .03  .01 .02  -.06 .00  -.01 .01 
Got married  -1.24 2.02  27% 0%  -.08* -.04  -a -a  -.04 -.07  -a -a 
 Note. N = 4,600 (only around 800 to 850 participants had no missing values on each life events variable). Results of 240 separate regression analyses that were 
    
performed in 240 different true individual change models (Figure 4.2): 2 (narcissistic admiration vs. Mach) × 2 (positively vs. negatively evaluated) × 2 (event 
dummies vs. continuous event scores) models for each of the 30 life events. In all models, we controlled for initial level of self-esteem, gender, age, grade point 
average, figural and verbal reasoning, a dummy for whether the participant indicated having been born abroad, a dummy for whether the participant indicated that 
her/his parents had been born abroad, the education of the participants’ parents, a dummy that indicated whether a participant was studying (for a comparison of 
results with and without control variables, see Chapter 4.6: Tables 4.13 and 4.14). Coefficients for effects that are significant at p ≤ .01 are bold. DV = dependent 
variable; dum = event dummies; cont = continuous event scores; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; β = standardized regression coefficient. 
a
 These events were experienced by fewer than 15 people, and thus, the estimated coefficients were not trustworthy. 
* p ≤ .05,  ** p ≤ .01,  *** p ≤ .001. 
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Participants who changed their eating and sleeping habits in a positive way at least once 
over the 8-year time period showed stronger increases in narcissistic admiration than people who 
did not make positive changes in their eating habits (dummy: b = .10, p = .007) and sleeping 
habits (dummy: b = .14, p = .003; Figure 4.4), respectively. The two events also showed an effect 
when the frequency and intensity of the events was taken into account: The more often eating 
and sleeping habits were changed and the more these changes were evaluated as positive, the 
more narcissistic admiration scores increased (eating habits, continuous: β = .11, p = .007; 
sleeping habits, continuous: β = .11, p = .001). Similarly, people who broke off a romantic 
relationship and evaluated it as a positive event increased more in narcissistic admiration than 
people who did not experience a positively evaluated break-up (dummy: b = .11, p = .008; Figure 
4.4). Again, there was also an effect when frequency and intensity were taken into account: The 
more often participants broke off a romantic relationship and the more these break-ups were 
evaluated as positive, the more narcissistic admiration scores increased (continuous: β = .10, p = 
.004). The effect of the event “Changed to another university/apprenticeship” was significant at p 
≤ .01 when frequency and intensity were taken into account: The more often a change to another 
university/apprenticeship took place and the more positively that change was evaluated, the more 
narcissistic admiration scores increased during early adulthood (continuous: β = .11, p = .004). 
Only one negatively evaluated life event was significantly (p ≤ .01) related to changes in 
narcissistic admiration during early adulthood: Participants who failed an important exam at least 
once showed more increases in narcissistic admiration than people who did not fail an important 
exam (dummy: b = .10, p = .007; Figure 4.4). When the frequency and intensity of that event 
were taken into account, the effect was not significant (continuous: β = .06, p = .12).
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Figure 4.4. Mean-level development in narcissistic admiration for participants who did or did not experience certain 
life events during early adulthood. The response format of the narcissistic admiration items was a 4-point Likert-
type scale ranging from 1 = not true at all to 4 = completely true (for item content, see Chapter 4.6: Table 4.5). 
 
Regarding Mach, there was only one event that showed an effect that was significant at p 
≤ .01: starting a new job and evaluating it as a positive experience. People who experienced the 
positive start of a new job—91% of the participants did—decreased more in Mach than people 
who did not experience the positive start of a new job (dummy: b = -.19, p = .005). In fact, 
people who did not experience a positive start of a new job did not decrease in Mach over the 8-
year period (Figure 4.5). Correspondingly, the more often and the more positively people 
evaluated the start of a new job, the more they decreased in Mach (continuous: β = -.11, p = .002; 
Table 4.3). 
 
Figure 4.5. Mean-level development in Machiavellianism for participants who did or did not experience the start of 
a new job positively during early adulthood. The response format for the Machiavellianism items was a 4-point 
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = not true at all to 4 = completely true (for item content, see Chapter 4.6: Table 
4.5).  
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4.3.3.2.2 Agency and communion event scores 
None of the agency and communion event scores showed a significant socialization effect 
on narcissistic admiration or on Mach (Table 4.2).  
4.4 Discussion 
The current study investigated (a) the mean-level development of narcissistic admiration 
and Mach during early adulthood and (b) how the development was associated with majoring in 
economics and the occurrence of several life events (socialization effects). In the following, we 
discuss the results separately for each of the two traits. 
4.4.1 Narcissistic Admiration  
In the two cohorts that we investigated, the mean levels of narcissistic admiration 
remained stable during early adulthood. Though this result is in line with two longitudinal 
studies (Carlson & Gjerde, 2009; Orth & Luciano, 2015), the finding seems to contradict cross-
sectional research that found a negative correlation between total scores on the Narcissistic 
Personality Inventory and age (Foster et al., 2003; Hill & Roberts, 2012; Roberts, Edmonds, & 
Grijalva, 2010). One reason for this apparent contradiction could be that narcissistic admiration 
does not decrease until after early adulthood because the longitudinal studies covered only the 
age range of early adulthood, whereas the cross-sectional studies covered the age range from 
early adulthood to old age. 
Furthermore, the lack of decrease in narcissistic admiration seems to contradict the 
assumption that narcissistic tendencies are “immature” and should thus decrease during the 
transition to adulthood (e.g., Roberts et al., 2010). Perhaps some narcissistic tendencies (e.g., 
narcissistic admiration) are less maladaptive than other tendencies (e.g., narcissistic rivalry) 
during early adulthood and thus only some narcissistic tendencies decrease during that time. In 
line with this reasoning, narcissistic admiration has positive or only very small negative 
associations with the three Big Five traits that increase with age according to the maturity 
principle (agreeableness, conscientious, and emotional stability; Back et al., 2013; Roberts et al., 
2008). The assertive facet of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory, Leadership/Authority, was 
also the facet with the smallest correlation with age in prior research (Hill & Roberts, 2012). 
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Moreover, Hill and Roberts (2012) argued that assertiveness and an optimistic outlook—which 
are features of narcissistic admiration—might exhibit increases in young adulthood as people 
master the challenges that occur during this difficult phase. Also, developmental research has 
found a distinct increase in the assertiveness component of extraversion (Roberts et al., 2006), 
which may be quite similar to narcissistic admiration. Future studies might want to test this 
explanation by utilizing a more thorough and comprehensive measure of narcissism and 
investigating whether facets associated with narcissistic rivalry decrease during early adulthood. 
The difference between narcissistic admiration and other facets of narcissism might also 
explain why we did not find socialization and selection effects of majoring in economics even 
though Bergman et al. (2012) found that economics students have higher scores on the 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory than psychology students. Majoring in economics might be 
related to some narcissistic tendencies assessed by the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (e.g., 
Entitlement/Exploitativeness) but not to narcissistic admiration. 
The life events results suggest that several changes in life are associated with the 
development of narcissistic admiration. The associated changes were changes in eating and 
sleeping habits, changes to another university/apprenticeship, and the end of a romantic 
relationship. It was not immediately clear why changes in eating or sleeping habits are related to 
increases in narcissistic admiration. Given that effects were present only when the events were 
evaluated positively, we can assume that these changes in habits increased the health, physical 
appearance, quality of life, or the way people felt about themselves, which may have led to more 
assertiveness and more optimism. That said, the effect might also work in the other direction: An 
increase in narcissistic admiration may have led to better sleeping and eating habits.  
The association of the positively evaluated event “broke off a romantic relationship” with 
increases in narcissistic admiration is better situated in existing narcissism research, which often 
focuses on narcissism and romantic relationships. Campbell, Brunell, and Finkel (2006) 
suggested—with reference to research on self-concept change in relationships and an 
unpublished longitudinal study—that people high in narcissism can shift from agentic to 
communal concerns when entering a romantic relationship. In line with such a shift would be a 
decrease in narcissistic admiration after these people “entered a new relationship.” Although we 
did not find evidence of such a decrease (Table 4.3), people seemed to increase in narcissistic 
admiration after the relationship was over, suggesting a post relationship shift from communal to 
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agentic concerns. It is noteworthy that such a shift—or at least the corresponding increase in 
narcissistic admiration—happened only when the break-up was evaluated positively. For the 
positive evaluators, the break-up might have been a relief, which might have increased the focus 
on agency or assertiveness and thus narcissistic admiration. Again, it could also work the other 
way around: Increases in narcissistic admiration lead to positive break-ups of (dissatisfying) 
romantic relationships. 
Finally, the association of a negatively evaluated failure on an important exam and 
increases in narcissistic admiration is in line with psychoanalytic theories that argue that 
unpleasant self-related experiences lead to a defensive inflation of self-esteem and self-
centeredness (e.g., Kernberg, 1975; Pulver, 1970) and theories suggesting that vulnerability is at 
the bottom of grandiose narcissism (e.g., Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Robins et al., 2001). That 
said, other negative experiences (Tables 4.2 and 4.3) and stressful life events (Orth & Luciano, 
2015) have not been found to be significantly related to changes in narcissistic admiration and 
narcissism, respectively. 
The selection effects we found indicated that people high in narcissistic admiration at age 
21.5 experienced more negative agentic (and communal) life events in the subsequent years than 
people low in narcissistic admiration (Table 4.2). These findings are in line with research by 
Orth and Luciano (2015) who found that young adults high in narcissism experienced 
subsequently more stressful life events than young adults low in narcissism. The more frequent 
occurrence of negative life events probably has to do with tendencies related to narcissism such 
as high approach and low avoidance motivation (e.g., Foster & Trimm, 2008), impulsivity 
(Vazire & Funder, 2006), and risky behavior (Foster, Shenesey, & Goff, 2009). 
4.4.2 Machiavellianism 
The gradual decrease in mean Mach levels in both cohorts is consistent with the maturity 
principle. The maturity principle states, among other things, that disagreeable tendencies 
decrease with age (e.g., Roberts et al., 2008; Specht et al., 2014): Commitments to family, 
friends, social and occupational roles, and/or genetic factors should lead to a decrease in 
antisocial, disagreeable, and antagonistic tendencies in early adulthood (e.g., Bleidorn et al., 
2013). Occupational roles seem to be the driving force behind this decrease in Mach in early 
adulthood given that only people who started a new job and evaluated it positively decreased in 
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Mach (Figure 4.5). In other words, successfully mastering occupational roles may contribute to 
decreases in Mach. 
Surprisingly, we found only one significant socialization effect for Mach. One reason 
could be the focus of the current study on long-lasting socialization effects: We related the 
events to changes in Mach over an 8-year time period. Some life events might be related to a 
temporary increase or decrease in Mach, but the level of Mach might rebound several weeks 
after the event happened. Fraley and Roberts (2014) showed that events such as a relationship 
break-up increased, for example, neuroticism levels, but personality bounced back after several 
weeks (see also Lucas, 2005). Momentary short-term increases or decreases might be more 
frequent than long-lasting socialization effects.  
Partly supporting our hypotheses about majoring in economics, we found selection but 
not socialization effects for studying economics. The selection effects explain why previous 
studies found higher levels of Mach in economics students (McLean & Jones, 1992; Skinner, 
1981; but see also Li-Ping Tang et al., 2008) and are in accordance with the low communal and 
high agentic motivation of people high in Mach and their motivation to achieve financial success 
(McHoskey, 1999).  
Finally, Mach at age 21.5 negatively predicted the subsequent occurrence of positive 
communal life events. Yet, it remains unclear whether people high in Mach experienced 
communal life events less often or whether they less often evaluated these events as positive than 
people low in Mach. 
4.4.3 Limitations and Future Directions 
Like many large-scale longitudinal studies, a potential limitation of our research was its 
reliance on self-reports: The validity of our findings stands or falls with the willingness and 
ability of our participants to respond objectively. That said, most of the life events we assessed 
are “objective”: They are externally verifiable and thus too salient to be misremembered (e.g., 
getting married; Magnus, Diener, Fujita, & Pavot, 1993). Finally, self-report instruments are the 
most common and most validated approach for assessing personality traits such as narcissistic 
admiration and Mach. Nevertheless, future research might want to measure narcissism, Mach, 
and life events with more than one method (e.g., via self-reports and other reports) in order to 
rule out self-report biases.  
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Because this study was the first to examine changes in narcissistic admiration and Mach 
over this long of a time period during early adulthood, the study was naturally largely 
exploratory. Similar future longitudinal research could endeavor to test the hypotheses from our 
study to determine whether the types of experiences associated with changes in narcissism and 
Mach can be replicated. In particular, future research might want to replicate the interesting 
finding that failing to experience the positive start of a new job hampers a decrease in Mach. 
Another reason why a replication of the results is warranted is our use of nontraditional 
measures of narcissistic admiration and Mach. That said, we validated the questionnaires that 
were used in three studies (see Chapter 4.6: Text 4.1 and Tables 4.6 to 4.8).  
Finally, although we used the term socialization effect in this study in accordance with 
previous research on personality development, our data and analyses did not allow us to make 
causal claims. We do not know whether life events caused changes in narcissistic admiration or 
Mach, changes in narcissistic admiration or Mach caused life events, or both were caused by a 
third variable not controlled for in the current study.  
4.4.4 Conclusion 
Clearly, compared with longitudinal research on the Big Five during early adulthood, 
longitudinal research on narcissism and Mach is only just beginning. The current study with its 
two large longitudinal data sets delivers one of the initial pictures of mean-level changes during 
early adulthood. This picture shows that narcissistic admiration does not change in early 
adulthood, whereas Mach gradually decreases. The life events analyses supplemented this 
picture by identifying events that potentially trigger long-lasting changes in narcissistic 
admiration and Mach. 
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4.6 Supplemental Material 
 
Text 4.1 
Validation of the Narcissism and Machiavellianism Items used in the TOSCA Study 
The convergent and divergent validity of the narcissism and Machiavellianism (Mach) items 
used in the TOSCA study (Chapter 4.6: Table 4.5) were assessed in three samples. Sample 1 was 
a US sample recruited online via Amazon Mechanical Turk in March 2015. Sample 2 was an 
international sample—60% of the people were from the US—recruited online via the site 
yourpersonality.net on which people can fill out personality questionnaires to receive feedback 
about their personality. Sample 3 was recruited at a German university in a lecture for people 
who are studying to become a teacher. All three samples filled out a questionnaire that contained 
the TOSCA narcissism and TOSCA Machiavellianism items and items from other self-report 
scales; the other scales varied from sample to sample. The first two samples filled out their 
questionnaire online and in English. The third sample filled out their questionnaire in a paper-
pencil format and in German. The correlations between the two TOSCA scales and all relevant 
other scales will be reported and discussed in the following. 
Results for Sample 1 (Amazon Mechanical Turk). The results for Sample 1 can be found 
in Table 4.6. TOSCA narcissism was strongly correlated with the NPI total scale: manifest12 r = 
.54; latent13 r = .66 (both p-values ≤ .001). However, unexpectedly, TOSCA narcissism was also 
                                                 
 
12 Manifest correlations: bivariate Pearson correlation between the average item scores of two 
scales. 
13 Latent correlations: Unidimensional models were fit to the items of each of the two scales, and 
the latent variables were allowed to correlate in a structural equation model. For this analysis, we 
used the R package lavaan (Rosseel, 2012) version 0.5-18. 
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strongly correlated with self-esteem: manifest r = .63; latent r = .72 (both p-values ≤ .001. This 
finding is in contrast to the correlation between TOSCA narcissism and self-esteem found in the 
two TOSCA cohorts: manifest r = .31 (p ≤ .001) at the first measurement occasion for the 
TOSCA-2006 cohort (N = 4,715) and manifest r = .26 (p ≤ .001) at the second measurement 
occasion for the TOSCA-2002 cohort (N = 2,287; TOSCA narcissism was not assessed at Time 1 
in the TOSCA-2002 cohort). In both cohorts, self-esteem was assessed with three items from a 
German version of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965; see also Rieger, Göllner, 
Trautwein, & Roberts, 2015). 
TOSCA Mach was strongly correlated with the MACH IV scale (Christie & Geis, 1970): 
manifest r = .63; latent r = .80 (both p-values ≤ .001). TOSCA Mach was also strongly correlated 
with the subscales from the Psychopathy scale SRP-III (Williams, Nathanson, & Paulhus, 2003), 
especially with the Interpersonal Manipulation subscale from the SRP-III (Table 4.5). 
Established Mach scales are often highly correlated with this subscale from the SRP-III (e.g., 
Jones & Figueredo, 2013). Similarly, MACH IV was also strongly correlated with the SRP-III 
subscales in Sample 1 (Table 4.5). 
Results for Sample 2 (yourpersonality.net). The results for Sample 2 can be found in Table 
4.7. In this sample, TOSCA narcissism was most strongly correlated with the Narcissistic 
Admiration scale from the Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry Questionnaire: manifest r = .71; 
latent r = .83 (both p-values ≤ .001). TOSCA Mach was strongly correlated with Narcissistic 
Rivalry: manifest r = .63; latent r = .70 (both p-values ≤ .001). This finding is in line with 
previous research that also found strong associations between the Mach IV total score and 
Narcissistic Rivalry (Back et al., 2013).  
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Results for Sample 3 (German university). The results for Sample 3 can be found in Table 
4.8. Similar to what was found in Sample 2, the TOSCA narcissism scale was strongly correlated 
with the Narcissistic Admiration scale from the Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry 
Questionnaire: manifest r = .72; latent r = .81 (both p-values ≤ .001). In contrast to the results 
from Sample 1, the TOSCA narcissism scale was only moderately strongly correlated with self-
esteem: manifest r = .31; latent r = .31 (both p-values ≤ .01). The strength of the correlation 
between narcissistic admiration and self-esteem in Sample 2 was similar to the strength reported 
in previous research (e.g., Back et al., 2013). TOSCA Mach was strongly correlated with the 
Machiavellianism subscale from the Short Dark Triad scale: manifest r = .59; latent r = .76 (both 
p-values ≤ .001). 
Conclusion. On the basis of the correlations in the three samples, we think the TOSCA 
narcissism items show the greatest overlap with narcissistic admiration, and the TOSCA 
Machiavellianism items show the greatest overlap with Machiavellianism. 
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Table 4.4 
Attrition Effects and Retention Rates 
 TOSCA-2006 Cohort (target = 6,177)  TOSCA-2002 Cohort (target = 5,901) 
 N NA 
T1 
Mach 
T1 
% 
Female 
GPA  N NA 
T1 
Mach 
T1 
% 
Female 
GPA 
T1 4,944 2.81 2.29 0.56 2.37  4,633   -   - 0.55 2.42 
T2 2,854 2.80 2.24 0.61 2.27  2,289 2.70 2.14 0.62 2.31 
T3 2,164 2.80 2.24 0.61 2.24  1,890 2.69 2.13 0.64 2.30 
T4 1,902 2.80 2.24 0.60 2.24  1,851 2.71 2.13 0.63 2.27 
T5 - - - - -  1,668 2.69 2.12 0.63 2.29 
T6 - - - - -  1,399 2.70 2.14 0.46 2.30 
Continuers  2,838 2.80 2.24 0.61 2.27  2,572 2.70 2.14 0.61 2.32 
Dropouts 2,106 2.82 2.35 0.49 2.52  2,061  -  - 0.47 2.55 
Cohen‘s d - 0.03 0.18   - 0.40    -  -   - 0.36 
Note. Dropouts participated only at the first measurement occasion; continuers participated at least one more 
time. NA = Narcissistic Admiration; Mach = Machiavellianism. 
 
 
    
Table 4.5 
Narcissism and Machiavellianism Items, Means, Standard Deviations, and Item-Total Correlations from the First Wave of the TOSCA-2006 Cohort 
Item 
no. 
Item content M SD rit 
 German English    
Narcissistic admiration 
1 
Insgesamt halte ich mich für einen eher außergewöhnlichen 
Menschen. 
All in all, I think I am a rather exceptional person. 2.68 0.75 .54 
2 Ich habe viele sehr spezielle Fähigkeiten. I have many special abilities. 2.96 0.74 .66 
3 
Ich bin sicherlich ein Mensch mit ganz besonderen 
Begabungen. 
I am an exceptionally gifted person. 2.83 0.75 .74 
4 Von mir könnten viele Menschen sehr viel lernen. Many people could learn a great deal from me. 2.58 0.67 .53 
5 Ich bin ein Mensch mit vielen besonderen Eigenschaften. I am a person with many special qualities. 2.90 0.70 .75 
6 
Ich habe sicherlich die Voraussetzungen dafür, etwas 
Besonderes zu leisten. 
I am capable of accomplishing something 
special. 
2.96 0.65 .65 
Machiavellianism 
1 
Was das Berufsleben anbetrifft, ist es oft nicht so wichtig, wie 
man gewinnt, sondern dass man gewinnt.  
In professional life, it’s often less important how you 
win, but rather that you win. 
2.74 0.90 .51 
2 
Wer etwas im Leben erreichen will, muss unter Umständen 
auch „über Leichen gehen“.  
In order to get ahead, you need to stop at nothing in 
some circumstances. 
1.94 0.93 .65 
3 
Egal ob man es mag oder nicht: Manchmal muss man die 
„Ellbogen einsetzen“, um etwas zu erreichen.  
Whether you like it or not: Sometimes you have to 
hurt other people to achieve something. 
2.72 0.83 .56 
4 
Um eine gute Idee durchzusetzen, sollte man - wenn nötig - 
auch zu weniger feinen Mitteln greifen.  
To push through a good idea, it’s sometimes 
necessary to cheat. 
2.05 0.79 .65 
5 
Fairness ist zwar wichtig, aber manchmal hilft sie nicht 
weiter.  
Sometimes behaving ethically is not useful. 2.34 0.84 .57 
6 In vielen Situationen heiligt der Zweck die Mittel.  In many situations, the end justifies the means. 2.21 0.79 .63 
Note. Narcissism: N = 4,882; Machiavellianism: N = 4,875. The response format for the narcissistic admiration and Mach items was a 4-point Likert-type scale 
ranging from 1 = not true at all to 4 = completely true. rit = item-total correlation. 
 
 
  
Table 4.6 
Correlations from the Validation Study of the TOSCA Narcissism and Machiavellianism Items in a US-American Sample Recruited via mTurk 
 
TOSCA 
Narc 
TOSCA 
Mach 
NPI 
NPI 
L/A 
NPI 
GE 
NPI 
E/E 
MACH 
MACH 
Tactics 
MACH 
Views 
MACH* SRP 
SRP 
IPM 
SRP 
CA 
SRP. 
ELS 
SRP 
ASB 
RSE 
TOSCA 
Narc 
.91                
TOSCA 
Mach 
.11 .84               
NPI .54 (.66) .25 .91              
NPI L/A .53 (.65) .17 .89 .85             
NPI GE .37 .19 .78 .57 .82            
NPI E/E .15 .33 .56 .39 .3 .55           
MACH -.16 .63 (.80) .14 .07 .07 .35 .84          
MACH 
Tactics 
-.14 .60 (.79) .15 .08 .11 .34 .90 .77         
MACH 
Views 
-.14 .51 (.72) .09 .04 .01 .27 .87 .58 .75        
MACH* -.13 .62 (.88) .10 .06 .04 .29 .87 .77 .79 .59       
SRP .07 .61 .37 .28 .28 .43 .68 .60 .59 .62 .93      
SRP IPM .07 .63 (.78) .34 .27 .24 .41 .77 .74 .62 .70 .82 .86     
SRP CA .01 .53 .25 .18 .14 .37 .63 .55 .55 .55 .83 .64 .81    
SRP ELS .10 .43 .34 .29 .29 .27 .47 .37 .44 .47 .83 .56 .54 .83   
SRP ASB .04 .37 .26 .16 .22 .36 .35 .29 .32 .29 .77 .44 .52 .55 .82  
RSE .63 (.72) -.17 .26 .28 .19 -.02 -.38 -.29 -.37 -.31 -.24 -.22 -.20 -.14 -.20 .93 
Note. N = 303 - 304. Cronbach’s alpha values are displayed on the diagonal. The correlation coefficients outside the parentheses are bivariate Pearson 
correlations between the average item scores from two scales. In parentheses, we present latent correlations that we obtained by fitting unidimensional models to 
each of the two scales and correlating the latent variables in a structural equation model using the R package lavaan (Rosseel, 2012) version 0.5-18. TOSCA Narc 
= narcissism scale used in TOSCA; TOSCA Mach = Machiavellianism scale used in TOSCA; NPI = Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Raskin & Hall, 1979); 
NPI L/A = Leadership/Authority facet from the Ackerman et al. (2011) solution; NPI GE = Grandiose Exhibitionism facet from the Ackerman et al. (2011) 
solution; NPI E/E = Entitlement/Exploitativeness facet from the Ackerman et al. (2011) solution; MACH = MACH IV Scale (Christie & Geis, 1970); MACH* = 
MACH IV scale trimmed (Rauthmann, 2013); SRP = Self-Report Psychopathy Scale SRP-III (Williams, Nathanson, & Paulhus, 2003); SRO IPM = SRP 
subscale interpersonal manipulation; SRP CA = SRP subscale Callous Affect; SRP ELS = SRP subscale Erratic Life Style; SRP ASB = SRP subscale Anti-Social 
Behavior; RSE = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). 
 
 
    
 
Table 4.7 
Correlation Table for Validation Study of TOSCA Narcissism and Machiavellianism Items in Sample 2 
 TOSCA Narc TOSCA Mach NPI NPI L/A NPI GE NPI E/E NARQ ADM NARQ RIV 
TOSCA Narc .89        
TOSCA Mach .31 .89       
NPI .63 .57 .90      
NPI L/A .62 .39 .86 .80     
NPI GE .44 .45 .78 .51 .78    
NPI E/E .30 .56 .65 .44 .43 .60   
NARQ ADM .71 (.83) .49 .78 .69 .62 .43 .87  
NARQ RIV .38 .63 (.70) .61 .41 .49 .62 .57 .87 
Note. N = 667. Cronbach’s alpha are displayed on the diagonal. The correlation coefficients outside of brackets are bivariate Pearson correlations between the 
average item scores of two scales. In brackets, latent correlations are presented that we obtained fitting unidimensional models to each of the two scales and 
correlating the latent variables in a structural equation model, using the R package lavaan (Rosseel, 2012) version 0.5-18. TOSCA Narc = narcissism scale used 
in TOSCA; TOSCA Mach = Machiavellianism scale used in TOSCA; NPI = Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Raskin & Hall, 1979); NPI L/A = 
Leadership/Authority facet of Ackerman et al. (2011) solution; NPI GE = Grandiose Exhibitionism facet of Ackerman et al. (2011) solution; NPI E/E = 
Entitlement/Exploitativeness facet of Ackerman et al. (2011) solution; ADM = Narcissistic Admiration Scale from the Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry 
Questionnaire (NARQ; Back et al., 2013); ADM grand = Grandiosity facet of the Admiration Scale of the NARQ; RIV = Rivalry Scale of the NARQ. 
 
  
 
Table 4.8 
Correlation Table for Validation Study of TOSCA Narcissism and Machiavellianism Items in a German Sample 
 
TOSCA 
Narc 
TOSCA 
Mach 
SD3 
Narc 
SD3 
Mach 
SD3 
Psych 
NARQ 
ADM 
NARQ 
RIV 
RSE 
B5 
EXTRA 
B5 
CONSC 
B5 
NEURO 
B5 
AGREE 
B5 
OPEN 
TOSCA 
Narc 
.89             
TOSCA 
Mach 
.28 .83            
SD3 Narc .56 (.73) .33 .63           
SD3 
Mach 
.15 .59 (.76) .34 .75          
SD3 
Psych 
.27 .39 (.63) .43 .45 .61         
NARQ 
ADM 
.72 (.81) .38 .74 .30 .48 .82        
NARQ 
RIV 
.11 .44 .32 .50 .51 .33 .79       
RSE .31 (.31) .04 .27 .01 .00 .39 -.19 .88      
B5 Extra .38 .03 .52 -.03 .21 .44 -.06 .31 .85     
B5 Consc .08 -.07 -.02 -.09 -.24 .01 -.16 .12 .10 .71    
B5 Neuro -.27 .05 -.13 .10 .08 -.20 .31 -.58 -.25 -.18 .81   
B5 Agree -.03 -.35 -.18 -.31 -.51 -.13 -.58 .23 .07 .25 -.38 .70  
B5 Open .34 -.05 .26 .03 .08 .23 -.12 .05 .37 .06 -.18 .16 .81 
Note. N = 158. Cronbach’s alpha are displayed on the diagonal. The correlation coefficients outside of brackets are bivariate Pearson correlations between the 
average item scores of two scales. In brackets, latent correlations are presented that we obtained fitting unidimensional models to each of the two scales and 
correlating the latent variables in a structural equation model, using the R package lavaan (Rosseel, 2012) version 0.5-18. SD3 = a German translation of the 
Short Dark Triad (Jones & Paulhus, 2014); TOSCA Narc = narcissism scale used in TOSCA; TOSCA Mach = Machiavellianism scale used in TOSCA; RSE = 
German 10-item version of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Ferring & Filipp, 1996); ADM = Narcissistic Admiration Scale from the Narcissistic Admiration 
and Rivalry Questionnaire (NARQ; Back et al., 2013); ADM grand = Grandiosity facet of the Admiration Scale of the NARQ; RIV = Rivalry Scale of the 
NARQ; Extra = Extraversion of the German BFI-42 (Lang, Luedtke, Asendorpf, 2001); Consc = Conscientiousness of the German BFI-42; Neuro = Neuroticism 
of the German BFI-42; Agree = Agreeableness of the German BFI-42; Open = Openness to Experience of the German BFI-42. 
 
 
    
Table 4.9 
Comparison of Results with and Without Control Variables: Selection and Socialization Effects for Studying Economics (TOSCA-2006 cohort) 
 Narcissistic Admiration  Machiavellianism 
 w/o control variables with control variables  w/o control variables with control variables 
Selection Effects (Regression of Study Major Choice on Initial Level of NA or Mach) 
Initial Level of NA/Mach 1.02 0.92  2.07*** 2.13*** 
Self-Esteem  0.84   0.81* 
Grade Point Average  0.92   0.82 
Figural Reasoning  0.96   0.96 
Verbal Reasoning  0.91   0.89 
Education of Parents  0.96   0.97 
Age  0.95   0.96 
Born Abroad  0.81   0.73 
Parents Born Abroad  0.92   0.92 
Vocational High School  3.97***   3.78*** 
Gender  0.83   1.12 
Socialization Effects (Regression of Change in NA or Mach on Study Major) 
Initial Level of NA/Mach -0.43*** -0.45***  -0.45*** -0.5*** 
Economics Major -0.02 -0.01  0.05 0.06 
Self-Esteem  -0.04   0.00 
Grade Point Average  0.01   0.04 
Figural Reasoning  0   0.02 
Verbal Reasoning  -0.02   -0.03 
Education of Parents  0.02*   -0.01 
Age  0.00   0.00 
Born Abroad  0.07   0.11 
Parents Born Abroad  -0.01   -0.01 
Vocational High School  -0.04   -0.02 
Gender  -0.03   -0.19*** 
Note. N = 1,950. Unstandardized regression coefficients from eight separate regression analyses that were performed within four different true individual change 
models (Figure 1). In all models, we controlled for initial level of self-esteem, gender, age, grade point average, participant’s figural and verbal reasoning, a 
dummy for whether the participant indicated to be born abroad, a dummy for whether the participant indicated that her/his parents were born abroad, the 
education of the parents, a dummy as control variable that indicated whether a participant was attending a vocational high school focused on economics. In the 
socialization effects models, we additionally controlled for the initial level of narcissistic admiration or initial level of Machiavellianism (depending on the 
dependent variable). The results for the tested selection and socialization effects are bold. NA = narcissistic admiration; Mach = Machiavellianism. 
* p ≤ .05.  ** p ≤ .01.  *** p ≤ .001. 
  
Table 4.10 
Selection effects of Narcissistic Admiration on Event Dummies and Continuous Event Scores 
 
 Expert Rating  
Base rate 
(dum = 1) 
 Event positively evaluated  Event negatively evaluated 
  
Agenc
y 
Com
m 
-union 
 
positiv
e 
negativ
e 
 dum OR  cont β  dum OR  cont β 
Event    
w/o 
cvs 
with 
cvs 
 
w/o 
cvs 
with 
cvs 
 
w/o 
cvs 
with 
cvs 
 
w/o 
cvs 
with 
cvs 
Started a new job  1.67 -0.89  91% 7%  1.09 1.03  
.11*
* 
.10*
* 
 0.66 0.97  -.02 .03 
Won an academic award 
or prize 
 1.67 -1.40  45% 1%  1.09 1.00  .09* .07  -a -a  -a -a 
Got promoted at work  1.51 -0.89  41% 0%  0.98 0.84  .02 -.01  -a -a  -a -a 
Began regular work 
after graduation 
 1.51 -0.38  51% 3%  0.87 0.80  .03 .02  1.87 3.30*  .05 .09* 
Increased working hours  1.34 -1.06  21% 44%  1.02 0.89  .04 .02  1.35 1.48*  
.11*
* 
.12**
* 
Change in financial 
situation (much better or 
worse) 
 1.18 -0.89  84% 29%  1.31 0.98  .04 -.01  1.59* 
2.56**
* 
 
.11*
* 
.19**
* 
Quit a job / Lay-off  1.18 -0.38  5% 19%  1.41 1.47  .04 .05  1.2 1.59  .04 .09* 
Changed major/stopped 
university 
studies/apprenticeship 
 1.02 -0.89  17% 4%  1.26 1.57  .05 .08*  1.97 3.12*  .04 .07 
Failed an important 
exam 
 0.86 -1.06  8% 29%  0.86 0.76  -.01 -.04  0.9 0.83  .01 .02 
Changed to another 
university/apprenticeshi
p 
 0.86 -0.38  22% 3%  
1.74*
* 
1.77*
* 
 .08* .08*  0.84 0.89  -.04 -.02 
Went abroad  0.38 -0.03  95% 2%  0.83 0.62  .04 -.01  4.04* 4.61**  .07* .09** 
Moved out of home  0.05 0.48  54% 4%  0.86 0.91  -.01 .02  2.1 3.08*  .03 .07 
Borrowed a large 
amount of money (more 
than €1,000) 
 0.05 -0.72  8% 15%  1.03 0.78  .02 -.01  1.26 1.54  .07* .09** 
Own injury or illness  -0.27 -0.38  3% 54%  2.64 2.55  .08* .08  0.99 1.13  -.02 .02 
Quit smoking  -0.27 -0.72  17% 1%  1.18 1.27  .03 .05  -a -a  -a -a 
    
Change in eating habits 
(much more or less food 
intake) 
 -0.43 -0.89  34% 26%  1.27 1.32  .07 .06  1.62* 
2.29**
* 
 .06 .13** 
Convicted for a minor 
offence (fare dodging, 
speeding, etc.) 
 -0.59 -0.55  4% 24%  2.71* 2.62  .08* .07  1.1 1.23  .05 .07 
Started psychotherapy  -0.59 0.48  13% 2%  0.86 1.35  -.03 .03  0.68 1.21  -.03 -.01 
Broke off a relationship 
with a 
boyfriend/girlfriend 
 -0.75 1.16  18% 48%  1.13 1.29  .03 .05  1.03 1.19  .02 .07 
Illness or injury of a 
family member 
 -0.75 1.16  2% 77%  1.56 1.88  .04 .05  1.6* 1.78*  .06 .09* 
Illness or injury of a 
friend 
 -0.75 1.16  1% 45%  -a -a  -a -a  1.52* 1.71**  
.10*
* 
.13**
* 
Change in sleeping 
habits (much more or 
less sleep) 
 -0.75 -1.06  15% 39%  1.36 1.31  .02 .02  1.43* 1.78**  .06 .11** 
Sexual problems  -0.91 0.14  1% 25%  -a -a  -a -a  1.15 1.41  .01 .06 
Death of a friend  -0.91 0.65  0% 16%  -a -a  -a -a  
2.06**
* 
2.32**
* 
 
.10*
* 
.11** 
Had an abortion (self or 
partner) 
 -0.91 0.31  0% 2%  -a -a  -a -a  2.74 3.09  .06* .07* 
Got pregnant (self or 
partner) 
 -0.91 2.02  20% 1%  1.00 0.97  .01 .02  -a -a  -a -a 
Entered a new 
relationship (lasting at 
least 1 month) 
 -1.08 2.02  63% 7%  1.45* 1.54*  .08* .08*  0.96 1.07  -.01 .01 
Death of a family 
member 
 -1.08 0.65  1% 62%  -a -a  -a -a  1.32 1.38  .00 .00 
Parents broke up or 
divorced 
 -1.08 0.31  2% 4%  0.79 1.02  .01 .02  1 1.24  .01 .03 
Got married  -1.24 2.02  27% 0%  0.76 0.66*  -.07 
-
.10*
* 
 
 -a -a  -a -a 
  
Note. N without control variables = 2,571 (narcissistic admiration) and 2,572 (Machiavellianism); N with control variables = 4,600. Results of 240 separate regression 
analyses that were performed within 240 different true individual change models (Figure 1): 2 (positively vs. negatively evaluated) × 2 (event dummies vs. continuous 
event scores) × 2 (without vs. with control variables) models for each of the 30 life events. In the models with control variables, we controlled for initial level of self-
esteem, gender, age, grade point average, figural and verbal reasoning, a dummy for whether the participant indicated having been born abroad, a dummy for whether the 
participant indicated that her/his parents had been born abroad, the education of the participants’ parents, a dummy that indicated whether a participant was studying. DV 
= dependent variable; dum = event dummies; cont = continuous event scores; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; β = standardized regression coefficient; OR = 
Odds Ratio; cvs = control variables. 
a
 These events were experienced by less than 15 people and thus the results were not trustworthy. 
* p ≤ .05.  ** p ≤ .01.  *** p ≤ .001. 
 
 
 
 
    
 
Table 4.11 
Selection effects of Machiavellianism on Event Dummies and Continuous Event Scores 
 
 Expert Rating  
Base rate 
(dum = 1) 
 Event positively evaluated  Event negatively evaluated 
  
Agency 
Comm 
-union 
 
positive negative 
 dum OR  cont β  dum OR  cont β 
Event    
w/o 
cvs 
with 
cvs 
 
w/o 
cvs 
with 
cvs 
 
w/o 
cvs 
with 
cvs 
 
w/o 
cvs 
with 
cvs 
Started a new job  1.67 -0.89  91% 7%  1.07 1.14  -.01 .00  1.1 1.28  .00 .01 
Won an academic award 
or prize 
 1.67 -1.40  45% 1%  1.43* 1.80**  .08 .12*  -a -a  -a -a 
Got promoted at work  1.51 -0.89  41% 0%  1.06 1.08  .06 .07  -a -a  -a -a 
Began regular work after 
graduation 
 1.51 -0.38  51% 3%  0.88 0.94  -.04 -.03  0.85 0.62  -.01 -.03 
Increased working hours  1.34 -1.06  21% 44%  0.86 0.83  .00 -.01  0.75 0.8  -.02 .00 
Change in financial 
situation (much better or 
worse) 
 1.18 -0.89  84% 29%  0.87 0.95  .04 .05  1.05 0.96  .03 .01 
Quit a job / Lay-off  1.18 -0.38  5% 19%  1.15 1.14  -.01 -.01  0.79 0.63  -.04 -.08 
Changed major/stopped 
university 
studies/apprenticeship 
 1.02 -0.89  17% 4%  1.41 1.24  .06 .04  2.45* 1.58  .09* .06 
Failed an important exam  0.86 -1.06  8% 29%  0.68 0.70  -.05 -.05  1.35 1  .07 .00 
Changed to another 
university/apprenticeship 
 0.86 -0.38  22% 3%  1.13 1.13  .02 .04  1.48 1.17  .04 .03 
Went abroad  0.38 -0.03  95% 2%  1.12 1.14  -.04 -.01  0.94 1.13  .02 .03 
Moved out of home  0.05 0.48  54% 4%  1.26 1.08  .06 .03  1.03 0.95  .01 .02 
Borrowed a large amount 
of money (more than 
€1,000) 
 0.05 -0.72  8% 15%  0.98 0.89  .05 .03  0.68 0.53*  
-
.08* 
-
.11* 
Own injury or illness  -0.27 -0.38  3% 54%  0.45 0.45  -.08 -.08  1.11 1.05  .04 .05 
Quit smoking  -0.27 -0.72  17% 1%  1.02 0.88  -.01 -.03  -a -a  -a -a 
Change in eating habits 
(much more or less food 
intake) 
 -0.43 -0.89  34% 26%  1.02 0.96  -.02 -.03  0.97 1.02  .00 .01 
  
Convicted for a minor 
offence (fare dodging, 
speeding, etc.) 
 -0.59 -0.55  4% 24%  1.84 1.21  .00 -.04  1.17 1.13  .04 .03 
Started psychotherapy  -0.59 0.48  13% 2%  0.69 0.75  -.08 -.07  0.78 1.07  -.02 .00 
Broke off a relationship 
with a 
boyfriend/girlfriend 
 -0.75 1.16  18% 48%  0.93 0.98  -.05 -.04  1.45* 1.39  .08* .08 
Illness or injury of a 
family member 
 -0.75 1.16  2% 77%  0.76 0.56  .00 -.02  1.44 1.59*  .04 .10* 
Illness or injury of a 
friend 
 -0.75 1.16  1% 45%  -a -a  -a -a  0.81 0.86  -.01 .01 
Change in sleeping habits 
(much more or less sleep) 
 -0.75 -1.06  15% 39%  1.09 1.00  .05 .04  1.1 1.15  .01 .02 
Sexual problems  -0.91 0.14  1% 25%  -a -a  -a -a  1.13 1.17  -.02 -.01 
Death of a friend  -0.91 0.65  0% 16%  -a -a  -a -a  1.56 1.64  .04 .06 
Had an abortion (self or 
partner) 
 -0.91 0.31  0% 2%  -a -a  -a -a  0.89 0.75  -.02 -.02 
Got pregnant (self or 
partner) 
 -0.91 2.02  20% 1%  0.52** 0.58*  
-
.14*** 
-
.12** 
 -a -a  -a -a 
Entered a new 
relationship (lasting at 
least 1 month) 
 -1.08 2.02  63% 7%  1.02 0.97  .01 .00  1.01 1.03  .00 .00 
Death of a family member  -1.08 0.65  1% 62%  -a -a  -a -a  1.23 1.36  .06 .07 
Parents broke up or 
divorced 
 -1.08 0.31  2% 4%  0.63 0.75  -.04 -.03  0.6 0.52  -.04 -.06 
Got married  -1.24 2.02  27% 0%  0.56** 0.57*  
-
.13*** 
-
.12** 
 -a -a  -a -a 
 Note. N without control variables = 2,571 (narcissistic admiration) and 2,572 (Machiavellianism); N with control variables = 4,600. Results of 240 separate regression 
analyses that were performed within 240 different true individual change models (Figure 1): 2 (positively vs. negatively evaluated) × 2 (event dummies vs. continuous 
event scores) × 2 (without vs. with control variables) models for each of the 30 life events. In the models with control variables, we controlled for initial level of self-
esteem, gender, age, grade point average, figural and verbal reasoning, a dummy for whether the participant indicated having been born abroad, a dummy for whether the 
participant indicated that her/his parents had been born abroad, the education of the participants’ parents, a dummy that indicated whether a participant was studying. DV 
= dependent variable; dum = event dummies; cont = continuous event scores; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; β = standardized regression coefficient; OR = 
Odds Ratio; cvs = control variables. 
a
 These events were experienced by less than 15 people and thus the results were not trustworthy. 
* p ≤ .05.  ** p ≤ .01.  *** p ≤ .001. 
    
 
Table 4.12 
Comparison of Results with and Without Control Variables: Socialization and Selection Effects for Aggregated Event Scores (without control 
variables) 
 Socialization Effect  Selection Effect 
 DV = Change in 
Narcissistic Admiration 
DV = Change in 
Machiavellianism 
 IV = Initial Level of 
Narcissistic Admiration 
IV = Initial Level of 
Machiavellianism 
Event score w/o cvs with cvs w/o cvs with cvs  w/o cvs with cvs w/o cvs with cvs 
Positive agency .09 .08 -.07
 
-.05
 
 .10 .07 .08 .11 
Negative agency  .08 .08 .10 .09  .11* .16** -.02 -.04 
Positive communion -.05 -.04 -.08 -.07  .00 .02 -.15** -.16** 
Negative communion .02 .02 .03 .07  .10 .13* .05 .08 
Note. N without control variables = 2,571 (narcissistic admiration) and 2,572 (Machiavellianism); N with control variables = 4,600. Standardized regression coefficients 
from 32 separate regression analyses that were performed in 16 different true individual change models (Figure 1). In the models with control variables, we controlled 
for initial level of self-esteem, gender, age, grade point average, figural and verbal reasoning, a dummy for whether the participant indicated having been born abroad, 
a dummy for whether the participant indicated that her/his parents had been born abroad, the education of the parents, and a dummy that indicated whether a 
participant was studying. DV = dependent variable; IV = independent variable; cvs = control variables. 
 
  
 
Table 4.13 
Comparison of Results with and Without Control Variables: Socialization effects of 30 Life Events on Changes in Narcissistic Admiration 
 
 Expert Rating  
Base rate 
(dum = 1) 
 Event positively evaluated  Event negatively evaluated 
  
Agency 
Comm 
-union 
 
positive negative 
 dum b  cont β  dum b  cont β 
Event    
w/o 
cvs 
with 
cvs 
 
w/o 
cvs 
with 
cvs 
 
w/o 
cvs 
with 
cvs 
 
w/o 
cvs 
with 
cvs 
Started a new job  1.67 -0.89  91% 7%  .02 .03  .06 .06  .00 .01  -.01 .00 
Won an academic award or 
prize 
 1.67 -1.40  45% 1%  .03 .04  .06 .07*  -a -a  -a -a 
Got promoted at work  1.51 -0.89  41% 0%  -.02 -.02  -.02 -.02  -a -a  -a -a 
Began regular work after 
graduation 
 1.51 -0.38  51% 3%  .02 .03  .06 .07  .04 .01  .00 .00 
Increased working hours  1.34 -1.06  21% 44%  -.03 -.04  -.02 -.02  .03 .03  .05 .05 
Change in financial 
situation (much better or 
worse) 
 1.18 -0.89  84% 29%  -.01 -.03  .02 .01  .04 .05  .08* .09* 
Quit a job / Lay-off  1.18 -0.38  5% 19%  .11 .10  .06 .06  .03 .02  -.01 .00 
Changed major/stopped 
university 
studies/apprenticeship 
 1.02 -0.89  17% 4%  .05 .05  .08* .08  .06 .04  .06 .06 
Failed an important exam  0.86 -1.06  8% 29%  -.05 -.04  .00 -.01  .10** .10**  .07* .06 
Changed to another 
university/apprenticeship 
 0.86 -0.38  22% 3%  .07 .08*  .10** .11**  .05 .04  .06 .06 
Went abroad  0.38 -0.03  95% 2%  -.12 -.15*  -.02 -.04  .14 .15  .06 .07* 
Moved out of home  0.05 0.48  54% 4%  -.04 -.06  .00 .00  .06 .03  .00 .00 
Borrowed a large amount 
of money (more than 
€1,000) 
 0.05 -0.72  8% 15%  -.03 -.02  -.02 -.03  .06 .06  .06 .06 
Own injury or illness  -0.27 -0.38  3% 54%  .00 .03  .00 .00  .03 .03  .06 .06 
Quit smoking  -0.27 -0.72  17% 1%  -.02 -.03  .00 -.01  
  
 
  
Change in eating habits 
(much more or less food 
 -0.43 -0.89  34% 26%  .09** .10**  .11** .11**  -.05 -.05  -.04 -.04 
    
intake) 
Convicted for a minor 
offence (fare dodging, 
speeding, etc.) 
 -0.59 -0.55  4% 24%  -.03 -.04  -.01 -.01  .02 .02  .03 .02 
Started psychotherapy  -0.59 0.48  13% 2%  .04 .07  .06 .08  -.09 -.06  -.05 -.05 
Broke off a relationship 
with a boyfriend/girlfriend 
 -0.75 1.16  18% 48%  .10* .11**  .09** .10**  .01 .00  .02 .02 
Illness or injury of a family 
member 
 -0.75 1.16  2% 77%  .01 .01  .01 .01  -.01 -.01  .00 .00 
Illness or injury of a friend  -0.75 1.16  1% 45%  -a -a  -a -a  .02 .02  .05 .06 
Change in sleeping habits 
(much more or less sleep) 
 -0.75 -1.06  15% 39%  .13** .14**  .12*** .11***  .03 .04  .02 .02 
Sexual problems  -0.91 0.14  1% 25%  -a -a  -a -a  .05 .05  .08* .08* 
Death of a friend  -0.91 0.65  0% 16%  -a -a  -a -a  .02 .03  .03 .03 
Had an abortion (self or 
partner) 
 -0.91 0.31  0% 2%  -a -a  -a -a  -.02 .02  -.02 -.01 
Got pregnant (self or 
partner) 
 -0.91 2.02  20% 1%  -.06 -.07  -.05 -.04  -a -a  -a -a 
Entered a new relationship 
(lasting at least 1 month) 
 -1.08 2.02  63% 7%  .02 .03  .01 .02  .11 .10  .02 .02 
Death of a family member  -1.08 0.65  1% 62%  -a -a  -a -a  -.05 -.04  -.02 -.02 
Parents broke up or 
divorced 
 -1.08 0.31  2% 4%  .04 .07  .02 .03  .01 .01  .02 .02 
Got married  -1.24 2.02  27% 0%  -.07* -.08*  -.03 -.04  -a -a  -a -a 
 Note. N without control variables = 2,571 (narcissistic admiration) and 2,572 (Machiavellianism); N with control variables = 4,600. Results of 240 separate regression 
analyses that were performed within 240 different true individual change models (Figure 1): 2 (positively vs. negatively evaluated) × 2 (event dummies vs. continuous 
event scores) × 2 (without vs. with control variables) models for each of the 30 life events. In the models with control variables, we controlled for initial level of self-
esteem, gender, age, grade point average, figural and verbal reasoning, a dummy for whether the participant indicated having been born abroad, a dummy for whether the 
participant indicated that her/his parents had been born abroad, the education of the participants’ parents, a dummy that indicated whether a participant was studying. DV 
= dependent variable; dum = event dummies; cont = continuous event scores; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; β = standardized regression coefficient; cvs = 
control variables. 
a
 These events were experienced by less than 15 people and thus the results were not trustworthy. 
* p ≤ .05.  ** p ≤ .01.  *** p ≤ .001. 
 
  
 
Table 4.14 
Comparison of Results with and Without Control Variables: Socialization effects of 30 Life Events on Changes in Machiavellianism 
 
 Expert Rating  
Base rate 
(dum = 1) 
 Event positively evaluated  Event negatively evaluated 
  
Agency 
Comm 
-union 
 
positive negative 
 dum b  cont β  dum b  cont β 
Event    
w/o 
cvs 
with 
cvs 
 
w/o 
cvs 
with 
cvs 
 
w/o 
cvs 
with 
cvs 
 
w/o 
cvs 
with 
cvs 
Started a new job  1.67 -0.89  91% 7%  
-
.19** 
-
.20** 
 
-
.11** 
-
.12** 
 .07 .09  .06 .07 
Won an academic award or 
prize 
 1.67 -1.40  45% 1%  -.01 .01  .00 .02  -a -a  -a -a 
Got promoted at work  1.51 -0.89  41% 0%  .04 .05  .02 .04  -a -a  -a -a 
Began regular work after 
graduation 
 1.51 -0.38  51% 3%  -.02 -.01  -.03 -.02  .11 .16  .05 .06 
Increased working hours  1.34 -1.06  21% 44%  -.03 -.04  -.03 -.03  .06 .07  .08 .08 
Change in financial 
situation (much better or 
worse) 
 1.18 -0.89  84% 29%  -.04 -.03  -.03 -.03  .05 .07  .06 .06 
Quit a job / Lay-off  1.18 -0.38  5% 19%  -.13 -.10  -.06 -.06  .06 .05  .06 .05 
Changed major/stopped 
university 
studies/apprenticeship 
 1.02 -0.89  17% 4%  -.03 -.04  -.02 -.02  .17 .13  .07 .06 
Failed an important exam  0.86 -1.06  8% 29%  -.07 -.07  -.05 -.04  .00 -.01  .02 -.01 
Changed to another 
university/apprenticeship 
 0.86 -0.38  22% 3%  -.01 .00  .00 .01  -.02 -.06  .00 -.01 
Went abroad  0.38 -0.03  95% 2%  .04 .01  -.01 -.01  .11 .11  .06 .06 
Moved out of home  0.05 0.48  54% 4%  .00 .00  .00 .00  -.06 -.03  -.02 -.01 
Borrowed a large amount 
of money (more than 
€1,000) 
 0.05 -0.72  8% 15%  .04 .02  .02 .01  .00 -.02  .01 .00 
Own injury or illness  -0.27 -0.38  3% 54%  -.14 -.15  -.04 -.05  .03 .04  .05 .06 
Quit smoking  -0.27 -0.72  17% 1%  .07 .09  .07 .07  -a -a  -a -a 
Change in eating habits  -0.43 -0.89  34% 26%  .04 .05  .02 .03  .01 .03  -.01 .00 
    
(much more or less food 
intake) 
Convicted for a minor 
offence (fare dodging, 
speeding, etc.) 
 -0.59 -0.55  4% 24%  .20 .11  .05 .03  -.02 -.02  -.01 -.01 
Started psychotherapy  -0.59 0.48  13% 2%  .03 .04  -.01 -.01  
-
.22** 
-.17  
-
.07** 
-.05* 
Broke off a relationship 
with a boyfriend/girlfriend 
 -0.75 1.16  18% 48%  .00 .01  .01 .02  .08* .08*  .06 .08 
Illness or injury of a family 
member 
 -0.75 1.16  2% 77%  -.02 -.02  -.02 -.02  -.04 -.02  -.01 .01 
Illness or injury of a friend  -0.75 1.16  1% 45%  
  
 
  
 -.06 -.05  -.04 -.03 
Change in sleeping habits 
(much more or less sleep) 
 -0.75 -1.06  15% 39%  -.05 -.06  -.06 -.06  .00 .02  .03 .03 
Sexual problems  -0.91 0.14  1% 25%  -a -a  -a -a  .06 .06  .05 .05 
Death of a friend  -0.91 0.65  0% 16%  -a -a  -a -a  .07 .09  .03 .04 
Had an abortion (self or 
partner) 
 -0.91 0.31  0% 2%  -a -a  -a -a  .06 .07  .03 .03 
Got pregnant (self or 
partner) 
 -0.91 2.02  20% 1%  -.10* -.08*  -.06 -.04  -a -a  -a -a 
Entered a new relationship 
(lasting at least 1 month) 
 -1.08 2.02  63% 7%  .04 .04  .03 .04  .21* .20*  .09* .10* 
Death of a family member  -1.08 0.65  1% 62%  -a -a  -a -a  -.05 -.05  -.02 -.01 
Parents broke up or 
divorced 
 -1.08 0.31  2% 4%  -.10 -.07  -.01 .00  -.06 -.01  .01 .01 
Got married  -1.24 2.02  27% 0%  -.04 -.04  -.07* -.07  -a -a  -a -a 
 Note. N without control variables = 2,571 (narcissistic admiration) and 2,572 (Machiavellianism); N with control variables = 4,600. Results of 240 separate regression 
analyses that were performed within 240 different true individual change models (Figure 1): 2 (positively vs. negatively evaluated) × 2 (event dummies vs. continuous 
event scores) × 2 (without vs. with control variables) models for each of the 30 life events. In the models with control variables, we controlled for initial level of self-
esteem, gender, age, grade point average, figural and verbal reasoning, a dummy for whether the participant indicated having been born abroad, a dummy for whether the 
participant indicated that her/his parents had been born abroad, the education of the participants’ parents, a dummy that indicated whether a participant was studying. DV 
= dependent variable; dum = event dummies; cont = continuous event scores; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; β = standardized regression coefficient; cvs = 
control variables. 
a
 These events were experienced by less than 15 people and thus the results were not trustworthy. 
* p ≤ .05.  ** p ≤ .01.  *** p ≤ .001. 
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5. General Discussion 
5.1 Summary of Results 
With three studies, this dissertation investigated the assessment, dimensionality, and 
development of narcissism in early adulthood. Study 1 investigated the closeness to 
unidimensionality and measurement precision of responses to two established narcissism 
questionnaires, the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Hall, 1979) and the 
Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry Questionnaire (NARQ; Back, 2013). The subscales of the 
NARQ showed higher closeness to unidimensionality and measurement precision than the 
subscales of the NPI. But this was the case only when the NPI was administered with a pairwise 
forced-choice response format, not when the NPI was—like the NARQ—administered with a 
Likert-scale response format. 
Study 2 focused on the often-reported but recently questioned association between 
narcissism and overclaiming bias (i.e., the tendency to illegitimately claim knowledge). To 
clarify the narcissism-overclaiming link, we investigated how different dimensions and 
subdomain-specific forms of narcissism are related to overclaiming bias. The findings show that 
the various dimensions of narcissism and subdomain-specific forms of narcissism differ in their 
relationship to overclaiming bias. Most important for the dissertation, assertive narcissism (~ 
narcissistic admiration)—but not antagonistic narcissism (~ narcissistic rivalry) or vulnerable 
narcissism—was positively related to overclaiming bias. 
Study 3 investigated how narcissistic admiration and Machiavellianism (Mach) develop 
during early adulthood and how their development is related to environmental circumstances 
(i.e., university majors and life events). We analyzed the data of two cohorts from the 
longitudinal TOSCA study (N1 = 4,962 and N2 = 2,572). Mean levels of narcissistic admiration 
barely changed during early adulthood, whereas mean levels of Machiavellianism declined. 
Furthermore, although people high in Machiavellianism more frequently choose to major in 
economics, studying economics at university was not related to the development of Mach or 
narcissistic admiration. The occurrence of some life events was related to the development of the 
two traits. For example, we found that a positively evaluated change in eating or sleeping habits 
was accompanied by an increase in narcissistic admiration in early adulthood. 
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5.2 Theoretical Implications 
5.2.1 The Assessment and Dimensionality of Narcissism 
As outlined in the Introduction, the assessment and dimensionality of the narcissism 
construct has been hotly debated, and a solid consensus has yet to be reached. Recent studies 
have suggested that three dimensions underlie the construct: narcissistic admiration, narcissistic 
rivalry, and vulnerable narcissism (e.g., Back et al., 2013; Miller et al., 2016). Studies 1 and 2 
make several contributions to this debate.  
Study 1 mainly supports Back et al.’s (2013) assertion that the NARQ measures two and 
only two distinct dimensions of grandiose narcissism: narcissistic admiration and narcissistic 
rivalry. The two NARQ subscales showed high levels of closeness to unidimensionality and very 
high levels of measurement precision (Table 2.2). Furthermore, the two dimensions were not too 
highly correlated (all rs < .50; Chapter 2.6: Table 2.21), which supports the notion that 
narcissistic admiration and rivalry are distinct dimensions of grandiose narcissism.  
In contrast to our expectation that the NPI subscales would have poorer psychometric 
properties than the NARQ subscales,14 some NPI subscales (i.e., Leadership/Authority and 
Grandiose Exhibitionism of the NPI Likert-scale version; Ackerman et al., 2011) also showed 
high to very high levels of closeness to unidimensionality and measurement precision in Study 1. 
These results suggest that the NPI, or at least its Likert scale version, adequately measures more 
than one dimension of narcissism, notwithstanding the fact that the NPI was created to measure a 
unidimensional construct.  
Important for the dimensionality debate, the lack of overlap between the latent traits of 
the various NPI and NARQ subscales (all but one r ≤ .60; Chapter 2.6: Table 2.21) suggest that 
the NARQ and NPI items assess more than two dimensions. This finding is in contrast to at least 
one of two claims made by narcissism researchers: (a) grandiose narcissism consists of two 
                                                 
 
14 We expected the NPI subscales to show poorer psychometric properties than the NARQ subscales because the 
NPI was not developed with subscales in mind. It was developed as a unidimensional narcissism questionnaire 
(Raskin & Terry, 1988). Furthermore, previous studies on the NPI could not extract a robust factor structure (i.e., the 
factor structure was inconsistent across studies). Yet, the dimensionality issues (e.g., inconsistent factor structure) 
reported in the literature seem to be partly due to the forced-choice response format (for details, see Chapter 2.4; see 
also Ackerman, Donnellan, Roberts, & Fraley, 2015). 
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dimensions (Back et al., 2013), and (b) the NARQ and NPI both measure grandiose narcissism 
and grandiose narcissism only (e.g., Back et al., 2013; Miller et al., 2011)—some authors have 
suggested that the NPI also measures non-narcissistic qualities (e.g., Brown et al., 2009; 
Emmons, 1987). In other words, our results suggest either that grandiose narcissism consists of 
more than two dimensions or that some NPI or NARQ subscales/items measure something other 
than grandiose narcissism.  
In favor of the notion that some NPI subscales measure something other than grandiose 
narcissism, some authors have pointed out that characteristics such as leadership are not part of 
the DSM’s description of Narcissistic Personality Disorder (e.g., Brown et al., 2009; Emmons, 
1987; see also Pincus & Lukowitsky, 2010). Thus, one might question whether the NPI subscale 
Leadership/Authority, which showed very good psychometric properties when administered with 
a Likert-scale response format (Table 2.2), should be considered a dimension of grandiose 
narcissism.  
That said, Miller and Campbell (2011) argued that leadership should be part of narcissism 
because (a) the DSM is not the ultimate arbiter of a construct, (b) leadership was part of Freud’s 
and Reich’s narcissism constructs, and (c) the NPI leadership subscale is substantially correlated 
with the other NPI subscales (see also Emmons, 1987). Similarly, Miller and Campbell (2011) 
do not view it as problematic that some aspects of the NPI are negatively associated with 
characteristics of internalization (e.g., distress, neuroticism, loneliness, and depression; e.g., 
Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004). They argued that the problem that 
people high in grandiose narcissism have is not internalization but externalization: It is not they 
themselves who suffer but the people with whom they interact.  
I think the debate about whether the NPI does or does not capture all narcissistic 
characteristics reflects the differences in the conceptualizations of narcissism held by 
social/personality psychologists versus clinical psychologists (Ackerman et al., 2016; Miller & 
Campbell, 2008). According to Miller and Campbell (2008), social/personality psychologists 
refer to Freud’s definition of narcissism as a personality characterized by independence 
(“narcissistic libidinal type”; Freud, 1931/1955; Chapter 1.1.1), whereas clinicians tend to have 
Kernberg’s description of narcissism in mind instead (i.e., narcissism as a personality disorder 
similar to a borderline personality; Kernberg, 1970, 1974; Chapter 1.1.3; Chapter 1.2: Footnote 
1).  
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These differences in the conceptualizations of narcissism are in turn probably the 
consequence of differences in the participants and research foci of the two fields: 
Social/personality psychologists usually investigate narcissism in healthy undergraduate students 
and are mainly interested in the social consequences of narcissism (popularity, aggressive 
behavior, etc.). Clinical psychologists frequently study narcissism in patients who sought the 
help of a clinician because they suffered from internalization problems. 
Taken together, whereas many social/personality psychologists believe that all 
characteristics measured by the NPI are an integral part of grandiose narcissism, clinical 
psychologists tend to focus on the narcissism characteristics described in the DSM and thus 
argue that some characteristics assessed by the NPI are not narcissistic (e.g., leadership). If we 
accept that both the NPI and NARQ measure grandiose narcissism, the results of Study 1 
indicate that there are more dimensions of grandiose narcissism than the two proposed by Back 
et al. (2013) because the NPI subscales Leadership/Authority and Grandiose Exhibitionism 
showed decent psychometric properties and considerable nonoverlap with the two NARQ 
subscales (Tables 2.2 and 2.21). 
Study 2 has similar implications for the debate on the assessment and dimensionality of 
narcissism. In line with the proposed three-dimensional structure (narcissistic admiration, 
narcissistic rivalry, and vulnerable narcissism; Chapter 1.2.3), we extracted three (second-order) 
factors from the subscales of various narcissism questionnaires (Chapter 3.2.3: Figure 3.1). Also 
in line with the three-dimensional structure, the three second-order factors showed diverging 
associations with overclaiming bias (i.e., a form of self-enhancement). One of the three factors 
showed a positive correlation with overclaiming bias, whereas the other two factors were 
uncorrelated. 
In contrast to the three-dimensional structure, the fit of the second-order model we used 
to extract the three factors was moderate. The fit was poor when we used individual items as 
indicators (i.e., when we did not use internal consistency parceling). The moderate and poor fit, 
respectively, might indicate that the various subscales do not measure the same second-order 
factor or that the proposed structure is too simple. Furthermore, the fact that we needed to use a 
second-order factor model in the first place can be taken as evidence against the three-
dimensional structure. If only three dimensions explained most of the variance in the responses 
to the items from the various narcissism scales, we should have been able to fit a three-
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dimensional factor model without the need for second-order factors (i.e., all items would have 
loaded directly on one of the three factors). Thus, Study 2 also suggests that there are more than 
three dimensions of narcissism and that the proposed three-dimensional structure (narcissistic 
admiration, narcissistic rivalry, vulnerable narcissism) is too simple.  
In summary, both studies confirmed the two dimensions proposed by Back et al. (2013): 
narcissistic admiration (or assertive narcissism) and narcissistic rivalry (or antagonistic 
narcissism; see also Miller et al., 2016). Furthermore, Study 2 indicated that it is important to 
distinguish these two dimensions as well as vulnerable narcissism. That said, the studies also 
suggested that there are more than these three dimensions of narcissism in existence or at least 
that more than these three dimensions are captured by the established narcissism questionnaires 
that we used. 
5.2.2  The Development of Narcissism 
5.2.2.1 Mean-Level Changes 
In Study 3, the mean levels of narcissistic admiration did not change much during early 
adulthood. Although these results seem to contradict the cross-sectional studies that found 
negative correlations between the NPI total score and age (e.g., Foster, Campbell, & Twenge, 
2003; Hill & Roberts, 2012), the results are in line with two longitudinal studies on the 
development of grandiose narcissism in early adulthood (Carlson & Gjerde, 2009; Orth & 
Luciano, 2015). A difference between the cross-sectional and the longitudinal studies (including 
Study 3) is that the longitudinal studies focused on the first phase of early adulthood (ages 20 to 
30) whereas the cross-sectional studies covered the whole range of adulthood and even included 
elderly people. Thus, the cross-sectional studies might have found negative correlations between 
grandiose narcissism and age because grandiose narcissism tends to decrease after the period 
covered by the longitudinal studies (i.e., after the first phase of early adulthood). 
An alternative interpretation is that only narcissistic admiration remains unchanged 
between the ages of 20 and 30, and other aspects of grandiose narcissism that are measured by 
the NPI decrease during this phase. This interpretation contradicts the findings of the two 
longitudinal studies (Carlson & Gjerde, 2009; Orth & Luciano, 2015). But these two studies have 
several limitations (e.g., short time frame, use of the short version of the NPI or observer ratings 
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to estimate the NPI scores, small- to medium-sized samples). Thus, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that, in contrast to narcissistic admiration, the dimensions of grandiose narcissism that 
are measured by the NPI do decrease from age 20 to 30. 
The finding that grandiose narcissism, or at least narcissistic admiration, does not 
decrease from age 20 to 30 seems to challenge some theories and perceptions of adolescence and 
early adulthood. First, narcissism is often believed to peak in adolescence and decrease thereafter 
(e.g., Bleiberg, 1994; Hill & Roberts, 2011; Thomaes, Bushman, De Castro, & Stegge, 2009). 
Second, adolescents are perceived to score higher on characteristics related to narcissism (e.g., 
selfishness, stubbornness, risk-taking) than people from other age groups (Buchanan & 
Holmbeck, 1998). In the time frame we investigated (from age 20 to 30), we did not find such a 
decrease in narcissistic admiration. Perhaps other dimensions of grandiose narcissism decrease 
during that time period, and perhaps narcissistic admiration decreases between adolescence and 
age 20.  
The finding that narcissistic admiration does not decline during the first phase of early 
adulthood suggests that narcissistic admiration is adaptive or at least not maladaptive during the 
turbulent and challenging transition to adulthood. In line with this interpretation, Hill and 
Roberts (2011, 2012) argued that assertive aspects of narcissism (inflated sense of self, self-
focus, optimism) can help people handle the challenging transition to adulthood and to establish 
themselves in the workplace (see also Chapter 1.4.2). Hill and Roberts (2012) also found that the 
NPI subscales that were most strongly related to narcissistic admiration (Chapter 2.6: Table 2.21) 
were positively related to life satisfaction in young adults under the age of 25 but not in young 
adults older than 25. That said, even though the mean levels of narcissistic admiration did not 
decrease in Study 3, they also did not increase. Furthermore, narcissistic admiration predicted 
the subsequent occurrence of a number of negative life events (Table 4.2). Taken together, 
narcissistic admiration does not appear to be clearly maladaptive or clearly adaptive during the 
first phase of early adulthood (from age 20 to 30).  
Finally, the relatively stable mean levels found for narcissistic admiration stand in 
contrast to the large and robust mean-level changes reported for emotional stability, 
conscientiousness, social dominance (i.e., a facet of extraversion), and agreeableness between 
ages 20 and 30 (e.g., Roberts et al., 2006). Hence, Study 3 also underscores the distinction 
between narcissistic admiration and these Big Five personality traits. 
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5.2.2.2 Environmental Influences on the Development of Narcissism 
Research on the Big Five personality traits has repeatedly indicated that the environment 
is related to personality development during early adulthood (Chapter 1.4.1). Study 3 
investigated whether environmental circumstances are also related to the development of 
narcissism during early adulthood.  
The results of our analysis of the TOSCA data in Study 3 are somewhat ambiguous. On 
the one hand, we did not find the expected socialization effect of studying economics at 
university on changes in narcissistic admiration. And the agency and communion event scores 
were not related to changes in narcissistic admiration during early adulthood. On the other hand, 
several event scores for individual life events were significantly (p < .01) related to changes in 
narcissism. We cannot rule out the possibility that one or two of these effects were false 
positives. But the fact that four or five (depending on the scoring method) were significantly 
related to individual differences in changes in narcissism suggests that some life events indeed 
influence the development of narcissistic admiration in early adulthood.  
What kind of life events shape the development of narcissism in early adulthood? The 
five life events related to the development of narcissistic admiration were: a positively evaluated 
change in eating or sleeping habits, a positively evaluated end of a romantic relationship, a 
positively evaluated change to another university or apprenticeship, and a negatively evaluated 
failure of an important exam. All these events were positively related to changes in narcissistic 
admiration.  
Four of the five events (all except for the failure of an important exam) were positive 
long-lasting changes in the young adults’ lives. When a person regularly eats unhealthy food or 
does not sleep enough, then a change in eating or sleeping habits might lead to more health, well-
being, and a different sense of self in the long run. When a person is in a dysfunctional or 
unsatisfying relationship, the end of that relationship might provide relief and leave the person 
free to meet new long-term relationship partners or to have other meaningful experiences. When 
a person is unhappy at one university, the change to another university or apprenticeship might 
increase the person-environment fit permanently. These four events can be interpreted as 
important corrections to the life path, corrections that can shape how people view themselves and 
might bestow upon them a sense of narcissistic empowerment and assertiveness.  
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It is interesting that these four events seem to be actively chosen events rather than 
passively experienced events—even though we do not know, for example, who broke up with 
whom. Taking control of and determining one’s own life might lead to increases in narcissistic 
admiration. Perhaps one can even say, with reference to Kohut (1966, 1971), that these events 
are an expression of creativity and a playful way of dealing with life and one’s surroundings (see 
also Chapter 1.1.2). These creative acts, if positively experienced, might foster narcissistic drives 
and self-views.  
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5.3 Implications for Educational Research 
An important take-away message for educational research is that various dimensions of 
narcissism need to be distinguished. Distinguishing various dimensions seems warranted because 
ignoring the multidimensionality of a construct or questionnaire (e.g., using the NPI total score) 
can hamper the interpretation of the results in several ways. 
If the multidimensionality of a questionnaire is ignored (i.e., when the narcissism variable 
is either the total score of a multidimensional narcissism questionnaire or the latent variable with 
all questionnaire items as indicators), it remains unclear whether an association between the 
narcissism variable and another variable (e.g., a specific behavioral outcome) is driven by all or 
by only some dimensions. Some dimensions might not show the association found for the 
narcissism variable. For example, previous research that did not differentiate various dimensions 
of narcissism found that the NPI total score was related to overclaiming bias. Study 2 indicated 
that only assertive narcissism but not antagonistic or vulnerable narcissism was linked to 
overclaiming bias. Similarly, Ackerman et al. (2011) found a positive relationship between the 
NPI total score and self-esteem even though the Entitlement/Exploitativeness subscale of the NPI 
was not associated with self-esteem (for similar examples, see Brown et al., 2009; Exline, 
Baumeister, Bushman, Campbell, & Finkel, 2004; Zeigler-Hill & Besser, 2013).  
Perhaps even worse, educational researchers who ignore the multidimensionality of a 
narcissism questionnaire might not detect an existing association. This can happen if some of the 
underlying narcissism dimensions are positively associated with the variable of interest, whereas 
other dimensions are negatively associated with that variable. Briggs and Cheek (1986), for 
example, broke up the self-monitoring scale into three subscales and found that two subscales 
were negatively related to social anxiety, whereas one subscale was positively related to social 
anxiety. As the associations canceled each other out, the total scale score was neither positively 
nor negatively related to social anxiety. 
In structural equation modeling, ignoring the multidimensionality of narcissism 
questionnaires in the measurement models can bias parameter estimates (i.e., loadings that are 
too high, error estimates that are too low). Thus, observed associations among measured 
variables might be inaccurate (i.e., structural coefficient bias; Reise, Bonifay, et al., 2013; Reise, 
Scheines, Widaman, & Haviland, 2013). This issue seems particularly relevant for educational 
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researchers given that structural equation modeling is frequently used in large-scale educational 
studies. 
To decide whether a narcissism scale is “unidimensional enough” to prohibit severe 
biases in model parameters, educational researchers might want to calculate and inspect the 
explained common variance and the percentage of (un)contaminated correlations, as was done 
by Reise, Scheines, et al. (2013) or in Study 1. Alternative ways to check whether the data are 
unidimensional enough include inspecting model fit statistics (e.g., RMSEA, SRMR, and CFI) or 
calculating and inspecting the Dimensionality Evaluation to Enumerate Contributing Traits index 
(DETECT; e.g., Bonifay, Reise, Scheines, & Meijer, 2015; Kim, 1994; Zhang & Stout, 1999). 
That said, these two alternatives have been found to be less diagnostic of bias in parameter 
estimates than the explained common variance in combination with the percentage of 
(un)contaminated correlations (e.g., Bonifay et al., 2015; Reise, Scheines, et al., 2013). 
Even if the narcissism questionnaire that is used is “unidimensional enough,” it is 
important to know and to take into account which dimension of narcissism is measured by the 
questionnaire. If a researcher does not know which dimension is being assessed, the results 
cannot be interpreted appropriately and cannot be compared with studies that used other 
narcissism questionnaires. For example, if we had not validated the TOSCA narcissism items, we 
would not have known that the results of Study 3 are applicable only to narcissistic admiration. 
As a consequence, we would have interpreted the results of Study 3 differently. We might have 
assumed that the results were valid for narcissism in general even though some other dimensions 
of narcissism (e.g., narcissistic rivalry) might develop differently during early adulthood (see 
Chapter 1.4.2). 
Aside from dimensionality, an implication of the dissertation is that overclaiming bias 
might be less of an issue for the academic performance of people high in assertive narcissism (~ 
narcissistic admiration) than one might expect on the basis of previous research. Previous studies 
have often reported a medium-sized effect for the correlation between unspecific narcissism 
(e.g., NPI total score) and overclaiming bias (e.g., Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, & Lysy., 2003). I 
thought the correlation between unspecific narcissism and overclaiming bias was driven by 
assertive narcissism but not by the other dimensions (Chapter 1.3.1). Thus, I expected that the 
link between assertive narcissism (~ narcissistic admiration) and overclaiming bias might be 
even larger than a medium effect size. Furthermore, I expected this effect to be part of a negative 
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pathway from narcissistic admiration via overclaiming bias to academic performance (Chapter 
1.3.1: Figure 1.1) because Paulhus and Dubois (2014) reported that overclaiming bias is 
negatively related to academic performance. However, in Study 2, the correlation between 
assertive narcissism (~ narcissistic admiration) and overclaiming bias was relatively small (r = 
.11). Thus, the proposed negative pathway from narcissistic admiration via overclaiming bias to 
academic performance appears to be negligible. 
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5.4 Implications for Educational Practice 
Studying economics was not significantly related to the development of narcissistic 
admiration in Study 3, but two educational life events were: the negatively evaluated failure of 
an important exam and the positively evaluated change to another university or apprenticeship. 
Given that the two life-event effects were exploratory, it is too early to draw any strong 
conclusions about how educational events influence the development of narcissistic admiration. 
If the socialization effect of failing an important exam on narcissistic admiration were to 
be confirmed in future research, this might be problematic because the higher levels of 
narcissistic admiration (e.g., grandiose self-views and assertiveness) seem to be defensive, 
compensatory, and inflated and thus potentially psychologically unhealthy (e.g., Kernberg, 1970, 
1974; Pulver, 1970). Teachers and educators might want to prevent such an unhealthy reaction 
by giving students emotional support when teachers communicate the results of important 
exams. Furthermore, teachers might want to track students’ reactions to exam failures and 
consider asking for psychological support if the teachers detect that a student is reacting in a 
potentially unhealthy way. 
If the effect of the positively evaluated change to another university or apprenticeship 
were to be confirmed in future research, I do not think this finding would have implications for 
educational practice. I think the increase in narcissistic admiration after a positive change is not 
problematic. Increases in assertiveness, grandiose self-views, and focus on the self might be 
normal after a positive change in one’s learning environment.  
Previous research has suggested that narcissistic rivalry and vulnerable narcissism are 
maladaptive in most educational situations (Chapter 1.3). Thus, educational interventions might 
want to target these two dimensions of narcissism. Unfortunately, these two dimensions of 
narcissism were not assessed in the TOSCA study. Therefore, I cannot draw inferences from 
Study 3 about which environments might lead to decreases in narcissistic rivalry or vulnerable 
narcissism.  
Generally, more research is needed before we can arrive at well-founded implications and 
recommendations for educational practice. 
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5.5 Strengths and Limitations 
The transparency, reproducibility,15 and replicability of psychological studies has often 
been questioned throughout the history of psychological research, especially recently (e.g., De 
Groot, 1956/2014; Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). 
Most prominently, in a 2015 Science article, a group of 270 researchers attempted to replicate 
100 effects reported in three flagship journals in the field of psychology (Open Science 
Collaboration, 2015). The authors of the Science paper deemed that only 39% of the attempted 
100 replications were successful. This and other recent studies (e.g., Ebersole et al., 2016) 
suggest that there is room to improve the transparency, reproducibility, and replicability of 
psychological studies. 
A discussion of all the potential reasons for lack of transparency, reproducibility, and 
replicability and the steps needed to increase transparency, reproducibility, and replicability 
would go beyond the scope of this dissertation (for reviews, see e.g., Asendorpf et al. 2013; 
Munafò et al., 2017). Here, I just want to explain the steps taken in the three studies of this 
dissertation to increase transparency, reproducibility, and replicability.  
1. In Studies 2 and 3, we pre-registered the hypotheses. Pre-registrations make the 
distinction between exploratory and confirmatory findings more transparent, and thus 
pre-registrations make p-values more interpretable (e.g., De Groot, 1956/2014; 
Moore, 2016; Wicherts et al., 2016). Pre-registrations should furthermore be able to 
increase replicability by preventing hindsight bias, hypothesizing after results are 
known (HARKING) by authors, and critiquing after the results are known 
(CARKING) by reviewers (e.g., Kerr, 1998; Munafò et al., 2017). Because pre-
registering a study usually involves the commitment to make the results public, pre-
registrations should also reduce selective reporting (i.e., the problem that many 
nonsignificant or unspectacular findings are not published, also called the “file drawer 
problem”; e.g., Rosenthal, 1979; Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2013). 
                                                 
 
15 Here, reproducibility refers to the ability to reproduce the results of a study with the original data. 
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2. For all three studies, we made use of the Open Science Framework to share the R 
Code, Output Files, other supplemental materials, and—when possible—the data.16 
Sharing all these materials and documents increases the transparency and 
reproducibility of studies (e.g., Sijtsma, 2016). 
3. Across the three studies, we used large samples to test our research questions and 
hypotheses. The median sample size was 1,682 (including the three validation studies 
for the TOSCA items) and 2,260.5 (excluding the validation studies for the TOSCA 
items). Holding all else constant, the larger the sample size, the smaller the Type I 
(false positives) and Type II (false negatives) error rates. Thus, the larger the samples, 
the higher the replicability. 
4. Two of the three studies (i.e., Studies 1 and 3) were co-authored by methodologists 
who had no personal investment in the research topic (Norman Rose and Wilco H.M. 
Emons). Munafò et al. (2017) have argued that including independent methodologists 
not only increases the quality of the statistical methods applied but also reduces 
confirmation bias (i.e., the tendency to focus on evidence that is in line with 
researchers’ expectations or favored explanation; for a similar argument see, Sijtsma, 
2016). Thus, including independent methodologists should make the findings more 
replicable. 
Some of the steps we took (i.e., pre-registrations and sharing materials in the Open 
Science Framework) have hardly ever been implemented until recently. Thus, time-proven 
guidelines to implement these measures have yet to be established (for new guidelines on pre-
registrations, see e.g., Wicherts et al., 2016). This lack of guidelines and experience led to some 
challenges during the implementation and limitations of the implementation. The use of pre-
registrations is a good case in point. The Study 2 pre-registration and especially the Study 3 pre-
registration should have included more details about the plan for data analysis and the exclusion 
criteria (Wicherts et al., 2016). For example, in Study 2, we did not specify in advance that we 
would recode responses as missing when participants answered with the lowest answer category 
on 45 items or more in a row. To be truly confirmatory research, all these criteria and decisions 
                                                 
 
16 Only the data from Studies 1 and 2 were shared because we did not have the consent of participants to 
share the data from Study 3. 
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would need to be pre-registered. Overall, the steps we took have nevertheless fulfilled their 
purpose and increased the transparency, reproducibility, and replicability of the studies. 
A further strong suit of the studies is their use of advanced statistical procedures to model 
latent traits. In his seminal article on the limited usefulness of Cronbach’s alpha, Sijtsma (2009) 
pointed out that there is a gap between psychology and psychometrics:  
[…] after the 1950s, psychometrics has developed to become more mathematically and 
statistically oriented while psychologists primarily have remained psychologists. One can 
argue whether psychologists should become better statisticians or whether 
psychometricians should become better psychologists (Borsboom, 2006), but it is a fact 
that the two worlds have drifted apart more than anyone should wish. (p. 115) 
 
Throughout this dissertation, it was my aim to narrow this gap between psychology and 
psychometrics by applying advanced psychometric methods: latent trait modeling via structural 
equation modeling, item response theory, minimum rank factor analysis, and so forth. Although 
mastering these methods was time-intensive and challenging, I believe the dissertation and the 
validity of the results have benefited a great deal from the effort. 
One limitation of the dissertation is its predominant reliance on self-report instruments 
(but see also the use of the overclaiming questionnaire in Study 2). That said, self-report 
questionnaires are the most widely used and validated method for assessing personality traits 
such as narcissism or the Big Five, and the dimensionality and development of these traits is 
usually investigated with self-report data. 
Finally, the samples for Study 1 were from Western countries (USA, Germany) and the 
samples for Studies 2 and 3 were all from Germany. Thus, we do not know the extent to which 
the results of the three studies are valid for other, especially non-Western, countries and cultures. 
213 
 
5.6 Directions for Future Research 
5.6.1 The Dimensionality of Narcissism 
The field of narcissism research seems to be cursed by uncertainty about the 
dimensionality of narcissism. The current dissertation is no exception. Although the proposed 
three-dimensional structure (narcissistic admiration, narcissistic rivalry, vulnerable narcissism; 
Chapter 1.2) was confirmed in part by the dissertation, several findings of the dissertation have 
suggested that narcissism consists of more than three dimensions.  
One way forward is to abandon simple two- or three-dimensional models of narcissism 
and accept that narcissism consists of more than two or three dimensions. Narcissism researchers 
would then conduct research with all narcissism subscales that are able to show a good 
approximation to unidimensionality and that do not overlap with other subscales (i.e., latent 
correlations below .75 with all other subscales). However, this solution comes with some 
practical challenges. There are many narcissism questionnaires, and most of them contain several 
(nonoverlapping) subscales (see e.g., Chapter 2.6: Table 2.21). As examples, the most 
established narcissism questionnaires are: the NPI (at least 2 subscales; Raskin & Hall, 1979), 
NARQ (2 subscales; Back et al., 2013), Pathological Narcissism Inventory (7 subscales; Pincus 
et al., 2009), Psychological Entitlement Scale (no subscales; Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, 
& Bushman, 2004). Due to space and time limitations, many researchers might use only some of 
these subscales. And because there is no agreement about which of the narcissism subscales 
narcissism researchers should focus on, the consequence would probably be a lack of 
comparability across narcissism studies—and such a lack of comparability already exists in the 
narcissism literature. Furthermore, assessing and reporting many dimensions might hamper the 
clarity and comprehensibility of the results, incurring the danger that readers might be confused. 
It is easier to comprehend, communicate, and discuss results involving a small number of 
dimensions (e.g., narcissistic admiration and rivalry) than those that involve six or more 
dimensions. 
Another way forward that might be able to overcome these practical challenges would be 
to agree on two, three, or four second-order factors (i.e., broad narcissism traits). These second-
order factors would each subsume, similar to the Big Five, a number of highly related 
  GENERAL DISCUSSION 214 
   
dimensions or facets. If we follow this argument, narcissism researchers could, for example, 
agree on the three second-order factors proposed in Study 2 (i.e., assertive, antagonistic, and 
vulnerable narcissism) and subsume the various subscales of established narcissism 
questionnaires under these three second-order factors (Chapter 3.2.3: Figure 3.1; for a different 
second-order structure, see Krizan & Herlache, 2017).  
That said, the number and nature of the second-order factors would need to be further 
investigated and agreed on. Narcissism researchers could decide on the number and nature of the 
second-order factors on the basis of (a) theories about narcissism (e.g., Back et al., 2013) as we 
did in Study 2, (b) results of an exploratory factor analysis on a variety of subscales (e.g., Miller 
et al., 2016), or (c) expert ratings (i.e., clinical and social/personality psychologists) of features 
that are central to the narcissism concept (Ackerman et al., 2016). These three ways to decide on 
the number and nature of (broad) narcissistic traits were combined by Krizan and Herlache 
(2017). They proposed the Spectrum Model of Narcissism on the basis of (a) psychoanalytical 
conceptualizations of narcissism, (b) a factor analysis of the total scores from 26 narcissism 
subscales—which is comparable to extracting second-order factors from the item scores—, and 
(c) expert ratings of narcissistic features as reported by Ackerman et al. (2016). The Spectrum 
Model of Narcissism is a three-dimensional model of narcissism with a dimension called 
Grandiosity—which is very similar to narcissistic admiration or assertive narcissism—and a 
dimension called Vulnerability—which is very similar to vulnerable narcissism. In contrast to 
the model proposed in Study 2 and the model proposed by Miller et al. (2016), the third 
dimension of the Spectrum Model is entitlement rather than narcissistic rivalry or antagonistic 
narcissism.17 Similar to the model in Study 2, the three-dimensional model proposed by Krizan 
and Herlache (2017) did not fit the data very well. Therefore, given the poor fit and the 
divergence between some of the proposed second-order factors, I can see there being four 
second-order factors: assertive narcissism, antagonistic narcissism, vulnerable narcissism, and 
                                                 
 
17 Entitlement seems to be distinct from antagonistic narcissism. Entitlement is characterized by 
Ackerman et al. 2016) as the “belief that one has a right to some positive valued resource or outcome; 
however, such beliefs are not typically based on realistic appraisals, exceed what is due, and may never 
be satisfied”. Antagonistic narcissism (narcissistic rivalry) rather emphasizes the tendency to devaluate 
others, to be aggressive, and the strive to be superior. That said, future studies research might want to 
investigate the equivalence of the three-dimensional model put forward by Krizan & Herlach (2017) and 
the three dimensional model put forward in the Study 2 and the one proposed by Miller et al. (2016): It 
needs to be tested how strongly antagonistic narcissism and entitlement overlap. 
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entitlement. Future research needs to test whether extracting four instead of three second-order 
factors fits the data better. 
After an agreement on the number and nature of the second-order factors is achieved, 
items would need to be developed to assess the second-order factors directly. When researchers 
assess a Big Five trait, say extraversion, they do not assess every facet of extraversion with 
several items and extract a second-order factor from the item scores. Similarly, when assessing, 
for example, assertive narcissism, it would not be economical to assess all subscales or facets of 
assertive narcissism with several items (e.g., NARQ Narcissistic Admiration with 9 items, NPI 
Leadership/Authority with 11 items). Thus, narcissism researchers need to develop 
questionnaires that can assess the second-order factors directly. This could be done by 
identifying existing narcissism items that are strongly associated with the second-order factors; 
or it could by done by running a factor analysis on the narcissism items from all established 
narcissism questionnaires, extracting three or four factors, and then identifying which items show 
the strongest loadings on each factor. 
Finally, there is a need for research to investigate the extent to which the various 
dimensions of narcissism overlap with the Big Five facets. Previous research has investigated the 
extent to which unspecific narcissism overlaps with the Big Five facets (Glover et al., 2012; 
O’Boyle, Forsyth, Banks, Story, & White, 2014) and the extent to which various dimensions of 
narcissism overlap with the Big Five traits (e.g., Back et al., 2013; Miller et al., 2017). However, 
not much research has investigated how the various dimensions of narcissism overlap with the 
various Big Five facets. It is important to know whether any dimension of narcissism overlaps 
considerably with one Big Five facet. This would make narcissism and Big Five research more 
comparable because dimensions of narcissism that overlap with Big Five facets could be located 
in the Big Five taxonomy. It would prevent different research teams from working on the same 
phenomenon under different labels. 
5.6.2 The Development of Narcissism 
The exploratory findings of Study 3 need to be confirmed before drawing any strong 
conclusions. In particular, the socialization effects of the five life events need to be confirmed. 
These life-event effects were tested in only one sample, and a considerable proportion of the 
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participants had missing values on the life-event variables. Thus, they need to be confirmed with 
fresh data.  
If these effects are found to replicate, it would be instrumental to investigate why these 
life events are related to changes in narcissistic admiration. To explore the mechanisms that 
underlie these effects, researchers could conduct experiments or longitudinal studies that contain 
more questions about the influential life events. An experimental investigation might not be 
feasible for some of the life events for ethical and technical reasons (e.g., failing an important 
exam or experiencing the end of a romantic relationship). However, some of the events could be 
experimentally manipulated. For example, young adults could be randomly assigned to one of 
two conditions: (a) a condition in which they are encouraged to positively change their eating 
habits or (b) a condition in which no encouragement for a change in eating habits is provided. 
Designs such as this would allow causal interpretations of the results and could clarify the 
processes involved. Researchers could also investigate what drives the relationship between a 
life event and changes in narcissistic admiration by longitudinal studies with more questions 
about the events. For example, questions about the new university/apprenticeship could reveal 
why a change to another university/apprenticeship is associated with increases in narcissistic 
admiration: Does a better fit of people’s abilities to the educational demands of their new 
university/apprentiship lead to an increase in narcissistic admiration? Or, is the relationship 
driven by a better fit to the social environment? In my opinion, such experiments and 
longitudinal studies have the potential to shed light on the underlying processes. 
Future research might also investigate how contexts and events not considered in Study 3 
influence the development of narcissism. The study by Jackson et al. (2012) suggested that 
military training influences the development of agreeableness in early adulthood. Lüdtke et al. 
(2011) reported that whether a person studies at university after high school or not influences the 
development of the Big Five during early adulthood. Future studies might want to test whether 
military training, studying at university, or other environments influence the development of 
narcissistic admiration. 
Moreover, longitudinal studies on dimensions of narcissism other than narcissistic 
admiration (assertive narcissism) are needed. The few longitudinal studies on the subject have 
either focused on narcissistic admiration (Study 3) or did not differentiate various dimensions of 
narcissism (Carlson & Gjerde, 2009; Orth & Luciano, 2015). Due to this lack of longitudinal 
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research on other dimensions of narcissism, many questions are still open. For example, how do 
mean levels of narcissistic rivalry and vulnerable narcissism develop during early adulthood? Do 
they decrease because these other dimensions are maladaptive in early adulthood? A decrease in 
the less adaptive aspects of narcissism during early adulthood is expected on the basis of the 
logic of the maturity principle (e.g., Roberts, Wood, & Caspi, 2008) and neo-socioanalytic 
theory (Roberts & Wood, 2006; see also, Bleidorn et al., 2013; Hogan & Roberts, 2004): Age-
related transitions and social and occupational roles should lead to an increasing number of 
commitments and expectations. These commitments and expectations should in turn lead not 
only to increases in conscientiousness, emotional stability, and agreeableness but also to 
decreases in (maladaptive) narcissistic tendencies such as narcissistic rivalry and vulnerable 
narcissism (e.g., Hill & Roberts, 2011; Roberts, Edmonds, & Grijalva, 2010). That said, we need 
empirical evidence to clarify the answers to these questions, especially because these other 
dimensions of narcissism most likely have more negative consequences than narcissistic 
admiration (see Chapter 1.3).  
Finally, future studies are needed to investigate the factors that influence the development 
of narcissism before and after the period from age 20 to 30. Recently, there have been some 
studies on the origins and development of narcissism in children (e.g., Brummelman et al., 
2015). However, these studies did not cover broad samples and time lags. Furthermore, they did 
not differentiate various dimensions of narcissism. Related to the lack of extensive longitudinal 
studies in childhood is the need for a well-validated narcissism questionnaire for children and 
adolescents that assesses more than one dimension of narcissism, preferably dimensions that are 
also found in adulthood.  
Taken together, the existing studies (including Study 3) are only the first steps in 
investigating the development of narcissism and how the environment influences its 
development. A diverse variety of additional longitudinal (and experimental) studies would be 
desirable. 
5.6.3 Narcissism and Educational Research 
As already pointed out in the Introduction (Chapter 1.3), more research on the 
consequences of the various dimensions of narcissism is needed. Previous research suggests that 
the three dimensions of narcissism have a number of consequences in educational contexts: from 
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self-enhancement, to academic motivation and academic performance, to social behavior in the 
classroom and group settings. These consequences have mainly been investigated by social and 
personality researchers who have used laboratory settings or online studies with the exception of 
many studies on narcissism and bullying (see Chapter 1.3.4). Thus, educational researchers 
might want to test the consequences of the various dimensions of narcissism in classroom 
settings and their influence on key educational outcomes. 
219 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
The current dissertation makes several contributions to the understanding of how 
narcissism develops in early adulthood. First, Studies 1 and 2 buttressed the notion that 
narcissism is not a unidimensional construct. Thus, longitudinal research is needed to distinguish 
various dimensions or kinds of narcissism. Second, Studies 1 and 2 indicated that more than 
three dimensions underlie the construct of narcissism. Until an agreement on the exact 
dimensionality of narcissism is achieved, developmental research might want to focus on the 
subscales of the most established questionnaires for measuring narcissism (i.e., the NPI, NARQ, 
Pathological Narcissism Inventory, and Psychological Entitlement Scale). Third, Study 3 
indicated that mean levels of narcissistic admiration (i.e., a dimension of narcissism) remained 
relatively stable from age 20 to 30. Fourth, and finally, several life events were found to be 
related to individual differences in the development of narcissistic admiration over an 8-year 
time period. These findings suggest that some life events have a profound and long-lasting effect 
on the development of (at least some) narcissistic personality traits. 
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